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Th e Ci v i l  Wa r remains the central moment of American history. The ordeal by fire kept the Union together at the cost of some 630,000 
deaths by bullets, disease, exposure, and the horrid conditions in both United 
States and Confederate prisoner of war camps. It was not merely Amer i ca’s 
bloodiest war, but as bloody as all other American wars combined. Wounded 
and maimed veterans came home bearing the outward scars of  battle and 
carry ing inner scars.
Our memory of the Civil War is mostly about warfare and  battles, the 
carnage made glorious and meaningful by emancipation. Certainly the cen-
tral meaning of the war is national unity and national freedom, followed by 
a critical (although incomplete) restructuring of the Constitution and the na-
ture of the national government. But as the essays in this volume show, the 
war changed the nation in other ways as well. Indeed, beyond emancipa-
tion and the constitutional changes of the Thirteenth,  Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth amendments, the war permanently altered the American nation. The 
war forced Congress to expand the size of the government beyond anything 
imaginable before 1861. At the same time, the absence of senators and rep-
resentatives from most of the slave states enabled Congress to pass legisla-
tion that allowed for internal improvements, expanded foreign policy 
initiatives, stimulated western settlement, and supported the general welfare 
of the nation. Southerners had blocked such laws, arguing that they helped 
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the North and the  free states, threatened slavery, harmed the South, or 
overly expanded the national government.
The war effort fundamentally and permanently changed the nation in 
many ways. About two million Northern men served in the United States 
Army and Navy during the war.1  These men constituted about 10  percent 
of the entire population of the North. The absence of so many men natu-
rally affected day- to- day life, as did the more than 300,000 Northern men 
who died while in the military. Recruitment of troops also affected the home 
front, the nation, and the  future of the nation. Initially the United States 
Army was made up of members of state militias, who  were mobilized at the 
very beginning of the war,  after a proclamation from President Lincoln.2 
 After the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln called for 75,000 
troops, thinking this would be sufficient to suppress the rebellion. But the 
war lasted longer and was more costly than anyone could imagine. By mid-
1862 the United States had suffered more than 75,000 casualties (killed, 
wounded, captured, or missing). In the Militia Act of 1862, Congress opened 
military ser vice to African American men,3 reversing seven de cades of dis-
crimination and ultimately paving the way for black suffrage on the same 
basis as whites. Its immediate consequence was to alter Northern society, 
especially in black communities, as tens of thousands of African American 
men enlisted.
The recruitment and movement of troops affected daily life in many 
places. As Guy Gugliotta notes, “Housing in war time Washington was at a 
premium.” Living conditions  were crowded and stressful. “Civility” had all 
but dis appeared as  people “routinely dumped garbage in the vacant lot[s]” 
and unruly  children threw rocks at win dows. The nation’s capital was filled 
with civil servants, politicians, contractors, fugitive slaves, tens of thousands 
of soldiers, and all manner of other  people. In the summer of 1862 Congress 
ended slavery in the District of Columbia, which dramatically altered 
1At least 300,000 Union ser vicemen  were Southerners, including about 150,000 former 
slaves.
2Abraham Lincoln, “Proclamation Calling Militia and Convening Congress (Apr. 15, 
1861),” in Roy P. Basler ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, 
N.J., 1953–55), 4:331.
3“Act to Amend the Act Calling Forth the Militia to Execute the Laws of the Union, 
Suppress Insurrections, and Repel Invasions, Approved February Twenty- Eight, 
Seventeen Hundred and Ninety- Five, and Acts Amendatory Thereof, and for Other 
Purposes [Militia Act of 1862],” Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 597 (1863).
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social life in the capital.4 Congress  later provided civil rights protections for 
former slaves and began to provide them with schools and other benefits of 
freedom.5
In March 1863 Congress more dramatically altered American culture 
and society by establishing the nation’s first system of military conscription.6 
This law gave vast powers to the national government. Ironically, the se-
cessionists claimed that a power ful national government threatened their 
way of life and states’ rights, but their acts of secession and treason facili-
tated and necessitated the enhancement of national power. Even more ironic, 
the Confederacy had implemented conscription in April 1862, thus for more 
than a year the Confederate government had more power than the United 
States government.7 Conscription was a major change in American policy 
and national culture. Military ser vice was no longer tied to patriotism and 
a desire to serve the nation. It was now becoming mandatory. In her essay 
“Conscription and the Consolidation of Federal Power during the Civil 
War,” Jennifer L. Weber outlines the mechanics of conscription, noting that 
the law “resulted in a tectonic shift in the relationship between federal and 
state governments and between the nation and its  people.” Indeed, much of 
this book tracks this theme, as we see the exigencies of war giving Congress 
powers it never would have  imagined using before the war.
Similarly, the sheer magnitude of the war— the expense in blood and 
treasure— forced other changes. The war effort required a vast industrial 
expansion— the war transformed the nation from one that was overwhelm-
ingly agricultural to one that was increasingly industrial. While  there  were 
factories and some industry in the North before 1861, the war was the en-
gine that truly brought the Industrial Revolution to the United States. In 
4“An Act for the Release of Certain Persons Held to Ser vice or  Labor in the District of 
Columbia,” Act of Apr. 16, 1862, 12 Stat. 376 (1863). See Kate Masur, An Example for All the 
Land: Emancipation and the Strug gle over Equality in Washington, D.C. (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2010).
5See Paul Finkelman, “The Summer of ’62: Congress, Slavery, and a Revolution in 
Federal Law,” in Paul Finkelman and Donald R. Kennon, eds., Congress and the  People’s  
Contest: The Conduct of the Civil War (Athens, Ohio, 2017).
6“An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces, and for Other Purposes 
[The Enrollment Act],” Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 731 (1863).
7Act of Apr. 16, 1862, Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of 
Amer i ca, 1st sess., chap. 31, pp. 29–32; William Alan Blair,  Virginia’s Private War: Feeding Body 
and Soul in the Confederacy, 1861–1865 (New York, 1998). See also Susanna Michele Lee, 
“Twenty- Slave Law,” in  Virginia Foundation for the Humanities, Encyclopedia  Virginia, 
May 31, 2012, http:// www . EncyclopediaVirginia . org / Twenty - Slave _ Law.
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addition to the obvious expansion of the production of military hardware, 
the nation had to produce vast quantities of preserved and canned food, 
boots, uniforms, bugles, drums,  saddles and reins, and other equipment and 
accoutrements. Nonmilitary industrial production that was used for the war 
effort, such as rails for train tracks, engines for trains, and wire for telegraph 
lines, further changed and modernized the nation by creating new jobs, new 
factories, investments, and profits.
Similarly, the war cost money. Paying for the war was enormously com-
plicated, as Jenny Bourne shows in “To Slip the Surly Bonds of States’ Rights 
and Form a More Perfect (Financial) Union: One Legacy of the Thirty- 
Seventh Congress.” Among other  things, the war led Congress to pass the 
nation’s first income tax and to print paper money for the first time since 
the Revolution. As Bourne notes: “Congress resorted to innovative schemes, 
including the first- ever income tax, widespread use of fiat money issued via 
newly created national banks, massive amounts of government borrowing, 
and debt sold directly to the public.” The war allowed Congress to remake 
the national economy, in part  because of necessity. Secession also made it 
pos si ble. With the demise of the Bank of the United States in the 1830s, op-
position to national economic policy— and even a national currency— had 
been a mantra of the Demo cratic Party, which usually controlled Congress 
and the White House in this period.8 But with the absence of Southern states’ 
rights legislators and the resulting huge Republican majority in Congress, 
nationalizing economic legislation was pos si ble. The nation now had paper 
currency— greenbacks— that was backed not by gold or silver but by only 
the full faith and credit of the United States.  Today we take such currency 
for granted, as we spend and receive Federal Reserve notes. But in 1862 and 
1863 the laws creating this currency— the  Legal Tender Acts— were 
revolutionary,9 and we still live  under the currency regime they helped create. 
8The only exception to control of the White House was the four years of the Taylor– 
Fillmore presidencies (1849–53) and the first month of William Henry Harrison’s 
presidency in 1841. Harrison’s successor, John Tyler, was a states’ rights slaveholder from 
 Virginia and a lifelong Demo crat who generally opposed Whig economic policies.
9“An Act to Authorize the Issue of United States Notes, for the Redemption or Funding 
Thereof, and for Funding the Floating Debt of the United States [First  Legal Tender 
Act],” Act of Feb. 25, 1862, 12 Stat. 345 (1863); “An Act to Authorize an Additional Issue of 
United States Notes, and for Other Purpose,” Act of July 11, 1862, 12 Stat. 532 (1863); and 
“An Act to Provide Ways and Means for Support of the Government,” Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 
12 Stat. 709 (1863).
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In 1862 Congress created the Internal Revenue Ser vice, and of course 
we live  under that regime as well.10 We live  under a tax system created by 
the war.
The military’s insatiable appetite for manpower, the use of greenbacks 
as a national currency, and the general expansion of the federal government 
in Washington led to another dramatic change in national culture: the em-
ployment of  women. The diversion of more than two million men into the 
military forced Americans to rethink gender roles, and pointed the way 
 toward a postwar world where  women would be working outside their homes 
as never before. All of the war production affected the  labor market and who 
worked. For the first time in American history the federal government hired 
 women in large numbers, as Daniel W. Stowell explains in “Abraham Lin-
coln and ‘Government Girls’ in War time Washington.” The “employment 
of female clerical workers in the federal government dates to the fall of 1861, 
when Francis E. Spinner, trea surer of the United States, began to employ 
 women to cut and count trea sury notes.” As Stowell tells us, Spinner was 
appalled to find healthy young men cutting newly printed sheets of currency 
into individual bills. Spinner believed “ these young men should have mus-
kets instead of shears placed in their hands,” and with  these men fighting 
the Confederates, Spinner would hire  women (at lower wages) to do what, 
to nineteenth- century men, appeared to be  women’s work— cutting  things 
with shears.  After the war, the nation realized that this single move led to a 
permanent change in the American  labor market.  Women could now be em-
ployed as clerks for the government. Paid less than men,  women neverthe-
less realized that wielding scissors and working for the Trea sury Department 
put food on their  tables, allowed them to make an impor tant and meaning-
ful contribution to the war effort, and put more soldiers in the field to de-
feat the Southern traitors. It also set the stage for a far greater expansion of 
 women workers  after the war.
Legislation passed during the war for nonmilitary purposes promised to 
further alter Northern society. During the war, Congress passed a plethora 
of laws that reshaped the nation but had nothing to do with the military.11 
10“An Act to Provide Internal Revenue to Support the Government and to Pay Interest 
on the Public Debt,” Act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 432 (1863).
11See Finkelman, “The Summer of ’62.”
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Thus, Congress created the Department of Agriculture,12 passed the Home-
stead Act,13 upgraded public education in the District of Columbia,14 and 
passed laws for the creation of the transcontinental railroad15 and land- grant 
colleges.16
While the war slowed down Amer i ca’s relentless westward expansion, it 
also stimulated it. The Pacific Railroad Act promised that  those who moved 
west would be increasingly less isolated from their families and friends in 
the East, and the goods they grew, raised, mined, and produced would be 
more likely to reach favorable markets. The Land- Grant College Act, as 
 Peter Wallenstein explains, also tied the East to the West during the war. By 
allocating western lands to provide money for eastern (and in the  future, 
western) public colleges, the law gave easterners a reason to support west-
ern settlement. The new colleges would benefit the  whole nation.
The West had of course always been a place of warfare. Before the Civil 
War the main occupation of the army had been to threaten or fight Indi-
ans, to force them to move farther west, and sometimes to protect them 
(however briefly) from overreaching white settlers. With the Civil War rag-
ing, the government had fewer resources to support a frontier army and less 
need. Thus, during the war, the United States was certainly not pushing 
for western migration or an aggressive policy  toward Indians. But, as my 
own chapter on the Dakota War in Minnesota shows, white- Indian rela-
tions did not come to a standstill during the Civil War. The brief war ended 
in defeat for the Dakota and a forced migration out of Minnesota.  After 
the war the military sought to execute more than 300 Dakota soldiers in a 
12“An Act to Establish a Department of Agriculture,” Act of May 15, 1862, 12 Stat. 387 
(1863).
13“An Act to Secure Homesteads to  Actual Settlers on the Public Domain [The 
Homestead Act],” Act of May 20, 1862, 12 Stat. 392 (1863).
14“An Act to Provide for the Public Instruction of Youth in Primary Schools 
throughout the County of Washington, in the District of Columbia, without the Limits of 
the Cities of Washington and Georgetown,” Act of May 20, 1862, 12 Stat. 394 (1863). It is 
worth noting that only North Carolina had even a rudimentary system of public schools in 
the South.
15“An Act to Aid in the Construction of a Railroad and Telegraph Line from the 
Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean, and to Secure to the Government the Use of the 
Same for Postal, Military, and Other Purposes [The Pacific Railroad Act],” Act of July 1, 
1862, 12 Stat. 489 (1863).
16“An Act Donating Public Lands to the Several States and Territories Which May 
Provide Colleges for the Benefit of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts [The Morrill Land- 
Grant College Act],” Act of July 2, 1862, 12 Stat. 503 (1863).
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grotesque attempt at racist vengeance. Lincoln commuted (and effectively 
pardoned) 87  percent of  those sentenced to die, just as he reprieved count-
less soldiers sentenced to the firing squad for failing to stay awake on guard 
duty, succumbing to their fears in  battle, or believing, in an almost pre-
modern view of military ser vice, that they needed to return home for the 
funeral of a parent. The Dakota War was a reminder, in the  middle of the 
War for the Union, that on the home front racism and oppression of Indi-
ans remained common and palpable. It is also a reminder of Lincoln’s abil-
ity, in the midst of the awful carnage of the war, to prevent unnecessary 
killing wherever he could. Fi nally, the  trials  after the war and Lincoln’s 
willingness to prevent the vast majority of the proposed executions, pointed 
to an age when the law of war would become part of military and po liti cal 
policy.
Emblematic of how the war changed the nation and the home front 
are the last two essays in this book. Jean H. Baker takes us into the Executive 
Mansion— what  today we call the White House.  Here the war and the 
home front intersected  every day, all day long. President Lincoln lived his 
life, strug gled with marriage and  family issues, and tried to raise one young 
son and guide another who was on the cusp of adulthood. He also faced the 
war,  every day,  every night. As Baker writes: “The White House, with its 
multiple functions as a  family residence, an executive office, and the loca-
tion of endless ceremonies and rituals, complicated the sixteenth president’s 
tenure in many, not always positive, ways.” Lincoln met dignitaries, gener-
als, and individual citizens in the White House. He invited Frederick Dou-
glass to discuss policy with him, thus rewriting the rules of racial etiquette 
in Amer i ca, as a president sought the advice of a black man. He considered 
po liti cal strategy and military strategy. He slept, often fitfully, worrying about 
the carnage of the war and the  future of a nation “dedicated to the proposi-
tion that all men are created equal.” It was  there he drafted the Emancipation 
Proclamation, to fi nally end slavery, and promised the nation a new birth 
of freedom.
Just as Lincoln drafted the language of liberty and freedom at his home— 
the White House— during the war, Congress helped provide a symbolic 
message of freedom to the nation through the architecture of the Capitol. 
As Guy Gugliotta teaches us in this volume, with most Southerners no 
longer in Congress, the Capitol dome could now be completed. In the 1850s, 
Southerners in Congress had prevented the design of the iconic statue 
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“Freedom— a gorgeous, wraithlike figure wearing a ‘liberty cap,’ ” sitting on 
top of the building. Power ful Southerners in Congress backed former Sena-
tor Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, who, as secretary of war, was able to 
prevent the national government from crowning Congress with an icon of 
“freedom” and a “liberty cap,”  because the cap was a cultural condemna-
tion of slavery. He pushed for a new design of Freedom that Congress accepted, 
but the proslavery Buchanan administration and the Southern Demo crats 
in Congress still prevented completion of the dome. But in 1861 Davis had 
embraced treason as the president of the Confederacy. Although he was a 
gradu ate of West Point, Davis had ordered his troops to fire on the United 
States Army at Fort Sumter and continued to make war on his former 
comrades- in- arms. But he could no longer stop the nation from embracing 
freedom with an icon to liberty at the top of Congress.
Thus, as Guy Gugliotta notes in his chapter, the symbol of the home front 
fi nally sat atop the Capitol dome in 1863— “a robust nineteen- foot Indian 
princess– Roman goddess with a buckskin skirt, classical drapery above the 
waist, Eu ro pean features, and a bird purporting to be an American ea gle 
sitting on her head with its mouth open.” The statue, called Freedom Tri­
umphant in War and Peace, was “bolted in place atop the Capitol dome during 
the depths of the Civil War.”
The message was clear: the American nation, backed by the Emancipation 
Proclamation, now stood for freedom. This freedom was being implemented 
by a gigantic army that included former slaves,  free black volunteers, and con-
scripted whites, all paid in greenbacks. The war had permanently changed 
the nation, and  these changes in turn made a victory for Freedom pos si ble. 
As we know, in hindsight, it was an incomplete and imperfect victory, but it 
still brought the nation many steps closer to the “new birth of freedom” 
Lincoln promised in the Gettysburg Address.
9
In M a rch  1863,  an increasingly desperate Union Congress passed a new law called the Enrollment Act to encourage more men to volunteer 
for military ser vice. In theory, it was a carrot- and- stick sort of arrangement: 
enlist honorably and receive a healthy incentive for  doing so, or undergo the 
shameful act of being drafted and pass on any bonus. In practice, the 
 arrangement was more complicated  because of the vari ous  legal options it 
provided for men to avoid ser vice altogether. And, as it turned out, the law 
had far- reaching consequences for Americans. The bland  legal language of 
the Enrollment Act belied the changes that it set in motion, changes that 
resulted in a tectonic shift in the relationship between federal and state 
governments and between the nation and its  people. The transformation 
that Americans experienced as a result of the draft act fell into three cate-
gories: who would raise troops, the degree to which federal government 
could use coercion, and the ability of the federal government to gather and 
keep information on its citizenry.1
The United States Army had a mere 16,000 members as of 1860, and they 
 were spread widely across the West. About a third of the officers, along with 
a handful of enlisted men, resigned to join the Confederacy. Clearly, the 
Union army did not have the manpower to bring the rebels in line. The day 
1“An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces, and for Other Purposes,” 
1863, 37th Cong., 3d sess., S.Misc.Doc. 41 (hereafter referred to as the Enrollment Act).
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 after the Confederates took Fort Sumter, President Abraham Lincoln issued 
a proclamation asking for 75,000 militiamen to suppress them. In the early 
days of the conflict, war fever gripped the North, and so many men volun-
teered that the states in charge of enlisting them turned them away. Rebels 
and Yankees alike predicted the war would last a mere ninety days. South 
Carolina Senator James Chesnut had offered to drink all the blood that 
would be spilled, and Southerners assured each other that “a lady’s thimble 
 will hold all the blood that  will be shed.” In the North, loyal men continued 
to step forward enthusiastically well  after ninety days had come and gone. 
For the next year or so, volunteers— the term “militiaman” had been rap-
idly replaced— were rewarded for their efforts with a hundred- dollar bounty 
payable upon their being mustered out at the end of their three- year term. 
Northern recruitment efforts hummed along  until the spring of 1862, when 
enlistments started to drop off.2
Over the course of that season, two  great realizations seeped into the 
Northern consciousness. First, Americans began to understand that many, 
many men would die in the war. The  Battle of Shiloh in early April was 
the deadliest fighting ever seen on the continent to that time, and it helped 
drive the point home. Seven Pines at the end of May, the biggest fight yet in 
the East, seconded the notion. The sobering real ity of war withered many 
young men’s visions that the war would be exciting, a lark. Second, the 
 people of the North came to realize that not only would the war be bloody, 
but it would also be long. Robert E. Lee in par tic u lar was responsible for 
this somber new real ity. Before his appointment on June 1 to command 
the Army of Northern  Virginia, Americans could still believe they would 
win the war in rather short order. His rapid string of successes in the spring 
and summer of 1862 forced Northerners to come to terms with a far more 
grinding war than they had expected. As  these two truths settled around 
the shoulders of Union loyalists like one of Lincoln’s shawls, even patrio-
tism shriveled as a motivation to join the ranks. As ideological reasons to 
enlist vanished, practical reasons not to serve grew. The army could not 
pay its men on time. The federal government shuttered all its recruiting of-
fices and sold the public property that went with them. Secretary of War 
2Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil 
War (Urbana, Ill., 1983), p. 10; Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln,  
9 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J., 1953–55), 4:331–32; E. Merton Coulter, The Confederate States 
of Amer i ca, 1861–1865: A History of the South (Baton Rouge, La., 1950), p. 15.
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Edwin Stanton said they  were too expensive to maintain. Besides, the pub-
lic was so flush with recent victories that the ranks would easily be refilled. 
Two months  later, in mid- June, he was begging governors for troops.3
On July 1, just as Union Major General George McClellan was wilting 
before Lee’s army at the Seven Days  Battles, Lincoln issued a call for 300,000 
three- year men. As had been the case to this point in the war, states had 
the constitutional responsibility to raise troops. The men  were considered 
citizen- soldiers rather than part of the permanent army, which remained a 
separate entity, and volunteer regiments  were designated by state. The gov-
ernor usually appointed regimental commanders— a po liti cal boon since the 
posts offered more opportunity for patronage— though in some instances 
soldiers would elect their own officers.  These units  were  under state control 
and subject to the laws of the state militia  until they  were mustered into fed-
eral ser vice.4
The president hoped that pride and patriotism  were still power ful enough 
to replenish the army, a hope articulated in a song that would become 
famous, “We Are Coming,  Father Abraham, 300,000 More.” Real ity over-
rode the optimism of the title. Men  were dribbling into recruiting offices, 
not flooding them. Support for the war softened with each of the keen blows 
the Union suffered in the summer of 1862. On July 17, Lincoln signed the 
Militia Act, which allowed black men to serve in the army. This was the 
first time since 1792 that African Americans had been allowed to serve 
legally, an indication of both how stretched the army was becoming and 
congressional Republicans’ commitment to emancipation. The Militia Act 
also allowed the administration to call on the states for an additional 300,000 
men who would serve a term of nine months, an option Stanton exercised 
two and a half weeks  after the law went into effect. States that did not fill 
their quotas by August 15 would have to hold drafts.5
3Reid Mitchell, Civil War Soldiers (New York, 1988), pp. 1–23; James W. Geary, We Need 
Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War (DeKalb, Ill., 1991), pp. 15–16; Allan Nevins, The War 
for the Union: War Becomes Revolution, 1862–1863, 4 vols. (New York, 1959), 2:105, 143; United 
States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Rec ords of the 
Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), ser. 3, vol. 2, pp. 2–3 (hereafter 
referred to as O.R.).
4Basler, Collected Works, 5:296–97.
5“We Are Coming,  Father Abraham, 300,000 More,” J. A. Getze, arranger 
(Philadelphia, 1862); O.R. ser. 3, vol. 2, pp. 280–82.
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Officials strug gled to meet the demands of the president and the Militia 
Act. First, they strug gled to determine who was responsible for what. Only 
the War Department could top up existing regiments with new men, and 
only the states could form new regiments. Second, they discovered stiff re-
sis tance to military ser vice, even  under the threat of conscription. The hope 
had been that the specter of drafting would prompt men to volunteer in 
greater numbers— conscription being deemed a cowardly way to wind up in 
the army. Much has been written about the honor culture of the South, but 
it extended north of the Mason- Dixon Line as well.6 The failure to volunteer 
brought shame not only on individual men but also on their communities. 
A supervisor in Cook County, Illinois, said that he would pay any sum of 
money to find recruits rather than have his county “submit to the disgrace” 
of a draft. Nevertheless, enlistments nationally fell short. Parts of the North 
would now experience conscription, though in truth the efforts in the fall of 
1862  were more of a protodraft.7
During the American Revolution, states had resorted to conscription to 
fill the ranks of their militia. The effort did not go particularly well then, 
and time had not improved the states’ abilities. The effort in the fall of 1862 
was beset with trou bles. Some governors dragged their feet in putting to-
gether the bureaucratic machinery to carry off a draft.  Others spent months 
haggling with the administration about how many men their states already 
had sent into the ser vice and how many more they  were now expected to 
send. Rioting broke out in Ozaukee County, Wisconsin, and in the coal fields 
of Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, vari ous forms of fraud and deceit began to 
creep into the system.  Because drafted men could buy substitutes, broker-
ages sprang up offering significant sums to attract men who would hire 
themselves out in this capacity. Brokers paid better than bounties, and vol-
unteer enlistments suffered as a result. Draft dodgers headed for Canada 
or the West or bribed doctors for certificates of disability. Some men en-
listed, accepted what ever bounty they might be paid up front, then de-
serted. Throughout the fall, the general approach to military manpower 
seemed to be one of dillydallying, nit- picking, bickering, and evasion, 
even as the Union forces continued to suffer huge losses at Second Bull 
6The best work on this remains Bertram Wyatt- Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and 
Be hav ior in the Old South, 25th anniversary ed. (New York, 2007).
7Aretas A. Dayton, “The Raising of Union Forces in Illinois during the Civil War,” 
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 34 (1941):413.
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Run, Fredericksburg, and, most notably, Antietam, the deadliest day in 
American history. Despite the many obstacles and frustrations, though, Lin-
coln’s calls yielded 421,000 three- year volunteers and 87,000 nine- month mi-
litia members.8
By early 1863, multiple  factors suggested that the Union would have to 
resort to a true draft, not the militia draft that had recently concluded. 
The enlistment period for men who had signed up for two years in 1861 
would be over in a few months. So would the terms of the nine- month men 
who had joined in the summer and fall of 1862. Most importantly, volun-
teer recruitment had dried up. Congress had to take steps to ensure the 
army could continue.  Under the Constitution, Congress has the authority 
to raise armies and call out the state militias. The states have the respon-
sibility of organ izing, training, arming, and disciplining  those militias. 
The Found ers dealt out authority this way  because they worried about 
what an unscrupulous commander in chief would do with a large standing 
army at his disposal. In addition, their military experiences involved local 
militias that supplemented  either the Royal or the Continental army. 
 Dividing power this way kept primary responsibility for the nation’s mili-
tary policy in state hands and for the most part avoided the threat of a stand-
ing army. This approach had worked during the Seven Years’ War and 
the American Revolution.  Later, the Constitution said nothing about con-
scription, which apparently did not come up in the Constitutional Con-
vention or the state ratifying conventions. During the War of 1812 James 
Madison and the Federalists had wanted to draft militiamen into the reg-
ular army, but the conflict ended before anything like that could be put in 
place. The Civil War was larger, more complex, and more violent than 
Amer i ca’s previous wars, and the piecemeal, state- level efforts proved ut-
terly inadequate to the task.9
8Gary Wamsley, Selective Ser vice and a Changing Amer i ca: A Study of Orga nizational 
Environmental Relationships (Columbus, Ohio, 1969), p. 18; Jack Furniss, “Civil Wars: Union 
Governors and Federal– State Conflict in the North” (paper presented at the biennial 
meeting of the Society for Civil War Historians, Chattanooga, Tenn., June 2016), pp. 3–7; 
Lawrence H. Larsen, “Draft Riot in Wisconsin, 1862,” Civil War History 7 (1961):421–26; 
Grace Palladino, Another Civil War:  Labor, Capital, and the State in the Anthracite Regions of 
Pennsylvania, 1840–68 (Urbana, Ill., 1990), chap. 5; Nevins, War for the Union, 2:164.
9U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8; Wamsley, Selective Ser vice, pp. 22–23. Gordon Wood, 
The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969) remains an 
excellent study of republican ideology in the Revolutionary War period.
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In March 1863, Congress passed the Enrollment Act, a law that one mod-
ern  legal scholar termed “desperate and problem- laden.” It marked a radi-
cal departure from what Americans understood as normative. During the 
Revolutionary War, some states had resorted to a draft, and five state con-
stitutions explic itly allowed conscription.  Under the law, states would no lon-
ger be conscripting— only the federal government would. The Enrollment 
Act created an agency within the War Department, the Provost Marshal 
General’s Bureau, to administer and enforce any draft. The law required 
that the bureau have at least one office in  every congressional district in the 
North. The provost marshal’s agents would take a census of men between 
the ages of twenty and forty- five and enroll them for the draft. If the area 
fell short in meeting its quota, the bureau would hold a draft, which gener-
ally meant blindfolded men pulling names written on slips of paper out of a 
draft wheel (fig. 1). If the agents could recruit a local blind man for the job, 
all the better.  After being drafted, a man had several days to report before 
his local draft board and take a physical. In the interim, he could avoid ser-
vice by hiring a substitute or paying a $300 commutation fee, or he could 
enlist voluntarily. As if the Enrollment Act had not encroached enough on 
traditional understandings of state- federal responsibilities, the War Depart-
ment on May  1, 1863, announced that the Provost Marshal General’s 
 Bureau would now be in charge of enlisting all volunteers. No longer would 
the states be involved in any way except to appoint regimental officers. Even 
so, the War Department could dismiss  those officers that commanders 
deemed in effec tive. With this change, the federal government would run the 
entire recruitment effort for the war. States would no longer have any re-
sponsibility for raising men for the Union war effort.10
10J. L. Bern stein, “Conscription and the Constitution: The Amazing Case of Kneedler v. 
Lane,” American Bar Association Journal 53, no. 8 (1967):708–12; John W. Delehant, “Judicial 
Revisitation Finds Needler v. Lane Not So ‘Amazing,’ ” American Bar Association Journal 53, 
no. 12 (1967):1132–35; James F. Simon, Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney: Slavery, Secession, and  
the President’s War Powers (New York, 2006), p. 243; James B. Fry, Final Report Made to the 
Secretary of War, by the Provost Marshal General, of the Operations of the Bureau of the Provost 
Marshal General of the United States, 2 vols. (n.p., 1866), 2:109. The militia system  after the 
war was “dead in spite of statutes to the contrary,” according to John K. Mahon. Southern 
states  were allowed to form militia companies in 1869 to support the army as it oversaw 
Reconstruction. Militia ser vice became an obligation nationally in the late 1870s with the 
advent of  labor riots.  These militia  were the nub of what would become the National 
Guard. John K. Mahon, The History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York, 1983), 
pp. 108–9; Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 
pp. 15–17.
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The newly appointed provost marshal general, James B. Fry (fig. 2), was 
a West Pointer and  career army man whom General Ulysses S. Grant had 
suggested for the job. Fry had made his name in the war not as a fighting 
man but as a highly competent administrator—or, as one historian wrote, 
“an efficient martinet.”  Little information about Fry is available. He did not 
leave personal papers  behind, and few  people in Washington seem to dis-
cuss him during the war years. In the postbellum era, he was engaged in 
several notable po liti cal fights and wrote a handful of books about them  after 
his opponents died. Thorough to the point of being a stickler, Fry appears 
to have done  little delegating. Almost  every halfway impor tant piece of cor-
respondence to come into the Washington offices from the field has his 
initials on it.  Under Fry, the bureau was as centralized and as top- down as 
a federal office could be in  those days.11
In a law that induced many unhappy emotions, the most controversial 
ele ment was the commutation fee. The commutation fee was not a new de-
velopment in American military history. The authors of the Enrollment 
Act thought it would hold down the asking price for substitutes, which it did. 
11Nevins, The War for the Union, 2:397.
Fig. 1. “Resumption of the Draft— Inside the Provost Marshal’s Office, Sixth District— 
The Wheel Goes Round.” An 1863 engraving depicts a blindfolded man drawing names 
for the draft in New York City. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
Fig. 2. Provost Marshal James B. Fry. Appointed in 1863 with the rank of col o nel, he 
was promoted to brigadier general in April 1864. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo­
graphs Division)
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When commutation was all but eliminated in 1864, prices for substitutes shot 
up. Nevertheless, opponents of the fee said it turned the rebellion into “a 
rich man’s war but a poor man’s fight,” even though options  were available 
for men of lesser means. The most notable was draft insurance, which was 
available on both formal and ad hoc bases. The North American Life In-
surance Com pany peddled coverage for the draft. For a premium of $100, 
the com pany would pay out $300 if the insured man’s name was pulled 
out of the draft wheel. Draft insurance socie ties also popped up with  every 
round of conscription. Sometimes  these comprised friends, other times co-
workers or  people who lived in the same place. However they came to-
gether, members would sign a contract promising to pay a certain amount 
of money— ranging between one dollar and one hundred dollars—if any 
member was conscripted. The draftee could use the pooled money to pay a 
commutation fee, hire a substitute, or support his  family if he deci ded to go 
into the army. No  matter. The “rich man’s war/poor man’s fight” label stuck 
for the duration. Yankee Notions sent up “We Are Coming,  Father Abraham” 
with a parody that made the point:
 We’re coming, Ancient Abram, several hundred strong,
We  hadn’t no $300, and so we come along;
We  hadn’t no rich parents to pony up the tin,
So we went unto the Provost, and  there  were mustered in.
Not surprisingly, Confederates had similar criticisms about their conscrip-
tion, which had gone into effect a year earlier, but historian James M. 
McPherson has shown that the accusation was not true for  either section.12
In the years  after the Enrollment Act, Lincoln made four calls for addi-
tional men, and they resulted in nearly a quarter of a million Northerners 
being held to ser vice. Thirty- five  percent of  those paid a commutation fee, 
which raised more than $26.3 million for the federal coffers— a sum that 
more than offset the cost of the draft effort. Forty- seven  percent furnished 
substitutes. Nineteen  percent actually served. Of the two million men who 
served in the Union army, only 6  percent by war’s end had been drafted, 
and both contemporaries and historians considered them to be notoriously 
poor soldiers. Nevertheless, Provost Marshal General James B. Fry— along 
12A Portland Conscript, “A Hymn,” Yankee Notions, Nov. 1, 1863;  Tables 20.1 and 20.2 in 
James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 3d ed. (Boston, 2001), 
p. 387.
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with  later scholars— considered conscription to be a success  because it 
prompted so many men to volunteer. This was true from the first round of 
conscription in the summer of 1863, Fry said. On its face, the Enrollment 
Act was “not directly fruitful in producing men,” he admitted, but it helped 
spur enlistments.13
The law’s success came at a cost, though. Conservative Demo crats had 
long since established a pattern of claiming many of Lincoln’s decisions  were 
unconstitutional. Federalizing military recruitment and coercing men into 
the ser vice against their  will fit neatly into their existing narrative of a ty-
rannical administration. Chauncey Burr, a vociferous critic of Lincoln, 
wrote in The Old Guard that the new law “clothes the President with unlimited 
and unchecked military powers. It makes him, at one bound, as absolute a 
monarch as the Autocrat of all the Rus sias.” The only one of President Lin-
coln’s actions that Demo crats objected to more strenuously than the draft 
was abolition, and even then not by much  because enrollment and conscrip-
tion  were far more likely to touch many of Lincoln’s foes personally. White 
 people of any class could be called up. The draft did not care  whether a con-
script supported the war. Conscription’s only obligation was to provide rea-
sonably healthy men to fill the ranks. Claims to personal liberty fell on deaf 
ears where the law was concerned. For Republicans, at least, the idea that 
the federal government was sending at least some of  these unwilling men to 
their deaths was a minor prob lem compared with the major existential cri-
sis facing the country. On the other hand, the consequences of emancipation 
remained largely abstract to Northern civilians during the war. Contra-
bands may have been flocking to the Union army in the South, but they 
 were not flooding the North and taking jobs.14
The Enrollment Act pushed many Demo crats who had been warily sup-
portive of Lincoln into the conservative, or “Copperhead,” wing of their 
party. In a resolution to New York Governor Horatio Seymour, who had 
some Copperhead sympathies himself, a man named M. Benedict claimed 
to represent “350,000 working men” when he observed that conscription was 
a “monarchical princi ple & a sin in itself.” Its burden fell on the poor twice 
over, Benedict wrote, first by drafting them, and then, if they  were killed or 
13E. B. Long and Barbara Long, The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, 1861–1865 
(Garden City, N.Y., 1971), pp. 707–8; Fry, Final Report, p. 34.
14Chauncey Burr, The Old Guard (March 1863):67.
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maimed in  battle, by forcing their families to beg. Writing as the draft riot 
in New York City was still raging, Benedict argued that no mob law could 
possibly be as “outrageous” as the draft law itself. Fry was unmoved by the 
complaints of the Copperheads. He boasted  after the war that the law 
 established “the power and determination of the government to proceed in 
the re- enforcement of its armies.”15
Opponents of the draft  were not without influential allies, especially within 
the judicial system. On November 9, 1863, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
ruled in Kneedler v. Lane that the draft law was unconstitutional  because it in-
fringed on the rights of the states to raise militias. Conscription in the com-
monwealth was therefore illegal. The 3–2 vote broke down on party lines, 
but the circumstances surrounding the case  were highly po liti cal. One of 
the Demo cratic justices who voted with the majority, George Woodward, 
was  running for governor when the case was heard September 23. He lost 
the October 13 election to incumbent Governor Andrew G. Curtin. The 
chief justice, Walter Lowrie, also lost his bid to remain on the court, but 
stayed on the bench long enough to write the majority opinion in Kneedler. 
Federal attorneys, who had refused to argue the case before the court, chose 
to ignore the ruling, and Fry told his men to conduct business as usual. When 
Lowrie left the court, Woodward, whose earlier opinions included one 
against soldiers voting in the field,  rose to become chief justice. Woodward’s 
promotion proved an empty victory, though,  because the partisan majority 
of the court had flipped in  favor of Republicans. On the very day Lowrie 
stepped down, the federal attorney moved to rescind the injunctions that 
the court had imposed on the draft effort. By a 3–2 vote the new court 
reversed Kneedler on January 16, 1864, and ruled conscription constitutional. 
For good mea sure, two justices also wrote opinions saying that Pennsyl-
vania courts had no jurisdiction over federal provost marshals.16
The question of conscription did not go before the Supreme Court of the 
United States during the Civil War but during World War I. In the Selective 
Draft Law Cases of 1918, the court unanimously disagreed with the plaintiffs, 
who had argued that states  were responsible for raising a militia and that a 
15Jennifer L. Weber, Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North (New 
York, 2006), chap. 1; M. Benedict to Horatio Seymour, July 16, 1863, Horatio Seymour 
Papers, Box 7, New York State Library, Albany; Fry, Final Report, pp. 352, 29.
16Richard A. Sauers and Peter Tomasak, The Fishing Creek Confederacy: A Story of Civil 
War Draft Re sis tance (Columbia, Mo., 2012), pp. 31–34.
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draft  violated their Thirteenth Amendment rights against involuntary ser-
vitude. Justices ruled that the government’s right to conscript was “obvious 
upon the face of the Constitution,” thereby cementing into law the unpre-
ce dented level of federal power that Republicans had created in 1863. Many 
 legal scholars dispute the opinion to this day, but it still stands. The Found-
ers  were  silent on the topic during the Constitutional Convention. Roger 
Taney, the chief justice of the United States for most of the Civil War, would 
surely object to the ruling. Although he never heard a case regarding the 
Enrollment Act, Taney went ahead and drafted an unofficial opinion about 
it, which he called “Thoughts on the Conscription Law of the U. States.” 
The state and federal governments each had sovereign authority within their 
own spheres, he wrote; any undelegated powers remained in the hands of 
the states or the  people. When the Framers gave the federal government the 
right to raise and support armies, they meant a national army fully  under 
federal control. This was an entity separate from the militia, which was “al-
ways existing and needing no law to bring it into existence.” While Con-
gress could summon the militia  under certain circumstances, the states 
remained responsible for training the militia and appointing its officers. 
Taney went on to interpret the Second Amendment as meaning that the mi-
litia was composed of “Citizens of the States, who retain all their rights and 
privileges as citizens who when called into ser vice by the United States are 
not to be fused into one body— nor confounded with the Army of the United 
States.” Regardless of the pres ent circumstances, the federal government had 
no authority over the states or their militias, Taney concluded. To give the 
central government that power was to risk “purely unlimited military 
despotism.”17
Coincidentally, Lincoln also wrote his own opinion on the  matter. Like 
Taney’s draft decision, this was never released or published in Lincoln’s life-
time. It is undated, yet it echoes some of the points and rhe toric of his well- 
known letter to James Conkling, who read it September 3, 1863, at a rally 
in Springfield, Illinois. “You who do not wish to be soldiers, do not like this 
17Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); see, for instance, Jason Britt, “Unwilling 
Warriors: An Examination of the Power to Conscript in Peacetime,” Northwestern Journal of 
Law and Society 4 (Fall 2009), http:// scholarlycommons . law . northwestern . edu / njlsp / vol4 
/ iss2 / 4, accessed June 30, 2016; Roger B. Taney, A  Great Justice on State and Federal Power: 
Being the Thoughts of Chief Justice Taney on the Federal Conscription Act, ed. Philip G. 
Auchampaugh (n.p., 1936).
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law,” Lincoln wrote in his opinion. “This is natu ral; nor does it imply want 
of patriotism.” What did suggest a want of patriotism was questioning the 
Enrollment Act.  People who thought it unconstitutional  were  those “who 
desire the rebellion to succeed.” In unusually peevish language, Lincoln 
 argued that the law was wholly within the Congress’s power to raise and sup-
port armies.  Under the current state of affairs, the United States needed an 
army to maintain its territory and institutions, Lincoln said. Armies are 
raised  either voluntarily or involuntarily, and the Union was no longer able 
to raise enough volunteers to fill the ranks. If enough critics joined volun-
tarily, he would happily get rid of the draft. A million of their “manly breth-
ren” already had done so, Lincoln said. “Their toil and blood have been 
given as much for you as for themselves.  Shall it all be lost rather than you 
too,  will bear your part?”18
Many of the men already in the army could not have agreed with Lin-
coln more, and they greeted the Enrollment Act enthusiastically. The new 
law showed that the government was serious about putting down the rebel-
lion, Isaac Jackson wrote from Milliken’s Bend, Louisiana, and that the sol-
diers “are not to be left alone and forsaken.” A draft was “the just and fair 
way of carry ing on this war[.] It brings the burthen upon all evnally and 
not upon willing only. . . .  I hope the  people have become fulle aroused to 
their sense of duty and  will attend to the double dyed trators at home while 
we attend to the open armed enemyes of the country down  here.” While 
many veterans shared such feelings, they  were hardly universal. Some sol-
diers assessed their own experiences and then advised younger relatives to 
stay away from the army. A member of the 119th Illinois was relieved to learn 
that his younger  brother had paid a commutation fee in the summer of 1864 
and gotten out of the draft. “I do not want to see or know of any of my friends 
having to soldier in this war,” he wrote his  sister from Memphis, citing the 
hardships of being on the march “nearly all of the time” and having “a good 
deal of fighting” along the way. He hoped the end of the war was near, but 
he saw no sign of it.19
18Basler, Collected Works, 6:406–10, 6:444–49.
19Isaac Jackson to Ethan A. Jackson, Mar. 19, 1863, Isaac Jackson Letters, Schoff Civil 
War Collection, Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; William N. 
Winans to Sarah M. Winans Thornley, Sept. 2, 1864, Winans  Family Correspondence, 
Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.
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In practice, the draft provoked opposition in multiple forms. In some 
parts of the country, hostility was so fierce that the government had a 
hard time hiring anyone to carry out even the enrollment. In  others, resis-
tors took violent action against draft agents, shooting at them, burning their 
crops or their homes, or exercising other forms of intimidation. By the end of 
the war, thirty- eight of Fry’s men had lost their lives trying to carry out or 
enforce the draft, sixty had been wounded, and a dozen had suffered property 
damage.  These figures do not include losses that regular troops or special 
forces supporting local provost marshals took. For months  after the Enroll-
ment Act passed, draft riots popped up in communities across the North. 
The most infamous of  these took place in New York City just a few days  after 
the  Battle of Gettysburg ended. Gotham’s weeklong uprising, which quickly 
morphed into a race riot, remains the deadliest civil disturbance in Ameri-
can history (figs. 3–5). That same week, riots broke out in five other North-
ern cities, and numerous  others  were on alert. By the end of the war, 200 
cities, towns, or counties had asked the secretary of war for troops to help 
deal with re sis tance efforts.20
Most illegal re sis tance was not violent, nor did it take place in the con-
text of a mob. More often it was a personal decision, and  those individual 
choices mounted to put  great pressure on an army that needed a steady flow 
of men to fill its maw. “Give us half the men called for by the draft, and 
 there  will be hardly any re sis tance made” by Confederates, Ulysses S. Grant 
wrote a longtime friend in August 1864. But that did not happen, and nei-
ther the conscripts who did show up nor the men who accepted bounties to 
enlist proved to be effective soldiers. One soldier said veterans like him  were 
“indignant at the insult and degradation of their being made companions 
of  Idiots, aliens and outlaws.”21
Historians do not know how most of the men who avoided the draft did 
so, if they stayed in their communities or went somewhere  else. We do know, 
however, that at times some places experienced something akin to an exodus. 
In February 1865, for instance, the Chicago Tribune reported that 300–400 
 people  were leaving the city each day to avoid the draft. Some went west, 
to parts of the country that  were still the United States but so thinly 
20Fry, Final Report, 2:352; Wamsley, Selective Ser vice, p. 28.
21Brooks D. Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph over Adversity, 1822–1865 (Boston, 2000), 
pp. 374–75; George Tobey Anthony to Benjamin Anthony, Sept. 4, 1864, George Tobey 
Anthony Letters, Schoff Civil War Collection, Clements Library.
Fig.  3. “Charge of the Police on the Rioters at the Tribune Office,” Harper’s Weekly, 
Aug. 1, 1863. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
Fig. 4. “Ruins of the Provost Marshal’s Office,” Harper’s Weekly, Aug. 1, 1863. (Courtesy 
Donald R. Kennon)
24    Jennifer L. Weber
settled— and where the government had so  little enforcement— that they 
could live with  little fear of being caught. This seems to have been the case 
around Canton, Illinois, where the local newspaper reported in Febru-
ary 1864 that “gold fever” had broken out  there “in  great severity.” Another 
option for draft dodgers was to leave the country. Senator Henry Wilson of 
Mas sa chu setts estimated in March 1864 that 12,000–15,000 American de-
serters  were outside U.S. borders. It is unclear  whether this number in-
cluded draft dodgers, who often  were called deserters even if they had not 
been formally mustered into the army. Some of  these emigrants went to 
Mexico, but Canada was the favored international destination for draft 
dodgers, especially if they lived in areas near the border. The assistant pro-
vost marshal in Elmyra, New York, estimated in the summer of 1863 that 
half the deserters from the state’s volunteer companies  were in Canada. 
Once in Canada, Americans avoiding military ser vice could face a diffi-
cult existence. Jobs  were hard to find  because so many Americans had come 
across the border, and  those jobs that  were available often paid poorly. 
Again, the runaway Americans  were responsible for this,  there being so 
many of them that wages fell. Canadian laborers found their own solution 
Fig.  5. “The Riots at New York— The Rioters Burning and Sacking the Colored 
 Orphan Asylum,” Harper’s Weekly, Aug. 1, 1863. (Courtesy Donald R. Kennon)
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by  going to the United States, where the war had resulted in manpower 
shortages that raised wages, but this obviously was not an answer for draft 
dodgers and deserters. Men looking to avoid military ser vice by leaving the 
country had a third, rather surprising option: the Confederacy. This would 
seem to be a surprising destination, but it was still out of the reach of the 
United States government, and 2,000–3,000 men fled  there, historian Ella 
Lonn estimated.22
Other well- known methods of evading the draft illegally involved brib-
ery and fraud. The local draft board was notoriously ripe for abuse, and its 
most influential member was inevitably the doctor who performed physi-
cals. As with so much about draft evasion, the fraud levels are impossible to 
know, but the head of Illinois’ draft operations said surgeons had “innumer-
able” opportunities to excuse conscripts for a fee. Fry was quick to strip his 
men of office if they  were engaging in illegal activity. In September 1863, 
he fired the entire board of Connecticut’s Fourth District for taking bribes. 
He ordered the physician to be court- martialed and the commissioner and 
local provost marshal to be drummed out of the ser vice and prosecuted in 
civilian courts. Where fraud was more con spic u ous, though, was on the 
other side of the  table. As they had in the militia draft of 1862, men would 
hurt themselves, temporarily or permanently, in order to be declared unfit 
for ser vice. “ There are very few enrolled or drafted men who do not claim 
disability of some kind, and of course demand exemption,” Dr. Benjamin P. 
Morgan of Rutland, Vermont, said. Some men would cut off fin gers or toes 
or knock out their own teeth to avoid conscription.  Others would put sand 
or cayenne pepper in their eyes or irritants such as lye on their skin to fake 
diseases. “We feel as if we  were among the lame, blind, dumb, and halt,” 
an Urbana, Illinois, medical examiner observed.23
22Chicago Tribune, Feb. 15, 1865; Dayton, “The Raising of Union Forces in Illinois 
during the Civil War,” p. 434; Congressional Globe, Mar. 23, 1864, 38th Cong., 1st sess., 
p. 1250; O.R., ser. 3, vol. 2, 425–26; John Boyko, Blood and Daring: Canada and the American 
Civil War (Toronto, 2013), p. 129; Elvira Aplin to George Aplin, Mar. 16, 1863, Aplin 
 Family Papers, Clements Library; Ella Lonn, Desertion during the Civil War (Gloucester, 
Mass., 1928), p. 202.
23House Exec. Docs., 39th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 4, doc. 1, part 2, p. 35; James B. Fry to 
Edwin Stanton, Sept. 8, 1863, M621, RG 110: Title Reports and Decisions of the Provost 
Marshal General, 1863–1866, National Archives and Rec ords Administration, 
Washington, D.C. (hereafter NARA); Peter T. Harstad, “Draft Dodgers and Bounty 
Jumpers,” Civil War Times Illustrated 6 (1967):29–32.
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One of the  great concerns of Fry and the congressmen who voted for 
the Enrollment Act was civilian meddling in the mobilization pro cess. 
The law provided a long list of offenses that could result in a fine of up to 
$200 and up to two years in jail. Offenses included enticing a soldier to 
desert, harboring a deserter, encouraging re sis tance to conscription, and 
assaulting or obstructing a draft official. The law instructed local provost 
marshals to arrest all deserters, find and detain  enemy spies, and obey 
“such as may be prescribed by law, concerning the enrolment and calling 
into ser vice of national forces.” Fry’s men quickly interpreted the law in its 
broadest pos si ble way and began keeping tabs on anyone who might cre-
ate trou ble in  either enlisting or drafting men. This marked a significant, 
though very quiet, change in the relationship between civilians and the 
federal government,  because the Provost Marshal General’s Bureau became, 
for all intents and purposes, the first nationwide domestic intelligence 
agency.24
Stephen E. Towne’s excellent work on Confederate conspiracies in the 
Midwest shows that the Provost Marshal General’s office was not the only 
agency to keep tabs on civilians during the war. When Stanton issued his 
order in August 1862 asking for nine- month men, he also directed local 
army commanders to arrest  people “who may be engaged by act, speech, 
or writing, in discouraging volunteer enlistments, or in any way giving aid 
and comfort to the  enemy.” Cramped by insufficient bud gets, neither fed-
eral marshals nor U.S. attorneys could adequately investigate the number 
of plots— real or alleged— they  were hearing about. Frustrated state offi-
cials then turned to the deepest pockets then in the country— the army’s— 
and asked for help. Sympathetic officers in some areas detailed their men 
to act as detectives to ferret out groups that  either fanned unrest in the 
ranks, encouraged desertion, or discouraged enlistments. In Washington, 
D.C., Lafayette C. Baker had a small contingent of detectives working in 
the War Department who performed a variety of jobs, including policing 
the district, spying in the South, and investigating Confederate intelli-
gence operations in the North and Canada. The Trea sury Department 
used Baker and his men to investigate counterfeiters prior to the creation 
of the Secret Ser vice in 1865. The government also employed private 
24Enrollment Act, secs. 24 and 25.
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detectives, most notably Allan Pinkerton, who spied for George  B. 
 McClellan in 1861 and 1862.25
 These efforts all involved genuine intelligence gathering, but not in a ho-
listic sense. Pinkerton mostly collected the kind of information that armies 
always wanted. Army officers such as Henry Carrington in Indiana and 
Ambrose Burnside in Ohio had agents investigating civilians, which was less 
common, but their efforts  were limited to their own commands. The Pro-
vost Marshal General’s office was diff er ent.  Under the terms of the Enroll-
ment Act, the bureau had at least one office, and often more, in  every 
congressional district in the Union. The average district had three per-
manent clerks, five temporary clerks, four deputies, three special agents, 
one assistant surgeon, and one janitor. All of that was in addition to the draft 
board, which comprised the local provost marshal, a surgeon, and a com-
missioner. In all, Fry’s bureau employed 4,716  people as of October 31, 1864. 
The information that Fry’s  people collected during the enrollment included 
a man’s name, date of birth, occupation, workplace, height, weight, hair 
color, and eye color. This information made it easier to identify draft dodg-
ers and deserters. The Provost Marshal General’s Bureau was a federal 
agency with the power to pull a young man into the army, potentially put-
ting him in a life- threatening position. Its representatives seemed to be ev-
erywhere. The bureau reached deep into the American countryside in a way 
that only the post office had before the war. But where the post office was a 
fairly benign institution, the Provost Marshal General’s Bureau most decid-
edly was not.26
The agency zealously followed Congress’s mandate to arrest anyone re-
sisting conscription, encouraging  others to do so, or obstructing the draft 
or the work of the provost marshal’s men. In fulfilling this duty, agents 
kept close tabs on anyone they considered suspect. Reports poured in to 
Washington from across the North about conspiracies to overthrow local 
or state governments, plots to  free Confederate prisoners and unleash them 
on the Northern public,  people who  were undermining recruitment efforts, 
 people who  were encouraging young men to desert, re sis tance to the en-
rolling effort, corrupt draft boards, and on and on. Some of  these reports 
25O.R., ser. 3, vol. 2, pp. 280–82; Stephen E. Towne, Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: 
Exposing Confederate Conspiracies in the Heartland (Athens, Ohio, 2015), pp. 32–37, 66–67.
26Fry, Final Report, p. 703.
28    Jennifer L. Weber
turned out to be nothing but rumor; some turned out to be true. A typical 
communication was like that from the local provost marshal in Columbus, 
Indiana, who wrote Fry to tell him that trou ble was brewing in Brown 
County, especially Hamlin Township. Locals  there had arrested a pair of 
deserters, and since that time one Union man had been shot to death in his 
field and a number of other residents had been disarmed and had their prop-
erty burned. Hundreds of reports of this kind arrived at Fry’s office, amid 
the vari ous reports on enrollments, enlistments, and bookkeeping. 
 Major B. H. Hill, who oversaw all of the bureau’s efforts in Michigan, was 
a heavy correspondent, regularly submitting reports about what Confeder-
ate agents and Copperheads  were  doing across the Detroit River in Canada. 
Amid the dry  orders on how to carry out the draft, order stationery, or sub-
mit requests for reimbursement, Fry or his top assistants responded with 
instructions to virtually all of the letters bearing intelligence that they 
received.27
While the draft came  under harsh criticism generally, the complaints 
about Fry’s operation  were mostly about the quotas he and his men set and, 
to a far lesser degree, questions about the quality of the local board. Con-
servative Demo crats complained often about the government’s “arbitrary 
arrests,” but they never singled out the provost marshal’s office. Most curi-
ously from a distance of a  century and a half, critics never discussed the in-
telligence role that the bureau carried out. It is hard to imagine that 
Copperheads  were totally unaware of the surveillance that Fry’s men  were 
carry ing out; they certainly  were aware that the government had  people spy-
ing on civilians, thanks to the highly publicized arrests of former Congress-
man Clement L. Vallandigham in Dayton, Ohio, in May 1863 and of editor 
and secret society founder Harrison H. Dodd in Indianapolis in August 1864. 
Perhaps opponents of the draft lumped the office’s intelligence work into a 
more general category of official abuses. And yet the silence of even Lin-
coln’s most strident enemies on the subject of domestic intelligence gather-
ing by the Provost Marshal General’s Bureau is deafening. Despite the 
27Stansifer to Col o nel James B. Fry, July 31, 1863, Provost Marshal General’s Bureau, 
letters sent, Indiana District 3, 1863–1865, RG 110, entry no. 5176, NARA; for Hill’s letters, 
see Provost Marshal General’s Bureau, letters sent by the acting asst. provost marshal 
general, Michigan, 1863–1866, RG 110, entry nos. 5897 and 3349, NARA.
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copious correspondence between Fry and his deputies, perhaps civilians 
 were simply unaware that they  were  under scrutiny from that office.28
The Provost Marshal General’s Bureau shut down in 1866 as part of the 
general demobilization of the army. The agency’s legacy lasted far longer 
and helped shape the twentieth  century. Most directly, the experience dur-
ing the Civil War created a pre ce dent that the federal government can 
 coerce its citizens into military ser vice. President Woodrow Wilson used 
Fry’s postmortem on the department to create the Selective Ser vice System, 
which administered the draft for World War I. (Congress never seriously 
considered conscription for the Spanish- American War.) Among the most 
impor tant lessons that officials took from the Civil War experience was not 
to allow commutation or substitutes. The Selective Ser vice System in turn 
was a model for the World War II draft. But the legacies of the Enrollment 
Act go well beyond conscription. States have never again been responsi-
ble for raising men for any of the federal ser vice branches. The relationship 
between them and the federal government in that sense changed perma-
nently, and with the blessing of the Supreme Court. The large and wide-
spread bureaucracy of the Provost Marshal General’s office presaged the vast 
government apparatus that would emerge in the twentieth  century. Fi nally, 
subsequent presidents routinely cite Lincoln as a pre ce dent for their incur-
sions on civil liberties, not the least of which has been the government’s 
surveillance of its own  people. The Civil War changed the relationship be-
tween the states and the federal government and the federal government and 
its citizens in ways that remain very clear to us in the twenty- first  century.
28Weber, Copperheads, pp. 95–99, 148–49.
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The policy of this country  ought to be . . .  to nationalize our country so 
that we  shall love our country. If we are dependent upon the United States 
for a currency and a medium of exchange, we  shall have a broader and 
more generous nationality.
Senator John Sherman (R- Ohio), February 10, 18631
As h i s   brot h e r William Tecumseh strug gled at Vicksburg to make the  father of  waters again go unvexed to the sea, John Sherman sought 
support for a national currency on the floor of the United States Senate. 
What the Thirty- Seventh Congress did to pay for the Civil War not only 
transformed the nation’s financial system, it also placed the federal govern-
ment firmly in charge.2 Just as Union troops prevailed over the rebels, so 
did federal- minded legislators triumph, in part  because most of their states’ 
rights counter parts sat in a diff er ent congress during  these crucial years. 
Yet, by binding the fortunes of the bankers to the success of the federal 
government, the Thirty- Seventh Congress also put into motion a system 
that ensured the reverse for its descendants.
1Congressional Globe, Feb. 10, 1863, 37th Cong., 3d sess., p. 843, http:// memory . loc . gov 
/ ammem / amlaw / lwcg . html.
2Michael Les Benedict, “Abraham Lincoln and Federalism,” Journal of the Abraham 
Lincoln Association 10 (1988/89):1–45, and David Currie, “The Civil War Congress,” 
University of Chicago Law Review 73 (2006):1131–226, discuss the roles of Lincoln and 
Congress in elevating the role of the federal government.
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What follows is a brief outline of the mea sures enacted by the Thirty- 
Seventh Congress, including information on votes by party for each major 
initiative.  Because the usual source of funding for the antebellum federal 
government— import tariffs— was wholly inadequate, Congress resorted to 
innovative schemes, including the first- ever income tax, widespread use of 
fiat money issued via newly created national banks, massive amounts of gov-
ernment borrowing, and debt sold directly to the public. Although some of 
 these schemes fell by the wayside for a few de cades  after war’s end, they soon 
returned and, for better or for worse, have become part of the national 
landscape.
The Eve of the Civil War: The Federal Government  
Is Not a Big Player
On the eve of the Civil War, the federal government was not a large part of 
the American economy. The United States had no national banks or na-
tional currency, no federal income tax, and very  little federal borrowing.3 
Federal spending and employment  were minuscule compared with that of 
 today, as figure 1 depicts.
Figure 1 also shows that state government in 1860 actually played a larger 
economic role than the federal government.4 Many  people, including vari-
ous presidents, suggested that the predominance of states was necessary to 
preserve comity. In a typical instance, President James Polk sent a letter to 
the House of Representatives arguing against federal spending for internal 
improvements:
It [bill to improve rivers and harbors] not only leads to a consolidation of 
power in the Federal Government at the expense of the rightful authority of 
the States, but its inevitable tendency is to . . .  [benefit] the few at the 
3Richard Sylla, John Legler, and John Wallis, “Banks and State Public Finance in the 
New Republic: The United States, 1790–1860,” Journal of Economic History 47 (1987):391–
403, offers a good discussion of antebellum state banking practices.
4Harry Scheiber, “Federalism and the American Economic Order, 1789–1910,” Law 
and Society Review 10 (1975):57–188, and John Wallis, “American Government Finance in the 
Long Run: 1790–1990,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (2000):61–82, point out the 
dominance of state government during the antebellum period.
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expense . . .  of the  whole. It  will engender sectional feelings and prejudices 
calculated to disturb the harmony of the Union.5
Import duties provided the main source of funds to the national govern-
ment. Figure 2 shows that tariff revenue comprised between 50 and nearly 
140  percent of federal expenditures in the score of years preceding the Civil 
5Congressional Globe, Aug. 3, 1846, 29th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1182, http:// memory . loc . gov 
/ ammem / amlaw / lwcg . html.
Fig. 1. Size of federal and state governments, 1860 and 2012. (Sources: John Wallis, “Ameri­
can Government Finance in the Long Run: 1790–1990,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 [2000]:­
61–82; Susan B. Car ter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard 
Sutch, and Gavin Wright, eds., Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition [New 
York, 2006], http:// dx . doi . org / 10 . 1017 / ISBN - 9780511132971 . A . ESS . 01 [hereafter HSUS], 
Series Ca10, Ca16; Economic Report of the President, 112th Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. 112–77 [2012])
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War.6 But even  these duties  were small. Fifteen years before Abraham Lin-
coln took office, the U.S. Congress followed in Britain’s footsteps to enact 
one of the lowest tariffs in American history to that point— the Walker Tar-
iff.7 Just over a de cade  later, Congress lowered rates even more with the 
Tariff of 1857.8 In the House, the vote fell partly along party lines but also 
had a regional flavor, with the South, Indiana, and Illinois voting no, and 
the Northeast and the West (Wisconsin, Iowa, and Missouri) voting yes. 
Among  those voting for the bill to reduce rates was Justin Morrill of Ver-
mont. The Senate vote was more decisive, with thirty- three voting for the 
bill and only eight against.9
6As the figure indicates, the federal government ran a small surplus between 1844 and 
1846, and between 1850 and 1855.
7The Walker Tariff (H.R. 384) was enacted by the Demo crats to cut the high rates of 
the so- called Black Tariff of 1842, passed by the Whigs. The Walker Tariff coincided with 
 Great Britain’s repeal of the Corn Laws, which had protected domestic growers of cereal 
crops.
8For discussion, see Richard Hofstadter, “The Tariff Issue on the Eve of the Civil 
War,” American Historical Review 14 (1938):50–55.
9House Journal, Feb. 20, 1857, 34th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 503–4; Senate Journal, Mar. 2, 
1857, 34th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 307–8, http:// memory . loc . gov / ammem / amlaw / lwcg . html.
Fig. 2. Import duties as a percentage of federal expenditures, 1840–95. (Source: HSUS, 
Series Ea585, Ee424)
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Early Financing Mea sures: The Morrill Tariff  
and the Revenue Act of 1861
The nation’s funding policies  were ill suited to the enormous costs of war, 
as figure 3 makes clear.10 This was particularly true  because Southern cus-
toms officers simply stopped sending in revenue to the federal government 
 after Lincoln was elected.11 Lincoln himself recognized the prob lem: in his 
message to the special session of Congress called on July 4, 1861, he ruefully 
remarked, “One of the greatest perplexities of the government is to avoid 
receiving troops faster than it can provide for them.”12
The frantic first step was a near doubling of tariff rates proposed by the 
aforementioned Justin Morrill. Figure 4 shows the sharp increase in rates 
as compared with the previous two de cades. Representative Morrill was a 
busy man during the first years of the war—he not only sponsored the tar-
iff bill but also authored the Land-Grant College Act and the Anti- Bigamy 
Act, both of which passed in 1862.
The House vote on the Morrill Tariff was largely regional in nature, as 
figure 5 illustrates. The gestation of the bill in the Senate took just over nine 
months; by then, most of the South had departed the halls of Congress, and 
the vote fell largely along party lines (fig. 6).13 A logistical regression re-
veals that Demo crats in the House  were 42 times as likely to vote no on 
the Morrill Tariff as Republicans, whereas the Senate figure was 312.14 The 
renegades in the Senate  were Demo crat William Bigler of Pennsylvania 
and Republican Benjamin Wade of Ohio.
Party- line votes  were critical for funding the war, as figure 7 shows. Re-
publicans held a majority in both  houses of the Thirty- Seventh Congress 
(March 4, 1861– March 4, 1863), and this group of men was responsible for 
10Robert Patterson, “Government Finance on the Eve of the Civil War,” Journal of 
Economic History 12 (1952):35–44, makes this point as well.
11Bray Hammond, Sovereignty and an Empty Purse: Banks and Politics in the Civil War 
(Prince ton, N.J., 1970), pp. 31–32.
12Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J., 
1953–55), 4:432.
13Senate Journal, Feb. 20, 1861, 36th Cong., 2d sess., p. 275, http:// memory . loc . gov 
/ ammem / amlaw / lwcg . html.
14Logistical regression is a statistical tool used to predict the likelihood of an outcome 
as a function of explanatory variables— here, the party of the representative or senator— 
when the dependent variable is dichotomous (that is, the vote is  either yes or no).
Fig. 3. U.S. government bud get: what a difference a year makes! (Source: HSUS, Series 
Ea584–5)
Fig. 4. Import duties as a percentage of import values, 1840–95. (Source: HSUS, Series 
Ee429)
Fig. 5. House vote on Morrill Tariff by region, May 10, 1860. (Source: http:// memory . loc 
. gov / ammem / amlaw / lwcg . html)
Fig .   6 . Morrill Tariff vote by party. (Source: http:// memory . loc . gov / ammem / amlaw / lwcg 
. html)
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shaping virtually all of the legislation concerning the nation’s finances dur-
ing the war.
But was Justin Morrill’s tariff enough? Not by a long shot. As figure 2 
illustrates, import duties went from covering about 80  percent of federal 
spending in 1860 to covering only 10  percent less than two years  later. Tar-
iff revenues did not come close to matching the federal government’s enor-
mous new expenditures.
So the Thirty- Seventh Congress had to resort to other mea sures. Shortly 
 after the rout at Bull Run, the Revenue Act of 1861 increased customs 
 duties still further, imposed taxes on real estate and other property, re-
quired direct taxes on each state, and, most shocking of all, included an 
individual income tax (which was beefed up a year  later). House Demo crats 
 were 253 times as likely to vote no as House Republicans for this law. As 
figure 8 shows, however, I could not perform a logistical regression for the 
Senate,  because not a single Republican senator voted no.15
How much did the vari ous taxes bring in? Figure 9 breaks down federal 
receipts by category for the years 1861 to 1865. Just like  today, “sin” taxes 
15The vote appears in House Journal, Aug. 2, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 226–27; 
Senate Journal, Aug. 2, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st sess., p. 167, http:// memory . loc . gov / ammem 
/ amlaw / lwcg . html.
Fig .   7 .  Percent Republican, by House, Thirty- Sixth– Thirty- Eighth Congresses. 
(Source: Congressional Globe, Thirty­ Sixth– Thirty­ Eighth Congresses, http:// memory . loc . gov 
/ ammem / amlaw / lwcg . html)
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on liquor and tobacco  were part of the package. Liquor eventually bore a 
tax of almost ten times its cost, cigars up to 100  percent of cost. Of course, 
 these high rates created incentives to avoid tax. The revenue from the 
 liquor tax went from $28 million in fiscal year 1864 to only $15 million a 
year  later— and I doubt that  people became teetotalers.16
16Susan B. Car ter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, 
Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright, eds., Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial 
Edition (New York, 2006), ser. EA588–592, pp. 600–602, http:// dx . doi . org / 10 . 1017 
/ ISBN–9780511132971 . A . ESS . 01.
Fig .   8 . Revenue Act of 1861 vote by party. (Source: http:// memory . loc . gov / ammem / amlaw 
/ lwcg . html)
Fig .  9 . Federal receipts by category, 1861–65. (Source: HSUS, Series Ea588–92, 600–02)
Fig. 10. Federal expenditures by category, 1861–65. (Source: Wesley Mitchell, “Greenbacks 
and the Cost of the Civil War,” Journal of Po liti cal Economy 5 [1897]:117–56)
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The income tax fi nally started generating funds by the end of 1864, and 
a tax on manufactured items played a role as well. One innovation was with-
holding at the source—by 1865, almost half of income tax revenue was 
collected via withholding.
Yet note that the maximum height of the columns in figure 9 is only about 
$100 million, and recall that expenditures had reached $500 million in 1862. 
Spending only grew from then on, as figure 10 shows. Taxes simply could 
not cover the massive bills piling up for the federal government.
A Desperate Government Turns to Borrowing
To meet its obligations, the federal government had to borrow— a lot (fig. 11). 
Some borrowing came in the form of standard interest- bearing bonds— 
although, as I discuss  later, the Trea sury had to resort to innovative ways of 
unloading this traditional sort of debt  because of the sheer volume involved. 
The not- so- standard way of obtaining additional funds was to create them 
out of thin air.
Fig. 11. Federal deficit and debt, 1861–65. (Source: HSUS, Series Cj35, Ea586–7)
To Form a More Perfect (Financial) Union    41
Greenbacks and National Banks
How exactly did the federal government “create” funds? It simply printed 
up pieces of paper and required its suppliers, creditors, and employees to 
take them in lieu of any other form of payment.  These pieces of paper  were 
the (in)famous greenbacks depicted in figure 12, so named for the distinctive 
green ink on the reverse side.17 Like the currency we have  today, green-
backs  were fiat money— they  were not backed by gold or silver but rather 
drew their value from the government saying they had value.18 The U.S. 
government thus made a radical decision: to finance the war, it departed 
from the specie standard to which it had adhered since colonial days and to 
which its major trading partners still subscribed.19
Note two features of the greenback: the unusual signature of U.S. Trea-
surer Francis E. Spinner and the portrait. Both deserve a short mention  here.
Francis Spinner made history not only for his notorious signature but also 
for hiring the first female federal government employees. Although he en-
dured merciless criticism for this act, he defended himself by saying that the 
 women clerks  were hardworking and efficient, and that they had excellent 
work habits and integrity. Best of all, many of them eventually could pro-
duce near- perfect copies of his signature— essential, given the number of 
greenbacks  going out the door. Spinner left unmentioned the fact that fe-
males earned only half the pay of the male clerks.20
The face on the greenback is that of Salmon P. Chase, U.S. secretary of 
the Trea sury at the time. Although his visage is commanding, not every one 
held him in high esteem: as one scholar put it, “Mr.  Chase is a man of 
17State banknotes constituted the main form of paper currency  after the demise of the 
Second Bank of the United States. State notes typically  were blank on the reverse side. For 
discussion of the Second Bank, see Ralph Catterall, The Second Bank of the United States 
(Chicago, 1903).
18The value of fiat money implicitly comes from a government’s ability to tax its 
citizens. The magnitude of its value depends on the trust  people have in the government 
and the degree to which the government relies on fiat money to fund operations.
19The United States was officially on a bimetallic standard from the beginning of the 
republic  until silver was demonetized in 1900, but it was effectively on a gold standard 
from 1834 to 1971, except for the period 1862–79. Michael Bordo and David Wheelock, 
“Monetary Policy,” in Car ter et al., Historical Statistics of the United States.
20Cindy Aron, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Civil Ser vice: Middle­ Class Workers in Victorian Amer i ca 
(New York, 1987), and Margery Davies,  Woman’s Place Is at the Typewriter: Office Work and Office 
Workers, 1870–1930 (Philadelphia, 1982), discuss the contributions of Francis Spinner.
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impressive appearance and of  great capabilities other than financial.”21 
Consistency was not among his capabilities. Chase enthusiastically sup-
ported the greenback when he sat in charge at the Trea sury, but as chief 
justice of the Supreme Court, he flip- flopped, deciding in 1869 that Con-
gress actually lacked the power to make paper money  legal tender.22
Chief  Justice Chase was responding to the  Legal Tender Acts, which 
had provided the congressional approval necessary for this new form of 
money to be accepted by the general public. As figure 13 depicts, the vote on 
the First  Legal Tender Act was largely, though not completely, along 
party lines.23 In the House, Demo crats  were 250 times as likely to vote no as 
Republicans. The Senate was not quite as monolithic as it had been for the 
Morrill Tariff and the Revenue Act of 1861— Democrats  were only eight 
times as likely to vote no as Republicans.
21Bray Hammond, “The North’s Empty Purse, 1861–62,” American Historical Review 67 
(1961):1–18, quote on p. 9.
22Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869). Hepburn was soon reversed by the 
so- called  Legal Tender Cases of Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. 457 (1871), and 
Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884). For discussion, see Kenneth Dam, “The  Legal 
Tender Cases,” Supreme Court Review (1981):367–412.
23The dates of the three  Legal Tender Acts are February 25, 1862; July 11, 1862; and 
March 3, 1863 (12 Statutes at Large 345, 532, and 709). The details of the First  Legal Tender 
Act vote appear in the House Journal, Feb. 6, 1862, 37th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 278–79, and the 
Senate Journal, Feb. 13, 1862, 37th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 206–7, http:// memory . loc . gov 
/ ammem / amlaw / lwcg . html.
Fig. 12. The (in)famous greenback. (National Numismatic Collection, National Museum 
of American History, Smithsonian Institution)
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Despite the new role of federal greenbacks in the monetary system, gold 
still mattered. Customs duties and, ironically, interest on government bonds 
had to be paid in gold.24  Legal tender was not  legal for every thing.
24Wesley Mitchell, “Greenbacks and the Cost of the Civil War,” Journal of Po liti cal 
Economy 5 (1897):117–56; Wesley Mitchell, “The Value of ‘Greenbacks’ during the Civil 
War,” Journal of Po liti cal Economy 6 (1898):139–67.
Fig. 13. First  Legal Tender Act vote by party. (Source: http:// memory . loc . gov / ammem / amlaw 
/ lwcg . html)
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Not too surprisingly, ordinary citizens started hoarding gold, as figure 14 
exhibits. By July 1, 1862, no coin larger than one cent remained in circula-
tion. This only exacerbated the need for alternative currency and for fed-
eral control over financial markets. Although Congress made stamps 
acceptable as a form of payment, this approval created such a headache for 
the postal ser vice that Postmaster General Montgomery Blair refused to is-
sue additional stamps to be used as currency.25
Consequently, Congress took another bold step: it created a set of na-
tional banks, which could issue national banknotes.  These notes  were 
backed primarily by Trea sury securities— that is, federal debt. To gain 
even more control over financial markets, Congress taxed state banknotes 
out of existence.26  These mea sures thus formed a market for federal bonds 
while at the same time making the issuance of state banknotes too expen-
sive to continue. Figure  15 shows what happened to the number of and 
25Wesley Mitchell, “The Circulating Medium during the Civil War,” Journal of Po liti cal 
Economy 10 (1902):537–74.
26Act of July 13, 1866, upheld in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869).
Fig .  14 . Percentage of specie held by the public, 1859–65 (biannually). (Source: HSUS, 
Series Cj29, 33)
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assets held by state and national banks between 1850 and 1895. During the 
Civil War and for about a de cade thereafter, national banks dominated the 
financial arena.
Another way to visualize what happened during the war is to look at the 
composition of the money supply. As figure 16 depicts, the proportions of 
specie and state banknotes plummeted, whereas the proportions of green-
backs and federal debt skyrocketed.
Fig. 15. Number of and assets in state and national banks, 1850–95. (Source: HSUS, Series 
Cj149–50, 212–13)
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Fig.  16. Proportion of money supply by type, 1859–66. (Source: HSUS, Series Cj29, 
34–37, 41)
Fig. 17. National banknotes. (Source: Office of the Comptroller of the Trea sury, Bureau of Print­
ing and Engraving)
Fig. 17. (Continued)
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Although the United States now had a national currency (at least in the 
North), it was by no means the uniform set of bills we have  today. Figure 17 
shows a few examples of national banknotes: the prominent feature is not 
the phrase “national currency” but rather the name of the bank of issuance. 
The United States continued to have a number of diff er ent sorts of 
banknotes— although they  were federal rather than state issued. This cre-
ated its own set of prob lems,  because to redeem them the holder had to take 
them back to the original bank of issuance.27 Once issued, then, the notes 
circulated  until they became so tattered and filthy that  people considered 
them a public health hazard.28 The original- issuance rule also meant diffi-
culties in returning to the gold standard  after the war, but that is history for 
another day.
Congress was not as  eager to institute national banking as it had been to 
do other  things to fund the Union war effort (fig. 18). In fact, the National 
Bank Act barely squeaked by in the Senate, where the vote was 22–21. Demo-
crats  were sixty- one times as likely to vote no as Republicans in the House; 
this figure was only nine in the Senate.29
As vari ous graphs in this chapter have shown, tariffs and taxes  were quite 
polarizing by po liti cal party. But the parties  were closer together— 
particularly in the Senate— when it came to experiments with fiat money 
and national banks. It was not clear to politicians of the day that the coun-
try needed national banking, and some modern scholars agree. The New 
York Clearing house and the Suffolk Bank of Boston had done a decent low- 
cost job of evaluating state banknotes and lubricating financial transac-
tions before the war.30
So why duplicate the banking system? Primarily  because the national 
banks provided a ready outlet for the burgeoning government debt. The 
27George Selgin and Lawrence White, “Monetary Reform and the Redemption of 
National Bank Notes, 1863–1913,” Business History Review 68 (1994):205–43.
28Ibid., p. 209.
29House Journal, Feb. 20, 1863, 37th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 442–43; Senate Journal, Feb. 12, 
1863, 37th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 240–41, http:// memory . loc . gov / ammem / amlaw / lwcg . html.
30For discussion, see Hammond, Sovereignty and an Empty Purse, pp. 136–37; Charles 
Calomiris and Charles Kahn, “The Efficiency of Self- Regulated Payments Systems: 
Learning from the Suffolk System,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 28 (1996):766–97; 
Arthur Rolnick and Warren Weber, “New Evidence on the  Free Banking Era,” American 
Economic Review 73 (1983):1080–91; and Gary Gorton, “Clearing houses and the Origin of 
Central Banking in the United States,” Journal of Economic History 45 (1985):277–83.
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federal government needed a willing buyer for federal bonds, and the na-
tional banks provided it.
The sheer amount of debt gave  people— and politicians— pause. Figure 19 
shows the steep increase in real ($1860) per capita federal debt from the 
beginning of the republic. Part of the reluctance to sanction national bank-
ing stemmed from worries over the mounting obligations incurred by the 
federal government. The same fear colored the debate over greenbacks. 
Fig.  18. National Bank Act vote by party. (Source: http:// memory . loc . gov / ammem / amlaw 
/ lwcg . html)
50    Jenny Bourne
 Because virtually every one expected that the departure from the gold stan-
dard was a temporary war time mea sure, greenbacks constituted a form of 
government borrowing as well.
Borrowing from the Private Sector
Swallowing the amount of borrowing necessary to pay its bills was no 
easy task for a country at war, even with the addition of the new national 
banks. Thus was born yet another financial innovation: the U.S. Trea sury 
turned to a private financier, Jay Cooke, to get government bonds into the 
hands of the public.
Cooke advertised directly to the  people, appealing to their patriotism. 
As an example, a notice placed in the Philadelphia Inquirer on November 12, 
1861, said “Receipts . . .  at the office of Mr. Jay Cooke  were $38,079.16, much 
of which was from ladies. On Monday the office is kept open till nine  o’clock, 
Fig .   19 . Real ($1860) per capita federal debt, 1791–1866. (Source: HSUS, Series Cc2; 
Ea587, 651)
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to enable  those employed during the day to call and subscribe to this most 
patriotic and best of investments.”
Two of the largest issues Cooke handled  were the 5-20 loans of 1863— bearer 
bonds that paid 5  percent interest at maturity— and the 7-30s of 1861, 1864, 
and 1865, which paid 7.3  percent interest.31 An opinion piece on the 5-20s 
appearing in the Philadelphia Inquirer on January 22, 1864, extolled Cooke’s 
efforts and, again, appealed to patriotism: “Jay Cooke . . .  and his sub- 
agents . . .  sold $516 million . . .  within nine months . . .  all taken by the 
loyal  people in our own country. . . .  This loan . . .  is a patriotic cord which 
unites the  people and binds them to the welfare of the nation, and makes 
 every man, and the  women too, God bless them, feel an individual interest 
in the prosperity of the country.”
When the  later 7-30s came out, Cooke took out full- page ads in  every 
Northern newspaper explaining that the federal bonds  were not taxable by 
states and that holders could be sure that the federal government’s taxing 
authority would guarantee bond redemption. Cooke even suggested that 
clergymen advocate the loan in their sermons.32 His efforts succeeded: an 
article in the New York Tribune (March 30, 1865) reported the journey of a 
boy who traveled all the way to Philadelphia from western Indiana to buy 
7-30s from Jay Cooke himself. The same article related the story of a Ger-
man man who walked thirty miles to Dubuque, Iowa, in a protective cover 
of rags to invest his and his neighbors’ money in the 7-30s.
Not only was Cooke’s effort the first example of the use of marketing to 
encourage  people to buy bonds, but it also familiarized the ordinary citizen 
with the notion of holding government debt. Before the war, less than 
1  percent of Americans owned securities of any sort. By war’s end, Jay Cooke 
alone had sold federal bonds to about 5  percent of the population of the 
North.
 Whether this was a blessing or a curse is a  matter of controversy. Jay 
Cooke himself wrote a front- page editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer ( June 17, 
1865) declaring that our national debt was a blessing. But an opinion piece 
in the June 23, 1865, New York Herald said this:
31James Gherity, “Interest- Bearing Currency: Evidence from the Civil War Experience,” 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25 (1993):125–31.
32Ellis Oberholtzer, Jay Cooke, Financier of the Civil War, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1907).
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 There is  little dissimilarity between the national debt and the system of slav-
ery.  Under slavery three or four hundred thousand slaveholders lived upon 
the  labor of 4 million blacks.  Under the national debt 3 or 400 thousand 
bondholders are to live upon the  labor of 30 millions of whites. . . .  The hold-
ers of the national debt have a mortgage upon the bodies of all the working 
men in the land, just as the slaveowners had mortgages upon the bodies of 
their slaves.
This author expressed a valid point— what makes government bonds valu-
able to their  owners is the promise of  future taxation that  will enable the 
government to pay up. So government bonds constitute an asset to their 
holders, but a liability to  future taxpayers.
The “Inflation” Tax
The “worth” or “wealth” represented by government bonds clearly depends 
on viewpoint. But the situation is even more complicated than that: the asset 
value of government bonds can erode if the government does not maintain 
the value of the dollar. If antebellum bondholders paid for the obligations 
in currency worth one dollar in gold but redeemed them for currency 
worth far less, the government potentially extracted extra funds via an “in-
flation” tax.33
Inflation ran rampant during the Civil War, as figure 20 makes clear. 
Some prices increased as much as fourfold over the course of the conflict.34
As prices  rose, the value of greenbacks fell. Figure 21 shows that green-
back value depended on action on the battlefield as well as activity on the 
Hill. At the lowest point, one hundred dollars in greenbacks bought less than 
forty dollars’ worth of gold.
But bondholders prob ably  were not the ones who suffered most from in-
flation. Despite depreciation in the value of their portfolios, at least they 
had them. Many  people did not, including most enlisted men. What 
33The amount extracted depends on the interest rate for dollar- denominated assets 
relative to that for gold- denominated assets. If  people anticipate inflation, for example, 
they would require a relatively higher interest rate on dollar- denominated assets to 
compensate for the loss in the value of the principal. Much of the inflation of the Civil War 
was unanticipated, however. Jeffrey Williamson, “Watersheds and Turning Points: 
Conjectures on the Long- Term Impact of Civil War Financing,” Journal of Economic History 
34 (1974):636–61.
34Mitchell, “Greenbacks and the Cost of the Civil War,” p. 129.
Fig. 20. Monthly commodity prices, 1860–65. (Source: Wesley Mitchell, “Greenbacks and the 
Cost of the Civil War,” Journal of Po liti cal Economy 5 [1897]:117–56)
Fig.  21. Specie value of greenback, January 1862– December 1865 (face=100). (Source: 
Wesley Mitchell, “The Value of the Greenback during the Civil War,” Journal of Po liti cal Economy 
6 [March 1898]:139–67)
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Fig.  22. Specie value (purchasing power) of monthly pay, white privates, July 
1861– December 1865. (Source: Wesley Mitchell, “Greenbacks and the Cost of the Civil War,” 
Journal of Po liti cal Economy 5 [1897]:117–56)
happened to their income during the war? One of the first war mea sures, 
enacted in August  1861, was to increase the pay of privates from eleven 
dollars a month to thirteen dollars a month— thirteen dollars in greenbacks, 
not in gold.  There it stayed  until May 1864, when it  rose to a handsome 
sixteen dollars.35 Figure  22 shows the erosion in purchasing power of the 
monthly pay of white privates.  Things  were even worse for African Ameri-
cans, who  until June 1864 earned a mere ten dollars a month, from which 
three dollars  were taken for a clothing allowance.36
Soldiers  were not the only ones to suffer a decline in the value of their 
paychecks. As just one example, teachers in 1865 earned about half of what 
they  were paid at the beginning of the war in terms of gold.37 In so many 
ways it was the ordinary citizen who paid for the Civil War.
35Ibid., pp. 134, 152.
36U.S. National Archives, http:// www . archives . gov / education / lessons / blacks - civil - war / .
37Mitchell, “Greenbacks and the Cost of the Civil War,” p. 140.
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 After the War: What Remained?
Several war mea sures dis appeared  after 1865, at least for a time. Tariff rates 
subsided and tariffs again loomed large in the revenue stream  until the early 
1890s, as figures 2 and 4 depict. The income tax vanished in 1872—at least 
for a few de cades. Excise taxes went away too, except for the ones on alco-
hol and tobacco.
As figure 23 shows, federal spending subsided as well and the country 
returned to a more sustainable debt burden, although both state and 
federal governments settled down to a larger role than they had played 
before the war. The nation also went back to the gold standard in 1879; 
in so  doing, it endured a deflationary pro cess that was nearly as painful 
as the inflationary one.38 In nominal terms, the debt burden per capita 
declined nearly continuously  after the war, but the real debt burden did 
not begin to fall  until  after the country had fully restored the gold 
standard.
State banks regained their footing (see fig. 15), in part  because of ineffi-
cient management of the national system.39 But state banks never again is-
sued their own notes.
Despite the apparent temporary nature of some war programs, the 
words of John Sherman ring true: by the end of the Civil War, Americans 
(at least in the North) had a “broader and more generous nationality” than 
they did at the beginning. This may have partly been due to widespread 
travels of young soldiers—my great- great- grandfathers had never left the 
confines of Baker Township in Morgan County, Indiana,  until they trav-
eled to Natchez, Mississippi, and Appomattox,  Virginia. The world grew 
for them.
The financial experiments undertaken by the Thirty- Seventh Congress 
also planted seeds that grew strong roots and bore  later fruit. The income 
tax returned via the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 and remains an impor tant 
38For discussion, see James Kindahl, “Economic  Factors in Specie Resumption in the 
United States, 1865–1879,” Journal of Po liti cal Economy 69 (1961):30–48.
39Richard Sylla, “Monetary Innovation in Amer i ca,” Journal of Economic History 31 
(1982):21–30.
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Fig. 23. Real ($1860) per capita federal revenue, federal expenditure, state and local tax 
revenue, federal debt, 1850–95. (Sources: John Wallis, “American Government Finance in the 
Long Run: 1790–1990,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 [2000]:61–82; HSUS, Series Cc2, 
Ea584–5, 587, 651)
revenue raiser for the federal government  today.40 War time financing using 
massive government borrowing reappeared in both world wars and the 
40The individual income tax raised 47  percent of revenue for the federal government in 
fiscal year 2012. Office of Management and Bud get, Bud get of the U.S. Government, 
 Table 2.2.
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Vietnam conflict, and it has now become routine even during times of rela-
tive peace—so much so that we have imposed “debt ceilings” on ourselves, 
which have in turn recently led the United States to the brink of default on 
its obligations.41
What is more, the impossibility of maintaining the gold standard in the 
face of monetary expansion and large federal expenditures on Vietnam and 
the  Great Society programs meant a permanent shift to fiat money in 1971, 
which was undertaken by another (though quite diff er ent) Republican 
president. Not only does the United States operate on fiat money, but it now 
truly has a unified currency, which includes a portrait of Salmon Chase on 
the $10,000 bill.
The movement  toward nationalization of banks and currency led to the 
creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913 and federal deposit insurance in 1933, 
which have ineluctably bound the federal government to the banking system. 
Banks and bank- like institutions are now considered “too big to fail,” and 
the federal government has come to their rescue many times over the past 
thirty years. Actions include the bailouts of Continental Illinois in 1984, 
Long- Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1998, and AIG (American 
International Group) in 2008, as well as the Emergency Economic Stabili-
zation Act of 2008, which authorized the Trea sury Department to buy or 
insure up to $700 billion in troubled assets.
Perhaps most significantly, the Civil War made us grapple with funda-
mental questions about the role of government generally and the role of 
the federal government specifically. Importantly, monetary policies en-
acted by the Thirty- Seventh Congress  later led to a broad interpretation 
of the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution42 when the Supreme 
41The website http:// www . whitehouse . gov / omb / budget / Historicals offers numerous 
 tables showing federal revenues and expenditures. Congress first imposed limits on  
the debt in 1917. In 1979, Representative Richard Gephardt (D- Mo.) proposed a parliamentary 
rule that effectively raised the debt ceiling when a bud get was passed. Congress repealed 
the rule in 1995, which led to a bud get controversy and a government shutdown. A delay 
in raising the debt ceiling in 2011 led to the first- ever downgrade in the federal government’s 
credit rating. The United States strug gled throughout 2013  after it reached the debt ceiling 
on December 31, 2012, with the government coming to the very brink of default in 
October 2013.
42U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 18: “The Congress  shall have power to make all 
laws which  shall be necessary and proper for carry ing into execution the foregoing powers, 
and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or 
in any department or officer thereof.”
58    Jenny Bourne
Court validated the use of paper money in the  Legal Tender Cases.43 As 
one scholar put it: “The authorization of the greenbacks was of greater 
significance in the evolution of federal powers than in monetary history 
and of greater importance to the student of government than to the 
economist.”44
43Dam, “The  Legal Tender Cases,” p. 390, argues that the  Legal Tender Cases are key 
to understanding current interpretations of the necessary and proper clause. Gerald 
Magliocca, “A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the  Legal Tender 
Cases,” Georgetown Law Journal 95 (2006):119–70, concluded that the operative standard in 
implied power cases comes from the  Legal Tender Cases.
44Hammond, Sovereignty and an Empty Purse, p. 227.
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Alt hough Cl a r a Ba rton and a few other  women had broken the gender barrier to employment in the federal government when they 
worked in the Patent Office in the early 1850s, by 1860 no  women worked 
in federal government offices in Washington.1 The war time employment of 
female clerical workers in the federal government dates to the fall of 1861, 
when Francis E. Spinner (fig. 1), trea surer of the United States, began to 
employ  women to cut and count Trea sury notes. Abraham Lincoln had ap-
pointed Spinner, a former congressman from New York, as trea surer in 
March 1861. The mobilization for war drew tens of thousands of men from 
the workforce while si mul ta neously expanding the need for clerical laborers. 
1Robert McClelland, secretary of the interior  under Franklin Pierce from 1853 to 1857, 
wrote to Mas sa chu setts Representative Alexander De Witt on September 27, 1855, 
regarding Clara Barton: “ There is  every disposition on my part, to do anything for the 
lady in question, except to retain her, or any of the other females at work in the rooms of 
the Patent Office. I have no objection to the employment of females by the Patent office, or 
any other of the Bureaus of the Department, in the per for mance of such duties as they are 
competent to discharge, and which may be executed by them at their private residences, 
but  there is such an obvious impropriety in the mixing of the sexes within the walls of a 
public office, that I determined to arrest the practice, though not  until  after full consideration, 
on account of the probable effect on some, now enjoying the emoluments of such  labor.” 
Robert McClelland to Alexander De Witt, Sept. 27, 1855, vol. 1, 224, Rec ord Group 48: 
Rec ords of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, Entry 186: Rec ords of the Patents 
and Miscellaneous Letters Division, 1813–1943, General Rec ords, 1813–1926, Miscellaneous 
Letters Sent, 1849–1906, National Archives and Rec ords Administration, College Park, 
Md. (hereafter NARA).
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Abraham Lincoln and “Government 
Girls” in War time Washington
Fig. 1. Francis Elias Spinner, trea surer of the United States (1861–75), photo graph ca. 
1860–65. (Brady­ Handy Photo graph Collection, Prints and Photo graphs Division, Library of 
Congress)
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When he arrived in Washington, Spinner found a “score or more of hale and 
hearty young men, armed with small shears, busy clipping the notes.” 
Spinner went to Secretary of the Trea sury Salmon P. Chase and declared 
that “ these young men should have muskets instead of shears placed in their 
hands, and be sent to the front, and their places filled by  women, who would 
do more and better work, at half the pay that was given to  these ‘men mil-
liners.’ ” Spinner continued, “A  woman can use scissors better than a man, 
and she  will do it cheaper. I want to employ  women to cut the Trea sury 
notes.” When Chase hesitated, Spinner suggested that they employ one 
 woman as a test. Spinner’s handpicked subject, Miss Jennie Douglass, did 
more work than any of the male clerks on the first day. “This deci ded the 
 whole  matter,” Spinner recalled. An 1869 editorial in the New York Times 
explic itly declared that “it is . . .  owing to Mr. Spinner, more than to any 
other man, that this department of  labor is now open in any degree to 
 women” (fig. 2).2
2Mary Elizabeth Massey, Bonnet Brigades (New York, 1966), 132; Mary Clemmer, Ten 
Years in Washington: or, Inside Life and Scenes in Our National Capital as a  Woman Sees Them 
Fig.  2. “Lady Clerks Leaving the Trea sury Department at Washington,” by A.  B. 
Waud, Harper’s Weekly, Feb. 18, 1865. (https:// babel . hathitrust . org / cgi / pt ? id​=​iau . 31858029244328; 
view​=​1up;seq​=​106)
62    Daniel W. Stowell
Although the war created and relentlessly expanded the need for female 
clerical workers to perform vari ous tasks in the burgeoning federal bureau-
cracy, it also created a supply of  widows, orphans, and  others desperate for 
work to support themselves and their families. The Trea sury Department 
and other bureaus and offices in Washington became “a vast refuge for the 
unfortunate and the unsuccessful.”3 According to a  woman familiar with 
the pro cess, “in order to secure any Government position, the first  thing a 
 woman had to do was to go and tell her story to a man—in all probability 
a stranger— who possessed the appointing power.” If the man took a per-
sonal interest in her story, he might recommend her appointment; if not, she 
had no chance of gaining the position, “ unless she could succeed in win-
ning over to her cause another man of equal po liti cal power.”4 Although 
most sought the aid of congressmen and senators, for a substantial number 
of  women across the North, the only man to whom they felt they could 
apply for aid was President Abraham Lincoln.
As early as the fall of 1861,  women began writing to and visiting Abraham 
Lincoln requesting assistance in obtaining jobs in the Trea sury Department. 
On September 8, 1861, Mary V. Tennison wrote to the president, imploring 
him for assistance. Her husband had been dismissed from the United 
States Revenue Ser vice for intoxication, and her  mother and two  little 
 children depended on her for support. Having heard of Lincoln’s “goodness 
and kindness,” she “made bold to write and request” that she receive some 
copy- work from one of the departments or bureaus of the government. “I am 
quite hard of hearing,” she continued, “which adds to my trou ble, as that 
infirmity precludes my teaching or other wise trying to support myself and 
 family.” She appealed to him as “most gracious President, believing that as 
the chief Magistrate and the  Father of this  great country, you  will not hear 
my petition in vain.” As with most of the surviving letters written to him, 
(Hartford, Conn., 1873), pp. 371–73; Ross K. Baker, “Entry of  Women into the Federal Job 
World—at a Price,” Smithsonian 8 ( July 1977):82–91; Nomination of Francis E. Spinner as 
Trea surer of the United States, Mar. 16, 1861, vol. 8, p. 220, Rec ord Group 59, Entry 774: 
Appointment Rec ords, Commissions, Miscellaneous Permanent and Temporary 
Presidential Commissions, 1789–1972, NARA; “General Spinner and the  Women Clerks,” 
 Woman’s Journal 16 ( Jan. 10, 1891):1–2; New York Times, Feb. 18, 1869, p. 2. See also Cindy S. 
Aron, “ ‘To Barter Their Souls for Gold’: Female Clerks in the Federal Government 
Offices, 1862–1890,” Journal of American History 67 (1981):835–53.
3Mrs. John A. Logan, Thirty Years in Washington or Life and Scenes in our National Capital 
(Hartford, Conn., 1901), p. 208.
4Clemmer, Ten Years in Washington, p. 374.
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 there is no endorsement by the president, so it remains uncertain  whether 
he read the letter and forwarded it to the Trea sury Department or  whether 
his secretaries did so for him.5
Other  women appealed in person to the president. On September 16, Lin-
coln wrote to Secretary Chase, “The  bearer of this— Mrs.  Ryder— has 
learned that  there is some ‘lady’s work’ in your Department in connection 
with the Trea sury notes, and wishes a chance for a share of it, if such be the 
fact.” Lincoln closed his brief note, “Please give her a fair hearing.”6
Another brief, ungrammatical letter arrived a few months  later from Jane 
Munsell informing the president that “I have no imployment found yet” and 
requesting a place in the Trea sury Department “cliping notes.” This letter 
did receive a coveted endorsement from Lincoln. The president wrote sim-
ply, “Respectfully submitted to the Trea sury Department. A. Lincoln, 
Nov. 13, 1861.”  There is no indication, however, that Jane Munsell obtained 
a job in the Trea sury Department.7
Victorian codes of conduct discouraged  women from writing to a man 
they had never met, even, or especially, the president of the United States. 
Most of Lincoln’s female correspondents who sought jobs with the govern-
ment asked his  pardon for addressing a letter to him. “ Pardon my pre-
sumption, in addressing you. Imperious necessity impels . . .” read one.8 
Charlotte S. Reed of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, asked, “I must beg you 
to excuse my presumption in asking your interference in my behalf, I feel 
that it is a privilege, that  every loyal citizen of the United States may ad-
dress the highest authority known to our government.”9 Missouri G. W. 
Finley of New York City wrote, “I feel that it is presumptuous, for one so 
 humble in position, to address a note, to one so high in power.”10 “You  will 
I hope  pardon the liberty I have taken,” Helen V. White of Baltimore wrote 
5Mary V. Tennison to Abraham Lincoln (hereafter AL), Sept. 8, 1861, Box 571, RG 56: 
General Rec ords of the Department of the Trea sury, Entry 210: Part II, Rec ords of 
Vari ous Divisions within the Office of the Secretary of the Trea sury, Rec ords of the 
Division of Appointments, Correspondence of the Division, Applications and 
Recommendations for positions in the Washington, D.C. Offices of the Trea sury 
Department, 1830–1910, NARA.
6AL to Salmon P. Chase, Sept. 16, 1861, in Roy P. Basler et al., eds., Collected Works of 
Abraham Lincoln, Second Supplement (New Brunswick, N.J., 1990), p. 34.
7Jane Munsell to AL, Nov. 12, 1861, RG 56, Entry 210, NARA.
8Mrs. M. W. Perrine to AL, Dec. 12, 1861, ibid.
9Charlotte S. Reed to AL, May 27, 1863, ibid.
10Missouri G. W. Finley to AL, Nov. 30, 1863, ibid.
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in December 1863, “by addressing you, considering the position you occupy, 
which is so far superior to my own, but owing to my circumstances I am 
compelled so to do.”11
Young  women sometimes wrote together to the president, perhaps en-
couraging each other to overcome the sense of impropriety they felt. Mollie 
Howard and Annie White of Friendship, New York, wrote to the president, 
“You  will doubtless be surprised at receiving a letter from us, who are entire 
strangers, and may think we are presuming to much in thus familliarly ad-
dressing you. [W]e hope we are not transcending the bounds of propriety 
in so  doing. But, sir it is from the most honorable motives we assume the 
liberty.” They had learned from a young man in Rochester that “respect-
able young ladies could find employment in Washington in the Mint stamp-
ing Green Backs.” As they  were “fatherless, and dependent on our own 
resources for a livelihood,” they thought they should apply for a position, 
“it being more lucriferous business than that which we are now engaged in; 
we are daily laboring for the small pittance of .25 cts which at the pres ent 
time  will hardly afford us the necessaries of life.”12
Similarly, teachers Florence Watson and Delia Swain of Beaver Dam, 
Wisconsin, apologized for being “very bold and presumptious” in writing 
to the president, “for we know you have other and far more impor tant 
 matters claiming your attention.” Together, the young  women wrote, “we 
have formed this proj ect of writing to you”  because they had learned that in 
some departments, “lady- clerks are employed, and thinking such a situa-
tion would be far more agreeable and profitable than our pres ent one, we 
came to the conclusion that  there could be no harm in writing you a pri-
vate letter.” Surpassing Mollie and Annie’s vocabulary display, Florence and 
Delia even included their photo graphs, “thinking you might wish to know 
how we look.” The young  women continued, “Now dear ‘ Uncle Abe’ we hav-
ing taken one bold step, dare to take another, and say, that we want very 
much to hear from you— whether you can do us any good or not— and re-
ceive the assurance that you are not offended by our unusual conduct.”13
Other applicants apologized for seeking his time  because he had so many 
other pressing duties. “I deem it almost an intrusion at this time to ask you 
11Helen V. White to AL, Dec. 13, 1863, ibid.
12Mollie Howard and Annie White to AL, Jan. 11, 1864, ibid.
13Florence Watson and Delia Swain to AL, Mar. 27, 186[5], ibid.
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for one moments attention,” wrote Carrie Roser of Philadelphia, “but the 
trou ble which has befallen me within the past year almost forces me to so 
bold an act.” Julia Richards of Schnectady, New York, assured the presi-
dent that “I should not have thought of applying to you amid the multiplicity 
of your cares did I not hope you had something in your gift.”14
Twenty- year- old Mary Ann Curry of Pottsville, Pennsylvania, was liv-
ing in Washington, D.C., with her  mother and siblings in the spring of 1862. 
On March 26, she wrote to President Lincoln asking for “some employment 
in any one of the Departments in any capacity where I should be compe-
tent.” She asked for a job to “aid my  mother in supporting a large and 
fatherless  family.” Two of her  brothers  were in the Union army, and she knew 
no one in Washington to aid her. President Lincoln endorsed the envelope 
on March 26, the same date as the letter, “Sec. of Trea sury, please see Mrs 
Curry, and give her employment if pos si ble. A. Lincoln.” Perhaps this first 
endorsement on the envelope was in effec tive, for three weeks  later, Lincoln 
wrote a second endorsement on the back of the letter itself, “Sec. of Trea-
sury, please see this poor  woman, and give her employment if pos si ble. A. 
Lincoln, April 15, 1862.”15
The president’s most recognizable petitioner was Grace Bedell of Albion, 
New York. In October 1860, eleven- year- old Grace Bedell wrote to candi-
date Abraham Lincoln to suggest that he grow a beard: “you  will look a  great 
deal better for your face is so thin.” She told him that she had four  brothers 
and “part of them  will vote for you any way and if you  will let your whis kers 
grow I  will try and get the rest of them to vote for you. . . .  My  father is  going 
to vote for you and if I was a man I would vote for you to but I  will try and 
get  every one to vote for you that I can.” Four days  later, Lincoln responded: 
“As to the whis kers, having never worn any, do you not think  people  will 
call it a piece of silly affection if I  were to begin now?” and signed the letter 
“Your very sincere well- wisher.” On his inaugural journey to Washington, 
President- elect Lincoln stopped in Westfield, New York, and asked a crowd 
14Carrie Roser to AL, Mar. 3, 1862; Julia Richards to AL, Apr. 17, 1863, ibid.
15Mary Ann Curry to AL, Mar. 26, 1862, ibid.; U.S. Census Office, Eighth Census of 
the United States (1860), Schuylkill County, PA, Pottsville North East Ward, p. 425. 
According to the 1860 census, Mary Ann Curry was a milliner, and her  father, Patrick 
Curry, was a sixty- year- old innkeeper born in Ireland. Her  mother, Ellen Curry, was 
forty- four in 1860.
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of admirers if Grace Bedell was pres ent. When the crowd passed her for-
ward, he showed her his new whis kers and gave her a kiss.16
On January 14, 1864, Bedell, now fifteen and “grown to the size of a 
 woman” in her own estimation, again wrote to Abraham Lincoln. Having 
heard that “a large number of girls are employed constantly and with good 
wages at Washington cutting Trea sury notes and other  things pertaining to 
that Department,” she asked the president to show that he was her “true 
friend and well- wisher,” as he had signed his letter to her. Her  father had 
lost nearly all of his property, and she wanted a job to support herself and 
perhaps help her parents, although they  were “ignorant of this application 
to you for assistance.” Apparently, she had written earlier but received no 
reply; she “chose rather to think you had failed to receive it. Not believing 
that your natu ral kindness of heart of which I have heard so much would 
prompt you to pass it by unanswered.”17 Unfortunately, we do not know if 
Lincoln ever saw  either of the letters she sent. However, she did not get a 
job in the Trea sury Department.
First Lady Mary Lincoln sometimes became involved in the recommen-
dation of  women for positions. In April 1862, Abraham Lincoln wrote a brief 
note to Secretary of the Trea sury Chase on behalf of Matilda Ivers: “Mrs L. 
is acquainted with Mrs Ivers,  bearer of this, and  will be obliged if the Sec. 
of the Trea sury can give her employment.” Seventeen months  later, Ivers 
wrote to Lincoln, “I ocupied a position in the note treming room in the Trea-
suary Department through yours and Mrs.  L  favor[.] when the worke 
ceased wee  were all dismised and I have not yet bein reappointed.” Ivers 
hoped that Lincoln would “bee kind enough to renew your faver for I am in 
the gretest need[.] Pleas give mee a note to Mr Chittenden and one to Mr 
Spinner[.]” In response, Lincoln wrote on the letter, “I have no recollection 
of Mrs Ivers, or of the card it seems I have given her; but as it is in my hand 
writing, I suppose Mrs L. told me that she knew the lady.”18
The register of female clerks lists Mrs. Lincoln as one of  those recom-
mending Mrs. E. D. Baker of Illinois for a position. On May 18, 1864, Baker 
received an appointment as a copyist in the Trea sury Department. She was 
the wife of Edward D. Baker Jr., son of Lincoln’s Illinois friend and colleague 
16Grace Bedell to AL, Oct. 15, 1860, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public 
Library, Detroit, Mich.; AL to Grace Bedell, Oct. 19, 1860, Private Collection.
17Grace G. Bedell to AL, Jan. 14, 1864, RG 56, Entry 210, NARA.
18AL to Salmon P. Chase, Apr. 4, 1862; Matilda Ivers to AL, ca. September 1863, ibid.
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Edward D. Baker,  after whom the Lincolns named their second son in 1846. 
 After the elder Baker’s death at the  Battle of Ball’s Bluff in October 1861, 
President Lincoln had helped Edward D. Baker Jr. in his ascent through the 
commissioned officer ranks from second lieutenant to captain and assistant 
quartermaster by March 1863.19
Other connections also prompted the president to act on behalf of par-
tic u lar candidates. In January 1864, M. A. Snead wrote to Lincoln, explain-
ing that “Joshua F. Speed brought me to this city and obtained for me an 
appointment in the Office of Internal Revenue.” She lost the position, and 
 because both Speed and another supporter  were out of town, she turned to 
Lincoln, “knowing your friendship for Mr Speed, in the hope that for his 
sake and  because I was one of the only two Kentucky ladies employed in the 
Trea sury, you  will not refuse me your assistance.” She closed, “Let my be-
ing a Kentuckian and the especial protégé of Mr Speed be my excuses for 
this appeal to yourself.” Lincoln endorsed the letter by writing, “I do not 
personally know, or remember about, this lady; but would be glad for her to 
have a hearing.”20
As some of his correspondents and petitioners hoped and believed, a 
recommendation from President Lincoln could be an impor tant asset in 
seeking a job. Laetitia G. Plunkett wrote to the president on August  20, 
1864. The wife of Major William H. Plunkett of the 17th Wisconsin Volun-
teers, twenty- three- year- old Laetitia Plunkett explained that her husband 
was discharged for “disability contracted in the line of duty,”  after serving 
from April 1861 to May 1863. “In his pres ent state of health,” she contin-
ued, “he is unable to earn enough for our support.” She also reminded 
Lincoln that she was the  daughter of Captain Charles Peshall, “an old and 
staunch friend of yours in Illinois,” and told him that her  brother died at 
Fort Donelson, “fighting for his country.” Plunkett’s letter also contained 
an endorsement from Leonard  J. Farwell, former governor of Wisconsin 
and an examiner in the Patent Office, that the Plunketts  were “highly re-
spectable persons.” On August 24, Lincoln added his own endorsement, 
“Commissioner of Internal Revenue, please see & hear this Lady.” One 
19AL to Andrew G. Curtin, May 26, 1862, Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.; 
AL to Joseph P. Taylor, Jan. 31, 1863, Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library and 
Museum, Springfield, Ill.; AL to Montgomery C. Meigs, Feb. 27, 1863, in Roy P. Basler, 
ed., Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J., 1953–55), 6:119.
20Mary A. Snead to AL, ca. January 1864, RG 56, Entry 210, NARA.
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week  later, Laetitia Plunkett received an appointment as a  counter in the 
Trea sury Department.21
Seventeen- year- old Louisa Knowlton also relied on her  father’s relation-
ship with Abraham Lincoln in her application for work. On October 20, 
1864, Knowlton wrote to the president with some trepidation, “I wish to see 
you on business: but never having transacted any for myself before, I feared 
my courage might fail me, did I resort to a verbal communication, before 
so many strangers.” She had introduced herself to Lincoln the previous day 
as the  daughter of Lincoln B. Knowlton, a  lawyer from Illinois. He and Lin-
coln had worked together or in opposition on several cases between 1840 
and 1852, but Knowlton had died in the mid-1850s. Louisa Knowlton wrote 
to Lincoln that “I am a native of dear, old Illinois, as you are also.” She pre-
ferred a job as a copyist, but if that was “difficult of obtaining, any situa-
tion, respectable and remunerative,  will suffice.” She came from Mas sa chu setts 
“with the fond hope that you would assist me.” Her widowed  mother was 
struggling to educate her  family of five  children, and Louisa wanted to help 
by supporting herself and aiding her  mother. “Mr. Lincoln,” she continued, 
“I know you have a  great many applications, which seem trivial and harrass-
ing to you, but which are every thing to the applicants. Please do not turn a 
deaf ear to my petition, but consult the feelings of your own warm, honest 
heart, and be assured, the blessing of the  widow, and her orphaned  children, 
 shall rest upon you, for ever more, and God  will show mercy even as you 
have done.”22
Lincoln endorsed Knowlton’s letter by writing, “I do not personally know 
this lady, but she is, I have no doubt, as she says within, the  daughter of my 
old friend L. B. Knowlton. She writes a very good hand, and I  shall be  really 
glad, if she can get employment. Hon. Sec. of Trea sury please see her.” On 
December 12, 1864, Knowlton received an appointment in the Trea sury 
Department. Fourteen years  later, she was still working for the comptroller 
of the currency at an annual salary of $900.23
In many cases, female applicants mentioned the military ser vice and sac-
rifices of  fathers, sons, and  brothers in support of their applications. In Sep-
tember 1864, New Yorker Julia R. Peck began her letter:
21Laetitia G. Plunkett to AL, Aug. 20, 1864, ibid., General Registry of Ladies, Trea sury 
Department, RG 56, Entry 222: Register of Female Clerks, 1861–68, NARA.
22Louisa W. Knowlton to AL, Oct. 20, 1864, RG 56, Entry 210, NARA.
23Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2:86, appendix for 1878.
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Sir.
My  brother Charles W. Peck A[cting]. A[ssistant]. Surgeon in the Navy, 
died while on duty at Pensacola, Florida; of Yellow Fever.
My  brother Herbert, a Corporal in Duryea’s Zouaves, in his tenth  battle, 
the 2nd of Bull Run, lost one leg, had the bone of the other leg permanently 
injured, and lost a part of his left hand.
My  brothers James B. and Edwin Peck,  were both drafted. . . .
 After reciting her  brothers’ ser vice in the Union armed forces, she implored 
Lincoln’s assistance. Although she had filed her application more than three 
months earlier with the endorsements of her representatives in Congress— 
Senators Ira Harris and Edwin D. Morgan and Representative Homer A. 
Nelson of New York— she had heard nothing more from the Trea sury De-
partment. Lincoln endorsed the letter on the same day, referring it to Wil-
liam P. Fessenden, the new secretary of the Trea sury, with the additional 
comment, “If  there is any such position vacant as that which this lady de-
sires, I hope she may receive it.” She did. Two months  later, on December 23, 
1864, Julia R. Peck received a position in the Trea sury Department.24
D. W. Bliss, a surgeon at a hospital in Washington, wrote a testimonial 
for Mrs. Alice E. Rutdge. He explained that she had been a nurse for sev-
eral months and had recently buried her son, who was a corporal in a New 
York artillery battery. Bliss declared that she was a “capable, devoted and 
valuable Nurse and a lady of estimable character.” Upon reading this, Lin-
coln wrote, “ Will Gen. Spinner please see and hear this lady, who, though 
a stranger to me, I believe is a worthy person, who has lost her son in our 
ser vice.” Not only the president but also many other officials in Washing-
ton believed that the government had an obligation to support  women who 
had lost  fathers, husbands, and sons in the Union armies and navy.25
The employment rec ords in the Trea sury Department also detail the mil-
itary ser vice of male relatives for some of the female clerks. Mrs. Fayetta C. 
Snead of Kentucky had two  brothers in the army. Miss Juliet G. Shearer of 
Pennsylvania had two  brothers who served for three months and two 
 brothers who served for three years in the army. Miss Agnes C. Houston had 
one  brother and seven cousins in the army, and the husband of Mrs. Harriet 
24Julia R. Peck to AL, Sept. 28, 1864, RG 56, Entry 210, NARA.
25D. W. Bliss to unknown, Sept. 19, 1864, ibid.; Cindy S. Aron, Ladies and Gentlemen of 
the Civil Ser vice: Middle­ Class Workers in Victorian Amer i ca (New York, 1987), p. 71.
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McConnell of New York was also in the army. Mrs. Carrie S. Sheads of 
Pennsylvania lost four  brothers in the army, and Miss F. S. Hoey of Ohio 
had a  brother killed at Shiloh and another  brother who served for three 
years. Mrs. Mary A. McCulloch’s husband and her  brother  were killed in 
the military, and Mrs. Mary F. McCaffrey of Ohio lost her husband when 
he was killed at the  Battle of Stone’s River in Tennessee.26
Some of Lincoln’s endorsements on  these letters reflect his appreciation 
of the losses  these  women had suffered. On a letter from a provost marshal 
in New York City recommending Mrs. Mary L. Rusk, Lincoln wrote, “I  shall 
be glad if any Department or Bureau, can &  will give suitable employment 
to this lady who is  widow of one who died in our Naval ser vice.”27
In one remarkable instance, a female applicant cited her own quasi- 
military actions on behalf of the Union cause in Baltimore. Informed that 
the president “possessed a kind and generous heart and that you  were social 
and friendly with  those around you,” Helen M. Linscott wrote that “I am 
an orphan girl— dependent upon my own exertions for a livlihood.” She 
continued, “I am a northerner, but at the commensement of this war I was 
living in the South.”  Because  those with whom she was living  were seces-
sionists, she left them and traveled north, arriving in Baltimore in mid- 
March 1861. She stayed in Baltimore for several weeks and was personally 
acquainted with Marshal of Police George P. Kane, who had well- known 
Southern sympathies. Linscott asserted that on Sunday, April 21, 1861, two 
days  after a mob attacked Mas sa chu setts troops on their way to Washing-
ton, Marshal Kane was planning to attack federal troops encamped in a 
field a few miles from the city. Linscott went to the room where Kane’s am-
munition was stored and wet as many percussion caps and gunpowder as 
she could reach. Asking Lincoln’s  pardon for “taking some much liberty” 
in writing to him, she closed her letter, “If  there is any prospects of my 
getting a situation in Washington, or if you think this scroll is worth your 
notice, you  will please address Helen M. Linscott, South Boston, Mass.”28
Several of Lincoln’s female correspondents  were teachers who had ex-
hausted their health in teaching and  were looking for a healthier and more 
lucrative alternative in clerical work. Maggie T. Millmore of Milwaukee, 
26Alphabetical Index of Names, passim, RG 56, Entry 222, NARA.
27Moses G. Leonard to AL, Oct. 10, 1864, RG 56, Entry 210, NARA.
28Helen M. Linscott to AL, Nov. 14, 1864, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.
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Wisconsin, had no  brothers who  were soldiers, but she had to support her 
el derly parents and had been teaching school for eight years. She had taught 
in Missouri, where she was “dismissed simply for being as they term it a 
Union Lady, a title in which I  shall ever glory,” even though it annoyed many 
of her pupils and their parents. Now twenty- seven, she wrote to the presi-
dent, “being fully persuaded that among the distinguished Personages by 
whom You are surrounded I could apply to no one of them possessing a 
kinder or more paternal heart than the President Himself.” She signed her 
letter, “I am with due reverence and esteem, Your Excellency’s most obedi-
ent and docile subject” and added a postscript, which read, “A line from 
the President, even though it contain a refusal of my request;  shall be trea-
sured by me, as a golden thread, in the web of my existence.”29 President 
Lincoln was never able to respond with that “golden thread.” Maggie Mill-
more wrote to him on April 13, 1865; the next day, he was fatally shot in the 
head at Ford’s Theatre.
Together, this collection of letters from  women seeking employment in 
the Trea sury Department reveals much about public perceptions of Abra-
ham Lincoln, at least among middle- class  women in the North. Many let-
ters mentioned Lincoln’s “goodness,” “honesty,” and “kindness.” While some 
of this rhe toric was the self- serving praise of the supplicant, much seems to 
be sincere expressions of admiration. Jennette E. Hamblin of Geneva, New 
York, wrote that “having heard much of the Presidents kindness of heart, I 
have presumed to lay my case before him well knowing that one word from 
him, in the right place,  will do more for me than the united efforts of many 
congressman.” Gertrude Dunn of Kenosha, Wisconsin, likewise declared 
that “I should not be this bold to solicit your aid did I not know that your 
kindness of heart always impells you to listen to appeals from the needy & 
helpless.” Helen V. White of Baltimore had “heard of your being a true 
Christian, and I know if it is in your power to assist me, you  will not turn a 
deaf ear to my petition.” “[H]aving been assured that our pres ent President 
reads all the communication addressed to him,” Missouri G. W. Finley of 
New York City was hopeful that her “epistle may not be passed by without 
at least, a passing thought.” Confident of the president’s innate goodness, 
29Maggie T. Millmore to AL, Apr. 13, 1865, RG 56, Entry 210, NARA.
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kindness, and honesty,  these  women appealed to Lincoln directly, desper-
ate to have him intervene on their behalf.30
Ultimately, the Trea sury Department hired at least 351 female clerks 
between 1861 and Lincoln’s assassination in April 1865. Of  these clerks, 
60  percent  were single and 40  percent  were married or widowed.31 Ninety- 
four (27  percent)  were appointed from the District of Columbia, but many 
of them had moved to the federal capital to follow husbands,  fathers, or other 
 family members who  were in government ser vice or the military. The re-
maining 246 clerks came from twenty- five states. They came from all of the 
states of the Union, including the four border slave states of Missouri (3), 
Kentucky (4), Mary land (21), and Delaware (1); the seceded states of  Virginia 
(16) and Tennessee (4); and the twice- seceded state of West  Virginia (1). New 
York was the home of the most female clerks with fifty- six, followed by Penn-
sylvania with twenty- eight, Mary land with twenty- one, and Mas sa chu setts 
with twenty. The states of California and Oregon contributed two each.32 
The war time female clerical employees of the Trea sury Department ranged 
in age from fifteen to sixty at the time they  were appointed. Their average 
age was thirty and their median age was twenty- eight. As might be expected, 
the married  women  were on average ten years older than the single  women, 
but  there  were single  women as old as fifty.33
The tasks outlined in the register of female clerks  were predictably nar-
row. Although the first female clerks had been employed to cut Trea sury 
notes, machinery soon began to perform that task. Nearly half (47  percent) 
of the clerks worked at counting notes, and 41  percent worked as copy-
ists. The remaining 12  percent performed a variety of jobs, including bond 
30Jennette E. Hamblin to AL, Oct. 1, 1864; Gertrude A. Dunn to AL, Mar. 17, 1865; 
Helen V. White to AL, Dec. 13, 1863, ibid.
31N = 324. The rec ords do not specify the marital status of twenty- seven of the female 
clerks (General Register of Ladies). The proportion of single female clerks increased to 
approximately two- thirds in the 1870s and to 73  percent by 1890. Aron, “ ‘To Barter Their 
Souls for Gold,’ ” pp. 839–40.
32N = 340. The rec ords do not specify the state of origin of eleven of the female clerks 
(General Register of Ladies). See Aron, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Civil Ser vice, pp. 43, 
204n7.
33N = 254. The rec ords do not specify the ages of ninety- seven of the female clerks. 
Single clerks ranged in age from fifteen to fifty, and married clerks ranged in age from 
twenty to sixty (General Register of Ladies). Cindy S. Aron observes that “what is most 
striking about the age distribution of female federal clerks is how old they  were compared 
to  women workers generally and to female clerks in other cities and situations” (Aron, 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Civil Service, p. 44).
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examiner, cutter, trimmer, folder, paper clerk, and  under the generic desig-
nation “For duty.”34
Opportunities for  women in the Trea sury Department expanded in the 
fall of 1862, when Trea surer Spinner, supported by Assistant Secretary of 
the Trea sury George H. Harrington, pressed Secretary Chase to employ 
 women in clerkships to count both new notes that had been printed and 
old, damaged notes that had been submitted for exchange. On October 9, 
1862, seven  women became the first  women to be appointed as clerks in any 
executive department of the federal government. “In the office of the Trea-
surer,” Spinner  later recalled, “it was soon found that in vari ous ser vices, 
and especially in counting money and in detecting counterfeits,  women  were 
altogether superior to men.”35
Virtually all of the successful applicants received recommendations from 
someone, most from their congressman or senator. Of the 351  women listed 
in the “Register of Female Clerks,” only two do not have a name listed in 
the column headed “Recommended by.” Twelve list President Lincoln as a 
recommender, and  others received recommendations from the secretary of 
the Trea sury or a governor. Eight received a recommendation from the wife 
of the president, the wife of a cabinet secretary, or the wife of a senator. With-
out some prominent person to recommend them, it appears that very few, 
if any, applicants secured a position in the Trea sury Department.36
The Trea sury Department was the largest, but not the sole, government 
agency to employ  women as clerks during the Civil War. The newly formed 
but tiny Department of Agriculture employed at least one female clerk,  after 
its formation in 1862. The new department assumed responsibilities formerly 
handled by the Patent Office.37 By 1863, the Patent Office employed a bak-
er’s dozen of female clerks, and thirty female clerks worked in the quarter-
master general’s office. Postmaster General Montgomery Blair hired ten 
34N =​320. The rec ords do not specify the jobs of thirty- one of the female clerks 
(General Registry of Ladies). New York Times, Feb. 18, 1869, p. 2.
35“General Spinner and the  Women Clerks,” pp. 1–2. The first seven female clerks  were 
Mrs. Abbie C. Harris of Maine, Miss Libbie Stoner of Pennsylvania, Miss Mary Burke of 
Washington, D.C., Miss Fannie L. Halsted of New Jersey, Miss Belle S. Tracy of New 
Jersey, Miss Jennie L. Wall of Maine, and Miss Annie York of Mary land. Halsted, Tracy, 
Wall, and York received transfers from the note- clipping room, but Harris, Stoner, and 
Burke  were all new employees.
36General Registry of Ladies.
37Lois Bryan Adams, Letter from Washington, 1863– 1865, ed. Evelyn Leasher (Detroit, 
1999), p. 20.
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 women in 1862 to work as clerks in the Dead Letter Office, and by 1863, 
sixteen of the thirty- two clerks in that office  were  women.38
The War Department also employed female clerks as copyists. In Octo-
ber 1864, Mary A. Watson wrote to President Lincoln from western New 
York. She was “informed the War Department has in its employ Ladies 
to do writing.” “Consequently,” she continued, “I ask, is  there a situation 
I could get . . .  to do writing for some of the diff er ent branches of the 
Department.” She had a widowed  mother dependent on her for support, 
and she wrote to Lincoln  because “I am not informed of the proper persons 
I should address in business like this.” She signed her letter, “Yours very 
Respectfly, The  sister of a Soldier, Mary A. Watson.”39
The opportunity for  women to work in clerical positions in the Trea sury 
and other departments during the Civil War continued to provide  women 
with employment opportunities  after the war. Although some  women left 
 these clerical positions with the return of peace, more  women  were ready 
to take their places, and the number of  women working in federal govern-
ment offices continued to grow through the remainder of the nineteenth 
 century. Income disparities  were severe at first, with female clerks earning 
between one- third and one- half the salary of male clerks. Female clerks in 
the Trea sury Department  were initially paid an annual salary of $600, 
which eventually  rose to $720 for most by war’s end. By 1870, federal 
legislation authorized departments to appoint female clerks to the same 
positions as male clerks and pay them accordingly, but enforcement re-
mained uneven.40
The entry of  women into federal offices raised fears among the general 
public about the “corrupting” influence of  women in the workplace (fig. 3). 
Critics believed that the presence of  women workers would distract male em-
ployees, undermining their productivity. They also feared for the virtue of 
female employees when the sexes mixed “promiscuously” in government 
38“Government Girls,” in Judith E. Harper, ed.,  Women during the Civil War: An Encyclopedia 
(New York, 2004), p. 174; Historian, United States Postal Ser vice, “ Women of Postal 
Headquarters,” August 2008.
39Mary A. Watson to AL, Oct. 27, 1864, box 91, Rec ord Group 107: Rec ords of the 
Office of the Secretary of War, 1791–1947, Entry 259: Rec ords of the Chief Clerk and the 
Administrative Assistant, Rec ords Relating to Personnel, General Rec ords, 1816–1899, 
Applications for Civilian Appointments and Regular Army Commissions, 1847–1887, 
NARA.
40Massey, Bonnet Brigades, pp. 340–41.
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offices. Even Secretary Chase was concerned that female clerks would 
“demoralize” the department in the literal sense that the workplace would 
become less “moral.”41  These concerns eventually bred scandalous rumors 
of “orgies and bacchanals” that reached even the floor of Congress.
Several months before Congress took notice, however, Secretary Chase 
asked Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton in December 1863 to loan him 
the ser vices of Col o nel Lafayette C. Baker. Baker was the leader of a secret 
detective ser vice or ga nized by Stanton to identify and imprison traitors, 
spies, and deserters. Chase asked Baker to investigate the charges of cor-
ruption and immorality in his department and to arrest  those responsible 
for any wrongdoing. In the course of his investigation, Baker arrested a few 
 people and obtained confessions from three female employees of immoral 
activities with Trea sury officials.42
41Aron, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Civil Ser vice, p. 71.
42Jacob Mogelever, Death to Traitors: The Story of General Lafayette C. Baker, Lincoln’s 
Forgotten Secret Ser vice Chief (Garden City, N.Y., 1960), pp. 248–78.
Fig .  3 . “The Trea sury Department— the New Secretary Looking Around,” Harper’s 
Bazaar, Apr. 3, 1869. The suspicions of the corrupting influence and improprieties in 
the employment of  women in government jobs continued  after the Civil War, as this 
1869 engraving demonstrates. (http:// hearth . library . cornell . edu / cgi / t / text / text ­ idx ? c​=​hearth; 
idno​=​4732809 _ 1443 _ 014)
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Late in April 1864, Representative James Brooks, a War Demo crat from 
New York, charged on the floor of the House of Representatives that the 
printing bureau of the Trea sury Department was the scene of both the theft 
of public money and sexual immorality, involving female clerks employed 
by the department. In response, freshman representative and  future Presi-
dent James A. Garfield of Ohio introduced a resolution on April 30 that the 
Speaker of the House appoint a select committee to investigate the charges.43 
The Speaker appointed nine congressmen to the select committee and named 
Representative Garfield as the chair.44
The committee began its investigations the following week and focused 
on two issues— the printing of public money in the Trea sury Department 
in Washington and the alleged immoralities of employees in the Trea sury 
Department. At the center of the controversy was Spencer M. Clark (fig. 4), 
the superintendent of the National Currency Bureau (which became the Bu-
reau of Printing and Engraving), who was responsible for the printing of 
federal currency at the Trea sury building in Washington and who employed 
many of the female clerks at work in the Trea sury Department. In its inves-
tigation, the congressional committee confined its attention to  whether Clark 
had allowed or participated in any “disreputable or immoral conduct” in 
the Trea sury building and  whether Clark had made any arrangements with 
female employees for “immoralities” outside the Trea sury Department. Al-
though the Demo cratic minority of the committee objected to the narrow-
ness of the investigation, the majority allowed Representative Brooks to 
introduce “very voluminous” testimony, much of it having “only a remote 
bearing on the subject- matter of the investigation.” Brooks used Col o nel 
Baker’s investigations to make six primary allegations, outlined in the re-
port the committee filed on June 30, 1864.45
43Congressional Globe, Apr. 29, 1864, 38th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1968; House Journal, Apr. 30, 
1864, 38th Cong, 1st sess., p. 597.
44Committee members included Republicans James A. Garfield of Ohio (chair), 
James F. Wilson of Iowa, Reuben E. Fenton of New York, and Thomas A. Jenckes of 
Rhode Island; Unconditional Unionist Henry Winter Davis of Mary land; and Demo crats 
James Brooks of New York, John T. Stuart of Illinois, John L. Dawson of Pennsylvania, 
and William G. Steele of New Jersey. House Journal, Apr. 30, 1864, 38th Cong, 1st sess., 
p. 598.
45House Select Committee to Investigate Charges against the Trea sury Department, 
Report, 1864, 38th Cong., 1st sess., Report No. 140, pp. 1, 13–15.
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First, Brooks and Baker insisted that Clark had offered a bribe to one of 
his female employees for “dishonorable purposes.” In testimony before the 
committee, however, the  woman who served as the alleged messenger of this 
offer denied that she had delivered any message and declared the entire story 
false. Second, they alleged that “a piece of gross immorality” had taken place 
between Clark’s principal assistant and a female employee in the bonnet 
room in the basement of the Trea sury building. Fourteen- year- old former 
employee Clara Donalson testified that she saw the man leave the room by 
another door just as she entered and that the  woman was in the room. A 
thorough cross- examination by the committee failed to yield any more 
details of “gross immorality.” Third, the accusers declared that the super-
intendent of the bronzing room offered a female employee double wages if 
she would “submit to his wishes” and work eve nings as well as during the day. 
Her  father  later told her that his expression could have a dishonorable 
Fig .  4 . Spencer M. Clark, supervisor of the National Currency Bureau (1862–68), was 
the subject of a congressional investigation into suspected improprieties involving 
 women employees at the Trea sury Department. He placed his own likeness on the five- 
cent U.S. fractional currency note seen  here. (National Numismatic Collection at the Smith­
sonian Institution)
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meaning. She also said that the same man winked at her on another 
occasion.46
Fourth, Brooks and Baker alleged that Clark and G. A. Henderson, a 
male clerk in the department, met with two female employees at the Cen-
tral  Hotel and spent the night with them  there  under assumed names. The 
witness who allegedly saw the two men with the two  women changed the 
month in which he saw them three times in three diff er ent testimonies, and 
his  sister had worked at the Trea sury Department twice  after the alleged 
tryst but had been dismissed. The testimony of three members of this same 
 family was, in the judgment of the majority of the committee, a “tissue of 
contradictions.” Fifth, they charged that Clark and Henderson had the same 
female employees dress in “male attire” and “accompany them to a disrep-
utable place of amusement” in Washington. The evidence was an anony-
mous note signed “H,” assumed to have been written by Henderson. Sixth, 
Baker presented “very contradictory statements” of a similar meeting in 
Philadelphia, but he admitted he had no personal knowledge of the charge. 
The committee questioned Superintendent Clark extensively on all of the 
charges, and he denied each of them.47
Baker was so zealous in proving the immoral actions of men and  women 
in the Trea sury Department that he even stopped a funeral pro cession and 
insisted on an autopsy to prove that the  woman had died while attempting 
to have an abortion. The autopsy not only revealed that she was not pregnant 
but also “afforded incontestible evidence of the unsullied virtue of the 
deceased.” In moral outrage, the majority of the committee condemned the 
charges and characterized them as, “in part, the result of an effort on the part 
of some to break up the plan of printing in the Trea sury Department, and 
partly the result of a conspiracy on the part of Col o nel Baker and the female 
prostitutes associated with him, by the aid of coerced testimony, to destroy 
the reputation of Mr.  Clark, and, by the odium thus raised against the 
Trea sury Department, shield himself and justify his unauthorized arrest of 
one of the officers in the Printing bureau.” The majority report continued, 
“The charges are exceedingly unjust and cruel, from the fact that they have 
to some extent compromised the reputation of the three hundred females 
employed in the printing division. A majority of them are wives or  sisters of 
46Ibid., p. 15.
47Ibid., pp. 15–16.
Abraham Lincoln and “Government Girls”    79
soldiers who have fallen in the field.” Fi nally, it concluded, “in no commu-
nity in the country  will  there be found a larger proportion of noble and re-
spectable  women than  those employed in the Trea sury Department.”48
The four Demo cratic congressmen on the committee submitted a minor-
ity report, written by Representative James Brooks, that insisted that the 
allegations of immorality  were true. “ These affidavits disclose a mass of im-
morality and profligacy, the more atrocious as  these  women  were employés 
of Clark, hired and paid by him with the public money.” Clark seemed to 
select female employees for their “youth and personal attractions,” and “nei-
ther the laws of God nor of man, the institution of the Sabbath, nor the 
common decencies of life, seem to have been respected by Clark in his 
conduct with  these  women.” Clark and his accomplices converted the 
Trea sury Department into a “place for debauchery and drinking, the very 
recital of which is impossible without violating decency.”49
Both the partisan division of the congressional committee’s report and the 
charges of immorality that may have been motivated by a larger attempt to 
discredit Spencer  M. Clark reveal more about Civil War Amer i ca than 
they do about the  actual be hav ior of female employees of the Trea sury De-
partment. That the committee divided along strict party lines, with Uncon-
ditional Unionist Henry Winter Davis siding with the Republicans, suggests 
that politics may have played a stronger role in the committee’s deliberations 
than a desire to find the facts to prove or disprove the allegations. Republi-
cans on the committee found the witness testimony contradictory, coerced, 
and self- interested. Demo crats believed that Clark had  violated the public 
trust for his own personal gain in printing the public money and  were dis-
posed to find his morals as repulsive as his ethics or perhaps his politics. If 
any of the charges  were motivated by a desire to discredit the printing of 
public money in a central location  under one man’s authority rather than 
by multiple printers in multiple locations, as the Republican majority be-
lieved, it is perhaps unsurprising that the accusers chose to focus on sexual 
48Ibid., pp. 16–17.
49Ibid., pp. 18–21. Lafayette C. Baker made the investigation of the Trea sury 
Department an impor tant part of his History of the United States Secret Ser vice, published in 
1867.  After recounting and defending his investigation and reprinting the minority report 
of the congressional committee, Baker closed the chapter, “I doubt not, the  people  will be 
surprised to learn that a con spic u ous object of this inquiry, S. M. Clark, still holds ( June, 
1866) his position in the United States Trea sury Department.” Lafayette C. Baker, History 
of the United States Secret Ser vice (Philadelphia, 1867), pp. 261–328, quote on p. 328.
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immorality. Drawing on the nation’s ambivalence  toward the mixing of the 
sexes in the workplace, critics could use public fears and fascinations to con-
struct a plausible portrait of a publicly funded harem, presided over by a 
man in his mid- fifties, surrounded by hundreds of young  women who owed 
their jobs to him.50
Some critics condemned female clerks as a class, insisting that they had 
stepped out of the proper sphere of  women into compromising situations 
where their virtue and their reputation  were at risk. From this perspective, 
jobs in government offices  were likely to attract  women whose morals  were 
questionable. For virtuous  women who took such employment, critics in-
sisted, the working conditions  were likely to encourage unacceptable sexual 
be hav ior and expose them to the seductions of immoral male supervisors 
and promiscuous coworkers.51
 Others followed the majority of the congressional committee in defend-
ing the virtuous and respectable character of most female clerks. When John 
Ellis wrote a description of the capital city in 1869, he described hearing a 
young man outside the National Theatre exclaim to a companion, “We’ve 
seen all the ladies! The rest of  these  women are only Trea sury Clerks!” Ellis 
decried the “melancholy fact” that many of the female employees of the 
Trea sury Department  were “ either suspected of immoral practices, or looked 
down upon by the Washingtonians as beings of a lower order.” The pure 
 women  were in a large majority, Ellis insisted, and “the suspicion which rests 
upon  these clerks, as a class, is most unjust and unfounded.” Despite his de-
fense of the virtue of the majority of female clerks in federal ser vice, how-
ever, Ellis concluded that “their positions are not to be envied, and  ought to 
be shunned by  women who can obtain honest employment elsewhere.”52
In her memoir Ten Years in Washington, Mary Clemmer in 1881 concluded 
of female employees in the Trea sury Department that, “the truth is,  there is 
not another com pany of women- workers in the land which numbers so many 
ladies of high character, intelligence, culture, and social position.” Admit-
ting that some  women  were forced to trade their virtue for an appointment, 
Clemmer insisted that it was the “unjust mode of appointment” of leaving 
female applicants at the mercy of power ful men that created the prob lem. 
50Nina Silber,  Daughters of the Union: Northern  Women Fight the Civil War (Cambridge, 
Mass., 2005), pp. 117–19.
51Aron, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Civil Ser vice, pp. 165–67.
52John B. Ellis, The Sights and Secrets of the National Capital (New York, 1870), pp. 383–86.
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The hardships of war and the intense competition for employment “placed 
side by side, with pure and noble  women, the women- adventurers and sin-
ners, whose presence cast so much undeserved reproach on the innocent, 
and who caused the only shadow of disrepute which has ever fallen upon 
 woman’s Treasury- service.”53
 Women who sought federal employment during the Civil War risked 
much in social status and reputation. Often desperate to support themselves 
or dependents, they stepped outside the socially prescribed bound aries of 
 women’s work into an area of  labor previously dominated by men. Apply-
ing to men in power for assistance in obtaining  these jobs, female clerical 
workers needed the approval of male supervisors to retain their positions. 
Although the demands for sexual  favors  were unlikely to have been as wide-
spread as the minority of the select committee believed, the threat and in-
cidence of such demands  were prob ably more prevalent than the majority 
wished to believe. Certainly, many  people in the North believed that the 
scandalous charges leveled in 1864 merely confirmed their belief that intro-
ducing  women into the offices of the Trea sury Department was a grievous 
 mistake.
Abraham Lincoln accepted the need for female clerks to fill clerical roles 
in the offices of an expanding federal government. His personal interven-
tion aided many  women in getting an interview and some in securing a job 
in the Trea sury Department. Female applicants appealed to the president 
from across the North, many feeling that he alone could help them. Their 
letters shed light on Lincoln’s reputation among  women in the North, and 
his endorsements on some of the letters illustrate his willingness to assist doz-
ens of  women in dire straits. Occupied with leading a nation, defending it 
against a domestic rebellion, and experimenting with the status of four mil-
lion of its most downtrodden inhabitants, President Lincoln still found time 
to aid individual  women who turned to him for help.
53Clemmer, Ten Years in Washington, pp. 357–58, 375.
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Ma n y of t h e past essays published in this series of books on the history of Congress have pointed  toward the  future, more specifically 
to the Civil War, and have therefore kept their attention focused on events 
before the 1860s. With the current volume, we find ourselves in the war; and 
therefore pointing  toward the  future suggests a very diff er ent shape, one that 
can readily, as this chapter does, take the story all the way down to the re-
cent past. At the same time, a chapter on the 1862 Morrill Land- Grant Col-
lege Act offers an opportunity to assess what becomes of congressional 
intentions, what degree of discretion gets put in the hands of  those actors 
who implement the outlines contained in congressional legislation, and how 
Congress itself returns to the original issues and reconsiders how best to 
carry out changing intentions  going forward.
A few years ago, at a conference at the University of Illinois, the 200th an-
niversary of the birth of Abraham Lincoln kicked off with an examination 
of Lincoln’s connection to the Land- Grant College Act of 1862, which itself 
was soon to turn 150. More than one participant took exception to a high- 
profile tele vi sion series at the time directed by Ken Burns, coupled with a 
coffee- table book, on “Amer i ca’s best idea”: the system of national parks. 
Not to take anything away from the national parks— Yosemite,  Grand Can-
yon, Mount Rainier, and all the rest— but  these speakers proposed a rival 
for the title “Amer i ca’s best idea.” Maybe they  were willing to consider shar-
ing top billing, maybe not, but regardless, they wished to nominate the 
Peter Wallenstein
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nation’s land- grant system of higher education as “Amer i ca’s best idea.” This 
alternative nomination supplies a place to begin examining how Amer i ca’s 
other “best idea” took legislative shape and— beyond that, central to its be­
coming a “best idea”— what was made of it over time.1
During the de cade 1862–72,  under the 1862 Morrill Land- Grant College 
Act, American states collectively embarked on the establishment of a con-
stellation of new institutions of higher education. Another transformation, 
or collection of transformations, over the course of the next hundred years 
built on  these nineteenth- century beginnings such that a new kind of in-
stitution emerged. What typically began as colleges to train farmers and 
engineers (in many cases both white and male and nobody  else) grew into a 
 whole new complex: coeducational, multiracial research institutions offer-
ing a near universe of programs to a near universe of constituencies. Ac-
cording to one leading thesis of this chapter, the “colleges of 1862” led the 
way in  these innovations.
Rather than use the phrase “the American constellation of public univer-
sities,” I prefer to say “the American system of public universities.” The Mor-
rill Act offers a fitting example of what Henry Clay and other Whig leaders 
had in mind during an earlier period, generally referred to by historians as 
“the American system”: federal power motoring change in policy and in the 
development of society, but in cooperation with state governments, and as-
sembling private as well as public resources and decision making in produc-
ing the end results.2 The tariff is often seen as the main source of revenue 
fueling the Whigs’ American system, but the national government’s other 
main source of funds, receipts from the sale of public lands, served as well, 
as exemplified in the land- grant colleges.
One way to highlight the extraordinary origins of the Land- Grant Col-
lege Act is to position that breakthrough mea sure against what was happen-
ing to education in the Confederacy at the very time that Congress passed 
1Dayton Duncan, The National Parks: Amer i ca’s Best Idea—an Illustrated History (New York, 
2009); Rededication of the Morrill Act Conference, University of Illinois, Urbana- 
Champaign, Ill., October 2009. The term is often ascribed to Wallace Stegner, in “The 
Best Idea We Ever Had,” Wilderness 46 (Spring 1983):4–13, a quotation from which is often 
featured at national park visitor centers. But see Alan MacEachern’s blog, “Who Had 
‘Amer i ca’s Best Idea’?” Network in Canadian History and Environment, Oct. 23, 2011, http:// 
niche - canada . org / 2011 / 10 / 23 / who - had - americas - best - idea / .
2Robert A. Lively, “The American System: A Review Article,” Business History Review 
29 (1955):81–96.
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the bill and Lincoln signed it. In  every Confederate state, and at  every level, 
school  after school suspended operations for any or all among a complex of 
reasons related to the war time emergency. Funds grew even less available, 
and both teachers and male students of military age went off to fight. Cam-
pus buildings  were repurposed to serve as headquarters for army officers or 
hospitals for wounded soldiers,  whether for the Confederacy or the Union 
or first one and then the other.3
This chapter is necessarily selective. Among the dimensions empha-
sized  here are race and gender— that is, which “ people” in a given state 
could attend that state’s so- called public land- grant school. The period cov-
ered  here ends around 1972,  after a de cade for the system to get up and 
 running and then a  century for it to evolve, although  there have certainly 
been new developments since then.
Congressional legislation supplied the programs and policies that framed 
the origins and development of the land- grant college system, but other 
forces contributed to the varied institutional transitions that emerged over 
the generations  after 1862. State policy, in par tic u lar, did much to shape 
 every land- grant school. Private funds, too, have always played impor tant 
roles—as any parent writing a check to cover tuition at a land- grant school 
 these days might readily observe. Within each institution, moreover, presi-
dents influenced the development of the school they served as custodian and 
leader. Also initiating new departures  were black applicants, for example, 
to institutions that opposed their enrollment, applicants who persisted in 
their efforts, sometimes with some success.
Origins, 1857–62
In 1854, Justin S. Morrill of Vermont (fig. 1) gained a seat in the U.S. House 
of Representatives, where Abraham Lincoln too had, for a single term in 
the 1840s, once represented his constituents. Morrill, born the year  after 
3Peter Wallenstein, “The Strug gle to Learn: Higher Education in Civil War  Virginia,” 
in William C. Davis and James I. Robertson Jr., eds.,  Virginia at War, 1864 (Lexington, Ky., 
2009), pp. 99–119, for a case study of the South; Michael David Cohen, Reconstructing the 
Campus: Higher Education and the American Civil War (Charlottesville, Va., 2012), pp. 19–50, on 
a small sample of institutions in the Union as well as the Confederacy. See also Wayne 
Flynt, “Southern Higher Education and the Civil War,” Civil War History 14 (1968):211–25.
Fig. 1. Congressman Justin S. Morrill of Vermont (1810–98) was chiefly responsible for 
the 1862 Land- Grant College Act. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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Lincoln, shared a background with the  future president that included per-
sis tent poverty, scant schooling, social and po liti cal ambition, and a strong 
sense of what the nation could and should become. Elected to his first term 
as a Whig, Morrill was elected to subsequent terms as a Republican; in 1867, 
during Reconstruction, he began a lengthy tenure in the Senate, where he 
served  until his death in 1898.4
Increasingly in the 1840s and 1850s, an idea had been circulating that 
new colleges to train farmers  were in order. By the end of the 1850s, a num-
ber of states, among them Mary land and Michigan, had established such 
schools, and  there  were increasing calls for federal assistance to help develop 
 these institutions. Several state legislatures instructed their U.S. senators and 
advised their U.S. representatives to support the 1861–62 bill. The Ohio leg-
islature, for example, instructed Senator Benjamin F. Wade (fig. 2) to sup-
port it, which he did so effectively that the mea sure can be, and sometimes 
is, referred to as the Morrill- Wade Act.5
As a member of Congress, Morrill, in par tic u lar, promoted an idea that 
might put to  great good the vast expanse of public land in the West, to im-
prove the lives of citizens throughout the nation, including in Lincoln’s 
Illinois and Morrill’s Vermont. Back in the 1830s, in earlier parts of the 
adult lives of both Lincoln and Morrill, the nation’s Trea sury had suffered 
the embarrassment of a chronic fiscal surplus, a result of land sales in what 
at that point was a less westerly West. Unable to agree on  whether or how 
to spend the resulting surplus directly, Congress had arranged for this bud-
getary “surplus” to be “distributed” to the states, on the basis of their 
repre sen ta tion in the electoral college— that is, each state’s combined repre-
sen ta tion in both  houses of Congress— and the recipient states would then 
4William Belmont Parker, The Life and Public Ser vices of Justin Smith Morrill (1924; reprint 
ed., New York, 1971), pp. 1–62; Coy F. Cross II, Justin Smith Morrill,  Father of the Land­ Grant 
Colleges (East Lansing, Mich., 1999).
5George N. Rainsford, Congress and Higher Education in the Nineteenth  Century (Knoxville, 
Tenn., 1972), pp. 72–83; John Y. Simon, “The Politics of the Morrill Act,” Agricultural 
History 37 (1963):103–11; Earle D. Ross, Democracy’s College: The Land­ Grant Movement in the 
Formative Stage (Ames, Iowa, 1942), pp. 14–45; Roger L. Williams, The Origins of Federal 
Support for Higher Education: George W. Atherton and the Land­ Grant College Movement (University 
Park, Pa., 1991), pp. 11–39; William Edwin Sawyer, “The Evolution of the Morrill Act of 
1862,” Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1948, pp. 25–94; Hans L. Trefousse, Benjamin 
Franklin Wade, Radical Republican from Ohio (New York, 1963), p. 188.
Fig. 2. Senator Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio (1800–1878) proved instrumental in secur-
ing passage of the 1862 Land- Grant College Act. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo­
graphs Division)
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determine how best to put such new funds to work for the benefit of their 
 people.6
Morrill’s bill fine- tuned that idea, to give it more par tic u lar direction, 
yet still leave it up to the states to manage the funds he intended to go 
their way. The direct object of this largesse was to be institutions, most of 
them new, that would transform the traditional approach of higher edu-
cation. Rather than seek to enhance the opportunities of the social elite— 
the sons of prosperous families, who might train to be  lawyers and 
doctors— Morrill championed providing formal training for the nation’s 
next generation of farmers and engineers, of agriculturalists and me-
chanics. And  those lands in the West could supply a means to support 
this new system.
Congressman Morrill introduced a land- grant college bill for the first 
time in December 1857, during the first session of the Thirty- Fifth Con-
gress. The House passed it in April 1858, but it ran into too much opposi-
tion in the Senate to make it through that chamber. The strug gle resumed 
 after the second session convened, in December.  After a few amendments, 
to which the House agreed, the mea sure went to the White House in 
February 1859.7
President James Buchanan vetoed it. In the House, the vote had been 105–
100, and in the Senate, 25–22, so  there was no chance of a legislative over-
ride. Much of the opposition came from the West, whose representatives saw 
no compelling reason for lands in their region to subsidize education in the 
East. President Buchanan’s menu of reasons given for the veto, however, bet-
ter reflected the adamant opposition of most congressional members from 
the South, committed to strict construction and finding nowhere in the Con-
stitution any authorization for such a mea sure giving public land to states 
for educational purposes.8
6Edward G. Bourne, The History of the Surplus Revenue of 1837 (New York, 1885); Peter 
Wallenstein, “Reintegrating the American Past: Revisiting the West, Frederick Jackson 
Turner, and the Early Republic,”  Virginia Social Science Journal 47 (2012):86–102.
7Rainsford, Congress and Higher Education, pp. 85–88; Williamjames Hull Hoffer, To 
Enlarge the Machinery of Government: Congressional Debates and the Growth of the American State, 
1858–1891 (Baltimore, 2007), pp. 17–34.
8Rainsford, Congress and Higher Education, pp. 87–91; Sarah T. Phillips, “Antebellum 
Agricultural Reform, Republican Ideology, and Sectional Tension,” Agricultural History 74 
(2000):799–822; Hoffer, To Enlarge the Machinery of Government, pp. 35–36.
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Morrill tried again in February 1860, in the first session of the Thirty- 
Sixth Congress. With the West leading the charge in the House Committee 
on Public Lands, the bill died  there.9
In December 1861, early in the Thirty- Seventh Congress, Morrill intro-
duced a new version of his earlier efforts. One substantive change increased 
the original figure of 20,000 acres of public land for each member of Con-
gress to 30,000. Another, reflecting the Civil War (by then raging), specified 
the inclusion of studies in military tactics.
On Morrill’s third attempt, conditions had changed such that when Con-
gress approved the 1862 mea sure, it was by wide margins: 32–9 in the Sen-
ate and 90–25  in the House.  Those margins reflected, to a degree, the 
absence of so many men who had earlier represented the eleven states by 
then in the Confederacy. A bigger difference, though, was in the White 
House. A new president held office, and Abraham Lincoln signed the mea-
sure on July 2, 1862.10
The Land- Grant College Act came in a package that included two other 
mea sures enacted in 1862. The Pacific Railroad Act laid the groundwork 
for the transcontinental railroad, a massive line that would be completed in 
1869. The Homestead Act supplied agricultural lots that farmers claimed 
over the de cades that followed. All three laws fostered benefits requiring no 
 actual transfer of money out of the federal trea sury. Each figured in the poli-
tics of enacting the  others, as the East and the West could find some com-
mon ground in signing on to assist in passage of mea sures that would variably 
affect their own direct well- being. A new American system emerged, one 
that promoted both education and transportation, and offering land to farm-
ers as well as the encouragement of scientific farming.11
In the midst of a huge war, the federal government embarked on an im-
mense new endeavor in the realm of higher education. The land in question, 
9Rainsford, Congress and Higher Education, p. 91.
10Ibid., pp. 91–97; Parker, Morrill, pp. 259–84; Heather Cox Richardson, The Greatest 
Nation of the Earth: Republican Economic Policies during the Civil War (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 
pp. 154–60; Hoffer, To Enlarge the Machinery of Government, pp. 37–60; Randal Leigh Hoyer, 
“The Gentleman from Vermont: The  Career of Justin S. Morrill in the United States 
House of Representatives,” Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1974, pp. 68–72; 
Sawyer, “The Evolution of the Morrill Act of 1862,” pp. 103–258.
11Simon, “The Politics of the Morrill Act”; Harold M. Hyman, American Singularity: The 
1787 Northwest Ordinance, the 1862 Homestead and Morrill Acts, and the 1944 G.I. Bill (Athens, 
Ga., 1986); Roger D. Billings, “The Homestead Act, Pacific Railroad Act and Morrill 
Act,” Northern Kentucky Law Review 39 (2012):699–736.
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held by the U.S. government in the West—or, rather, scrip representing a 
certain amount of acreage— was apportioned to states on the basis of their 
congressional repre sen ta tion, at 30,000 acres per member of the House and 
the Senate. Each state arranged for the sale of its allocation of land, created 
an annuity, and began contributing to the support of a school (or in some 
cases more than one school) with programs of study consistent with flexible 
specifications as outlined in the 1862 law.
 People are often unclear as to the origins of land- grant institutions. Ac-
cording to one typical notion, for  Virginia, for example, the state long ago 
owned some land in Blacksburg, the state granted the land to a school, and 
a university emerged on that land. The notion is wrong on three counts. 
One, the land was granted by the federal government to the state of  Virginia, 
not from the state to the college. Two, the land that fostered the growth of 
a school came in the form of land scrip— paper representing a certain 
acreage—to be sold for an endowment, and the endowment provided an 
annuity, not a location. And three, by the 1850s and 1860s, most remaining 
public land was in the West, not the East. The land scrip conveyed control 
of land in the  Great Plains, beyond the Mississippi River. President Thomas 
Jefferson had bought the land for the nation from France in the Louisiana 
Purchase of 1803. In  later years the United States obtained that land 
again—by conquest, by treaty, by hook or by crook— this time from its 
aboriginal occupants, the Indian  peoples of the American West. Like 
 Virginia, most states  were granted land far outside their own bound aries, so 
they could hardly situate a college on that land. Moreover, since the land 
could be widely scattered, one might envision students making their way 
across campus between classes from Nebraska to North Dakota.
How might “Amer i ca’s best idea” work out? One Lincoln scholar has said 
about the president, always distracted as he was by extremely pressing mili-
tary  matters, that he “apparently played no role” in the act’s passage and 
then “forgot to mention it”  later that year in a list of his administration’s 
accomplishments. Another notes that the press paid scant attention to it 
 either, though once it had become law one leading journalist suggested that 
it could bring “wide and lasting good.”12
12Olivier Frayssé, Lincoln, Land, and  Labor, 1809–60, trans. Sylvia Neely (Urbana, Ill., 
1994), p. 179 (first two quotes); Ross, Democracy’s College, p. 65; Richardson, The Greatest 
Nation of the Earth, p. 160 (final quote).
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Indeed, the congressman’s handi work proved—in the twentieth  century—
to have a stunning impact on the course of American social and economic 
history in general and the history of higher education in par tic u lar. Yet, 
throughout the system’s first quarter  century, the evidence to support such 
a prospect was hardly compelling. Launching the new system proved daunt-
ing, but  after Congress enacted two new mea sures in 1887 and 1890, genu-
ine pro gress proved widespread.
Implementation, 1862–87
As one historian of the origins of the land- grant system observed, the Mor-
rill Act “offered to the states a grant insufficient to establish agricultural 
colleges, but too large to refuse.”13 States moved along vari ous timetables 
 toward resolving  whether to accept, or at least what to do with, the limited 
largess that could soon be heading their way. They had to accept the bounty, 
then convert it to cash, then invest the cash in a fund whose proceeds could 
provide some operational support for one or more institutions of higher ed-
ucation. They had to  settle on a location, typically selecting among a num-
ber of hopeful claimants. Much of this was contentious, and all of it took 
time. Nonetheless,  every state launched its share of the new system.
As with the original American system, the land- grant system proved 
something of a patchwork of private and public institutions, and with finan-
cial support as well as policy guidelines from the states and the federal 
government. Most of the states sent their land- grant funds to public insti-
tutions,  whether new ones or old ones, and  whether  these  were flagship 
universities or separate institutions.
The Morrill Act permitted limited use of the land- grant funds to pur-
chase land for a school farm, but it did not permit expenditure of Morrill 
Act money for buildings. So legislatures tended to  favor localities that could 
offer appropriate real estate. Often, therefore, the new funding and pro-
grams  were attached to already- existing institutions, in some cases private 
colleges.
In New  England, the Connecticut legislature first attached the program 
and funds to Yale; Rhode Island, to Brown; and New Hampshire, to 
13Simon, “The Politics of the Morrill Act,” p. 111.
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Dartmouth. Mas sa chu setts considered  doing so at Harvard, before split-
ting the money between a recently established private institution, the Mas-
sa chu setts Institute of Technology, where engineering education would be 
promoted, and a new fa cil i ty to be established at Amherst, the Mas sa chu-
setts Agricultural College. Proponents of a new institution in Vermont 
proved unable to come up with the funds necessary for such a separate 
venture, so the money went to the University of Vermont.14
Farmers in Maine had been calling for some time for an agricultural col-
lege, and the state fi nally created one  under the Morrill Act. At first, sev-
eral private colleges sought the money: Bowdoin, Bates, and Waterville (soon 
renamed Colby). Eventually the town of Orono offered both a central loca-
tion and financial support— $14,000 and a farm— and the legislature set-
tled on that choice in 1866 and supplied $10,000  toward the construction of 
a dormitory and a laboratory. Classes began at the new school in 1868, and 
the first cohort to gradu ate, six young men in 1872, took their degrees the 
same year that the school admitted its first young  women. Maine State 
College— a land- grant school, a coeducational institution, a start on a new 
state university— was  under way.15
A similar range of responses soon emerged, mostly in the 1860s, in all the 
states outside the Confederacy. Already in 1863, Bluemont Central College, 
a private institution at Manhattan, became the Kansas State Agricultural 
College. That same year, what had started out in 1857 as the Agricultural Col-
lege of the State of Michigan, a public institution, became a land- grant school, 
now Michigan State University. By 1867,  after the usual bruising competition 
among vari ous schools and communities, Illinois established a new institution, 
now the University of Illinois at Urbana– Champaign. California accepted 
an offer in 1868 made by the debt- ridden College of California, a private 
school in Berkeley, of its buildings and 160 acres of land in return for a 
pledge to establish “a University of California” in its place.16
14Nathan M. Sorber, “Creating Colleges of Science, Industry, and National 
Advancement: The Origins of the New  England Land- Grant Colleges,” in The Land­ Grant 
Colleges and the Reshaping of American Higher Education, ed. Roger L. Geiger and Nathan M. 
Sorber, Perspectives on the History of Higher Education 30 (2013):41–71.
15David C. Smith, The First  Century: A History of the University of Maine, 1865–1965 (Orono, 
Maine, 1979), pp. 1–40.
16James C. Carey, Kansas State University: The Quest for Identity (Lawrence, Kans., 1977), 
pp. 3–37; Madison Kuhn, Michigan State: The First Hundred Years, 1855–1955 (East Lansing, 
Mich., 1955), pp. 1–81; Winton U. Solberg, The University of Illinois, 1867–1894: An Intellectual 
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As in Maine, gender swiftly emerged as an issue.  Were  women eligible 
to attend  these schools? Could public land- grant schools legitimately exclude 
them? Year by year, state by state, the question elicited an answer, and then 
maybe a diff er ent answer. When classes began in 1874 at Purdue Univer-
sity, a new land- grant institution in Indiana, thirty- nine students  were en-
rolled, a number that would have been larger except that the eight female 
applicants had all been rejected; but the following year, the school reversed 
its policy of exclusion and admitted  women.17
 Matters of race, too, inevitably came up. Cornell University, both a pri-
vate institution and New York’s land- grant school, opened its doors in 1868 
without regard to race or gender. Legislation establishing the University of 
Illinois would have specified “white” had it passed in 1863, but by 1867 such 
restrictive language had vanished. More generally, schools across the North-
east and Midwest slowly demonstrated their willingness to accept black ap-
plicants. In degree, the schools’ slowness was an artifact of the trickle of black 
applications to  these small new schools from state populations with typically 
small black proportions; regardless, the schools grew in size, and so did their 
states’ black populations. In 1877, to take an overwhelmingly white state, the 
University of Vermont graduated  Virginia native and former slave George 
Washington Henderson, who was also elected to Phi Beta Kappa. Andrew 
Hilyer, born a slave in Georgia, graduated from the University of Minne-
sota in 1882. Prob ably the first black gradu ate of Ohio State University was 
Sherman Hamlin Guss, in 1892. Michigan Agricultural College’s first known 
male and female black gradu ates  were William  O. Thompson in 1904 
and Myrtle Craig in 1907.18 Each was a pioneer, and each represented a 
and Cultural History (Urbana, Ill., 1968), pp. 59–83; Verne A. Stadtman, The University of 
California, 1868–1968 (New York, 1970), pp. 1–83, quote p. 31. See also Peter L. Moran and 
Roger W. Williams, “Saving the Land Grant for the Agricultural College of 
Pennsylvania,” in Geiger and Sorber, Land­ Grant Colleges, pp. 105–29.
17Robert W. Topping, A  Century and Beyond: The History of Purdue University (West Lafayette, 
Ind., 1989).
18Morris Bishop, A History of Cornell (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962), pp. 1–179; Solberg, University of 
Illinois, p. 81; http:// vermontcivilwar . org / units / 8 / henderson . php; Richard Melvin 
Breaux, “ ‘We Must Fight Prejudice Even More Vigorously in the North’: Black Higher 
Education in Amer i ca’s Heartland, 1900–1940,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 
2003, pp. 102–3; Pamela Pritchard, “The Negro Experience at the Ohio State University 
in the First Sixty- Five Years, 1873–1938: With Special Emphasis on Negroes in the College 
of Education,” Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1982, pp. 32–34; “The African 
American Presence at MSU, 1900–1970,” http:// www . archives . msu . edu / collections 
/ african _ presence . php.
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beginning, a possibility to build on, though no straight- line mea sure of pro-
gress  toward full racial inclusion actually emerged. The South displayed a 
diff er ent approach.
Eleven states  were warring against the United States when the Morrill 
Act became law. Not  until  after Confederate defeat and po liti cal restoration 
could they qualify for land- grant funds, but by 1872 all of them had. South-
ern land- grant schools typically featured a greater emphasis on a military 
dimension of campus life than  those elsewhere.19 On gender and, especially, 
race, the South contrasted even more with the non- South. Yet in the chal-
lenges of settling on a location and launching the new institutions, the 
southern states more closely resembled the range of patterns displayed by 
states of the North and the West.
Tennessee, alone among the eleven states of the former Confederacy, rati-
fied the  Fourteenth Amendment without delay or compulsion. As a conse-
quence, its members of Congress quickly gained readmission, and in early 
1867 Congress approved Tennessee’s obtaining its share of the land- grant 
funds. The same Republican leanings that permitted ratification and early 
readmission led to a legislative decision to put the land- grant funds to work 
in East Tennessee, the area of the state that had displayed strong Unionist 
attitudes and be hav ior among whites during the Civil War. By 1869, the Ten-
nessee legislature had settled on an established school in Knoxville, East 
Tennessee University, as the state’s sole land- grant institution.  After Demo-
crats returned to power in 1870, they tried but failed to undo that settlement, 
and in 1879 the school became the University of Tennessee. The Volunteer 
State subsequently fumbled through vari ous resolutions to the question of 
where, if at all, black Tennesseans might benefit from the Morrill Act 
money.20
The Alabama legislature might have created a new land- grant unit as a 
wing of the University of Alabama, in Tuscaloosa, an outcome supported 
by both the board of education and the state university. But rivals called for 
it to go  either to Auburn, in the southeast, where a struggling Methodist 
school, the East Alabama Male College, could supply appropriate real estate, 
19Rod Andrew Jr., Long Gray Lines: The Southern Military School Tradition, 1839–1915 
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001).
20James Riley Montgomery, Stanley J. Folmsbee, and Lee Seifert Greene, To Foster 
Knowledge: A History of the University of Tennessee, 1794–1970 (Knoxville, Tenn., 1984), 
pp. 65–86, 96, 101–5.
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or to Florence, a North Alabama town that could offer another Methodist 
school, Florence Wesleyan University. Then a new town, Birmingham, 
stepped forward, with a generous promise of cash, a drill field, acreage for 
experimental farming, barracks for the cadets, and other buildings as well. 
Moreover, a black legislator, Holland Thompson, called for  either space for 
black as well as white students wherever the new institution might end up 
or a division of the funds to support a black school too. In the end, the entire 
land- grant endowment went to Auburn, with nothing for black citizens. 
Florence, bridesmaid in the land- grant sweepstakes, received a new state 
teachers’ institute for whites.21
In  Virginia, loyal supporters of each of the two state- supported institutions 
of higher education, the University of  Virginia and the  Virginia Military 
Institute, canceled each other out, nor—in what one newspaper termed the 
“war of the colleges”— could any contender among a collection of private 
institutions secure sufficient legislative support. Instead, a former Methodist 
boys’ acad emy, the Preston and Olin Institute, in the pro cess at the time of 
seeking to emerge as a small college, gave up its single building on five 
acres as well as its name, and Montgomery County voters offered $20,000, 
so an improbable candidate from the western reaches of the state emerged 
with the land- grant designation for young white men,  Virginia Agricultural 
and Mechanical College.22
Unlike Alabama and Tennessee, some former Confederate states arranged 
for black citizens to benefit in some fashion from the land- grant money. In 
 Virginia, the same statute that gave two- thirds of the Morrill money to a 
new public white male school gave the other third to a coeducational pri-
vate black institution, Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute. In 
Georgia, the entire amount of money available  under the Morrill Act, 
some $17,000, went to the University of Georgia. Into the 1880s, nonethe-
less, the legislature appropriated to Atlanta University the same amount, 
$8,000, that it gave the University of Georgia in state funds. That arrangement 
did not go uncontested through the vagaries of post– Civil War politics, but 
21William Warren Rogers, “The Founding of Alabama’s Land- Grant College at 
Auburn,” Alabama Review 40 (1987):14–37.
22Duncan Lyle Kinnear, The First 100 Years: A History of  Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University (Blacksburg, Va., 1972), pp. 19–65, quote on p. 32; Clara B. Cox, “Olin and 
Preston Institute and Preston and Olin Institute: The Early Years of  Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University, Part II,” Smithfield Review 20 (2016):1–26.
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at one point early on whites conceded that  there might be a “negro interest 
in the land scrip fund”;  there was a perceived threat that one way for black 
Georgians to realize  those benefits might be for the state university to “ad-
mit all students, regardless of color”; and white legislators could see real 
merit in finding a way to “fi nally  settle this complicated trou ble.”23
The view from Mississippi— majority black and cash poor, but relatively 
 free of physical destruction from the war— offers another perspective. In 1871 
the Republican- controlled Mississippi legislature designated two land- 
grant schools— one for black students and one for whites. An established 
public school, the University of Mississippi— Ole Miss— received two- 
fifths of the state’s land- grant funds. A new public school, the nation’s first 
black land- grant college, Alcorn University, received the other three- fifths. 
At Ole Miss, no students showed up for the agricultural and mechanical 
program in 1872, a  grand total of five students came in 1873, and then three 
the next year. The program disintegrated, and by 1876 the state was down 
to one land- grant site, the one for black Mississippians. In 1878 the legisla-
ture tried again, and the Agricultural and Mechanical College of the State 
of Mississippi,  today’s Mississippi State University, began classes in 1880.24
Having accepted the terms of the Morrill Act,  every state embarked on 
an experiment to bring into being a college for which  there often appeared 
limited demand and insufficient resources, but a college that served as a pre-
cursor, at least, to an institution that— especially  after 1887— gained ever 
greater traction, resources, and significance.25
Elaborations, 1887–1938
In the years between 1887 and the New Deal, shifts in the nation’s policy 
environment brought a series of transitions in the mission and operations of 
23Robert F. Engs, Freedom’s First Generation: Black Hampton,  Virginia, 1861–1890 
(Philadelphia, 1979), pp. 139–60; Peter Wallenstein, From Slave South to New South: Public Policy 
in Nineteenth­ Century Georgia (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1987), pp. 160–65, 167–68, quotes on p. 164.
24John K. Bettersworth,  People’s University: The Centennial History of Mississippi State 
( Jackson, Miss., 1980), pp. 1–30; David G. Sansing, Making Haste Slowly: The Troubled History 
of Higher Education in Mississippi ( Jackson, Miss., 1990), pp. 55–68.
25See Eldon L. Johnson, “Misconceptions about Early Land- Grant Colleges,” Journal of 
Higher Education 52 (1981):333–51.
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the land- grant schools.26 The Hatch Act of 1887, followed by the Second 
Morrill Act three years  later, put the entire land- grant system on far stur-
dier financial footing than had been the case during its first quarter  century. 
Assured of far more generous funding, a number of states redirected their 
efforts, and the land- grant colleges undertook a host of new initiatives. That 
the new funds  were conditional on states’ providing access to prospective 
black students, moreover, led to the emergence of a new group of institu-
tions, the “colleges of 1890,” in the segregated South. With each new step, 
as with the 1862 Morrill Act, Congress took up ideas already floating about 
and built on institutional beginnings in vari ous states to promote an en-
hanced system throughout the nation.
A Changing Policy Environment
The land- grant institutions clearly had a teaching mission, but in many cases 
 little to no research wing. For this deficiency, as it soon came to be viewed, 
a new leadership of the land- grant movement shepherded a remedy through 
congressional enactment. Chief among this new generation of leaders was 
George W. Atherton, president in the 1880s and 1890s of Pennsylvania State 
College. The Hatch Act of 1887 authorized experiment stations for  every 
state and supplied substantial new funds to support their work in agricul-
tural research.27
Three years  later, Congress turned its attention to the land- grant colleges 
themselves. Enacted a generation  after the initial 1862 legislation, the 1890 
Morrill Act substantially increased the colleges’ annual funds—by $15,000 
per state for the first year, an amount to be increased by $1,000 each year 
for the next decade— and also their discretion as to how to deploy that 
money. Every one won in the Second Morrill Act. It offered considerably 
higher funding for all states’ land- grant institutions— but on the condition 
that black students, too, benefit from the money. In legislation that prefig-
ured the “separate but equal” formula constitutionalized six years  later in 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson, the two groups need not 
26For a survey of  these changes, see Willis Rudy, Building Amer i ca’s Schools and Colleges: 
The Federal Contribution (Cranbury, N.J., 2003).
27Rainsford, Congress and Higher Education, pp. 115–23; Williams, Origins of Federal Support, 
pp. 84–122; Henry C. Dethloff, A Centennial History of Texas A&M University, 1876–1976 
(College Station, Tex., 1975), pp. 218–26.
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attend the same institution, provided the funds  were “equitably divided” 
between “a college for white students” and an “institution for colored 
students.”28
Southern white educators and politicians alike could support the mea-
sure  because it conferred much greater financial support for their institu-
tions while safeguarding  those schools from any calls for desegregation, in 
fact clearly indicating that Congress had accepted black exclusion from  those 
schools. Black southerners could support the mea sure  because it would re-
inforce their claims on black access to higher education and in several states 
would supply institutions that had not previously existed. State legislators 
could determine that  little or no additional money, drawn from state bud-
gets, would supplement the federal money  going to black schools. From a 
black perspective, “not much” was a lot more than “none at all.” Across the 
twentieth  century, seventeen states each supported a “college of 1890” (his-
torically black land- grant institution) as well as a “college of 1862” (historically 
white land- grant school): the eleven states of the former Confederacy, plus 
the Border South states of Delaware, Mary land, West  Virginia, Kentucky, 
Missouri, and Oklahoma.
Some of the colleges of 1890  were outright new institutions.  Others  were 
repurposed from earlier—as a rule, not much earlier— schools the state had 
set up. Georgia revived public support for black access to land- grant bene-
fits; the Georgia State Industrial College, opened in 1891 to only black stu-
dents taught by only black faculty, would receive both the $8,000 that Atlanta 
University had received for many years (in lieu of funds from the 1862 act) 
and one- third of the 1890 funds. Kentucky’s State Normal School for Col-
ored Persons, established shortly before the 1890 Morrill Act, suddenly re-
ceived an infusion of new funds—14.5  percent of both the 1862 and the 1890 
money. The white school did not lose any money when some of the 1862 
fund was redirected to the black school,  because the new money from the 
1890 act far surpassed the loss of a portion of the old and, moreover, kept 
climbing  every year through the following de cade.29
28Rainsford, Congress and Higher Education, pp. 103–14; Williams, Origins of Federal 
Support, pp. 141–56; Joel Schor, Agriculture in the Black Land­ Grant System to 1930 (Tallahassee, 
Fla., 1982), pp. 165–71.
29Wallenstein, From Slave South to New South, pp. 168–69; Schor, Agriculture in the Black 
Land­ Grant System, pp. 47–149; Leedell W. Neyland, Historically Black Land­ Grant Institutions 
and the Development of Agriculture and Home Economics, 1890–1990 (Tallahassee, Fla., 1990). See 
also Lester C. Lamon, “The Tennessee Agricultural and Industrial Normal School: Public 
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In North Carolina, black citizens had called for years, with  little or no 
support from any whites, for a state- supported institution of higher educa-
tion. Some argued to let black students attend with whites. Within weeks of 
enactment of the 1890 Morrill bill, Interior Secretary John W. Noble wrote 
North Carolina Governor Daniel G. Fowle inquiring about black access to 
an agricultural college in that state. Fowle conceded the current situation, 
declared his intention to request establishment of a black institution at the 
next legislative session, in early 1891, and put out his hand for the first year’s 
$15,000 of the 1890 Morrill Act money. Fowle did make the promised rec-
ommendation, “for only this,” he explained to legislators, “ will entitle our 
State to her portion of the appropriation.” The legislature did authorize the 
requisite black college, the Agricultural and Mechanical College for the Col-
ored Race. The city of Greensboro soon secured the location with an offer of 
twenty- five acres and $15,000, and the new school opened in 1893. The 
carrot- and- stick of the 1890 Morrill Act made all the difference between black 
access to a public institution in that state and continuing to have none.30
By no means  were new land- grant institutions for black students the only 
schools that the 1890 Morrill Act helped launch. The surge of new money 
spurred a number of states to redirect the land- grant designation and funds 
to new institutions. This was true in the Northeast with the establishment 
of state universities in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire, so 
the land- grant mission was moved from private institutions to incipient 
flagship universities. And it was true in the Southeast with the establish-
ment of new colleges of 1862 in both North Carolina and South Carolina, 
where the land- grant operations  were moved from flagship institutions to 
stand- alone land- grant schools, much as Mississippi had done earlier. Re-
gardless, new funds meant new possibilities.31
Education for Black Tennesseans,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 32 (1973):42–58; William C. 
Hine, “South Carolina State College: A Legacy of Education and Public Ser vice,” 
Agricultural History 65 (1991):149–67; Larry Eugene Rivers and Canter Brown Jr., “ ‘A 
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Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, 1865–1887,” Florida Historical Quarterly 85 
(2006):1–41; John R. Wennersten and Ruth Ellen Wennersten, “Separate and Unequal: 
The Evolution of a Black Land Grant College in Mary land, 1890–1930,” Mary land 
Historical Magazine 72 (1977):110–17.
30Frenise A. Logan, “The Movement in North Carolina to Establish a State Supported 
College for Negroes,” North Carolina Historical Review 35 (1958):167–80.
31Nathan M. Sorber, “Farmers, Scientists, and Officers of Industry: The Formation 
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100    Peter Wallenstein
In a single year in the mid-1890s, the land- grant institutions absorbed to-
tals of $505,630 from the 1862 act, $652,576 from the Hatch Act, and $891,389 
from the 1890 act.32  These figures indicate how crucial the new legislation 
was for enabling the land- grant institutions to perform their expanding 
functions— and why  there was a return to jousting over where  those funds 
should be directed.
Yet it soon became clear that the agricultural experiment stations needed 
additional resources. The intellectual capacity to conduct research was grow-
ing, as ever more frequently the typical station scientist had done gradu ate 
work at a land- grant college; yet into the twentieth  century, the Hatch Act 
stipend remained constant at $15,000 per state. At the behest of some agri-
cultural station leaders, Congressman Henry C. Adams of Wisconsin in-
troduced a bill to double the annual stipend over the next five years. In 
return, each station was directed to propose specific research proj ects to the 
Department of Agriculture for approval, each with a research design and a 
cost estimate. The Adams Act of 1906 further entrenched the princi ple of 
federal funding, channeled through the experiment stations, for scientific 
research in general and agriculture in par tic u lar. The concept of a national 
science policy along  these decentralized lines, building on this approach, 
eventually took on a more general and robust configuration.  Later enhance-
ments included the Purnell Act of 1925 and the Bankhead- Jones Act of 1935.33
In the 1910s, Congress fostered further enhancement of land- grant insti-
tutions, both black and white, by enacting additional laws, new mandates, new 
opportunities, and new missions. With the Smith- Lever Act of 1914, Con-
gress created the cooperative extension ser vice, according to which 
land- grant schools had a big new responsibility of seeing to it that the knowl-
edge being taught—or even generated—at the home campus be extended 
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2011, pp. 192–250; Everett B. Sackett, 
New Hampshire’s University: The Story of a New  England Land­ Grant College (Somersworth, N.H., 
1974); David A. Lockmiller, History of the North Carolina State College of Agriculture and 
Engineering of the University of North Carolina, 1889–1939 (Raleigh, 1939), pp. 19–42; Helene M. 
Riley, Clemson University (Charleston, S.C., 2002), pp. 2, 7–13. Scott M. Gelber, The 
University and the  People: Envisioning American Higher Education in an Era of Populist Revolt 
(Madison, Wis., 2011), emphasizes developments during  these years in Kansas, Nebraska, 
and North Carolina.
32Williams, Origins of Federal Support, p. 155.
33Ibid., pp. 174–78; Rainsford, Congress and Higher Education, pp. 123–27; Norwood Allen 
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throughout society.  People should benefit from the land- grant system regard-
less of  whether they had ever set foot on a college campus, or  whether they 
even knew such a school existed. The president of  Virginia Polytechnic In-
stitute (VPI) declared his wish “to make the state of  Virginia the campus” 
for his school. The historian of Texas A&M observes that the Smith- Lever 
Act “had an even more profound effect” on land- grant schools than did the 
Hatch Act with its experiment stations.34
Three years  later, the Smith- Hughes Act of 1917 promoted the training 
of teachers for vocational education in the emerging high schools: teachers 
of home economics for girls and agriculture for boys. Land- grant colleges 
contributed mightily to schooling the teachers who would undertake that 
teaching.35
During the New Deal years, the land- grant schools picked up a collec-
tion of new responsibilities and opportunities. The Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration depended on the extension agents scattered throughout most 
counties in the nation to implement the production controls and other fea-
tures of New Deal agricultural policy. Massive funding from the Works Pro-
gress Administration and successor entities assisted with the construction 
of countless new administration and classroom buildings as well as residence 
halls and other structures at land- grant schools (as well as other campuses), 
from VPI to Louisiana State University. The National Youth Administration, 
created  under an executive order by President Franklin D. Roo se velt, offered 
work- study opportunities that assisted many tens of thousands of students at 
land- grant institutions.36
Race and Gender in the Land- Grant Schools
The land- grant system in the South long featured distinctive regional vari-
ations on the national pattern, starting with the distinction between the 
34Rainsford, Congress and Higher Education, pp. 127–29; Kinnear, The First 100 Years, 
p. 229; Dethloff, Texas A&M University, pp. 260 (quote), 382–403.
35Dethloff, Texas A&M University, pp. 131, 218; John Gadell, “Charles Allen Prosser: His 
Work in Vocational and General Education,” Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, 
1972.
36Christopher P. Loss, Between Citizens and the State: The Politics of American Higher 
Education in the 20th  Century (Prince ton, N.J., 2012), pp. 53–87; Richard A. Reiman, The New 
Deal and American Youth: Ideas and Ideals in a Depression De cade (Athens, Ga., 1992). See also 
Hine, “South Carolina State College,” pp. 157–58.
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colleges of 1862 and the colleges of 1890. The South’s historically white 
land- grant schools tended to combine three characteristics in a configura-
tion that proved not only typically long- lasting in that region but ever more 
anomalous elsewhere: a greater emphasis than outside the South on a mili-
tary regimen, a legislated mandate for racial segregation, and a rejection of 
coeducation.
White  women found places in the land- grant system early on at most in-
stitutions outside the South. Even in institutions that inaugurated female 
enrollment at about the same time, experiences could vary widely. In 1890, 
in establishing the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, the first 
Oklahoma territorial legislature provided for coeducation from the very be-
ginning. Both “males and females  shall be admitted to all the privileges” of 
the new school, the law declared, and at the institution’s first session, in 1891, 
the twenty- three young  women slightly outnumbered the twenty- two young 
men.  Women’s experiences at Oklahoma A&M often differed from men’s— 
for example,  whether they might represent their school in intercollegiate 
athletics— but the differences proved less stark than at many other schools, 
and a few  women as well as men  were hired for faculty positions.37
One scholar, having explored the early history of some  Great Plains land- 
grant schools, has observed that, where men and  women together entered 
newly founded institutions,  women  were perceived by their male classmates 
and teachers far less as intruders, far more as partners in a shared enter-
prise, with more or less equal proprietary claims on their school. The gen-
eral adoption of coeducation moved apace, at least outside the white 
institutions of the South.38
With re spect to gender, Oklahoma acted in a manner more consistent 
with its neighbors in the West than with its fellow segregated states. In Ala-
bama,  after two de cades of operation, Auburn began admitting  women as 
degree candidates in 1892. But the numbers remained very small—at least 
before the Smith- Lever Act in 1914 and especially the Smith- Hughes Act 
37Pauline W. Kopecky, A History of Equal Opportunity at Oklahoma State University 
(Stillwater, Okla., 1990), pp. 21–31.
38Andrea G. Radke- Moss, Bright Epoch:  Women and Coeducation in the American West 
(Lincoln, Neb., 2008), a study that emphasizes the land- grant institutions of Iowa, 
Nebraska, Utah, and Oregon between about 1870 and 1920. For another school open to 
 women from the beginning, see Pouneh Moghadam Alcott, “ Women at The Ohio State 
University in the First Four De cades, 1873–1912,” Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State 
University, 1979.
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in 1917 inaugurated a home economics program, as well as pos si ble  career 
tracks for  women gradu ates, and a  women’s dormitory came onstream in 
1921.39
West  Virginia University, located in Morgantown, in response to a pack-
age of resources that included the Woodburn Female Seminary, refused 
admission to gradu ates of that pre de ces sor institution. Having opened its 
doors to male students in 1867, West  Virginia University at last opened a 
door, at least a bit, for  women as degree candidates in 1889. The first female 
gradu ate, Harriet Eliza Lyon, class of 1891, wrote years  later that she had 
felt like “an alien and an intruder.”40
Despite significant divergences, the South and the non- South  were not 
all that diff er ent. Race is the best indicator of how  these regions, the South 
and the rest of the nation,  were not polar opposites. The South, however, 
was categorical in its exclusion of black students from white campuses, and 
not very good at supplying the second adjective in the phrase “separate but 
equal”; thus, black citizens often found themselves simply excluded from a 
range of opportunities.
Among African Americans associated with the land- grant system in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, perhaps the most famous is 
George Washington Carver. He was born in Missouri in 1864 or 1865, his 
 mother  either still a slave or just recently having been emancipated.  After 
growing up on farms or attending school in Missouri, Kansas, and Iowa, 
Carver began what turned out to be his life’s work in the land- grant con-
stellation when he enrolled in 1891 as Iowa Agricultural College’s first 
black student. When he graduated three years  later, he immediately be-
came the school’s first black gradu ate student and also its first black instruc-
tor of white students. Unlike most black gradu ates of land- grant schools 
outside the South, he could have stayed on at his alma mater. But before 
he earned his master’s degree in 1896, Mississippi’s black land- grant school 
offered him a faculty position, and then so did Tuskegee Institute’s Booker T. 
Washington, newly famous  after his 1895 Atlanta Speech. Alabama of 
39Leah Rawls Atkins, Blossoms amid the Deep Verdure: A  Century of  Women at Auburn 
(Auburn, Ala., 1992).
40William T. Doherty Jr. and Festus P. Summers, West  Virginia University: Symbol of Unity 
in a Sectionalized State (Morgantown, W.Va., 1982); Lillian J. Waugh and Judith G. Stitzel, 
“ ‘Anything but Cordial’: Coeducation and West  Virginia University’s Early  Women,” West 
 Virginia History 49 (1990):68–80.
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course had a black land- grant school too, the State Agricultural and Me-
chanical College for Negroes; but Washington managed to wrest the new 
black branch experiment station for Tuskegee Institute, at just about the 
time Carver chose to work at Tuskegee.41
Carver’s relatively smooth ac cep tance at a predominantly white land- 
grant school should not be taken as representative, even outside the South, 
especially a generation  after he attended Iowa State. In 1932, Doris Weaver 
sought equal admission into a capstone course in the home economics 
program at Ohio State University. The program required students to com-
plete a laboratory course, Home Economics 627, which gave students “the 
responsibility of home- making  under conditions approximating  those of a 
modern home.” In a special structure, students lived two to a room. Weaver, 
the only black se nior in the program, had not named a roommate, and 
the school pointed out that it could not require someone of a diff er ent 
race to room with her. When her college arranged an alternative place for 
her to live during the same period, where she could satisfy all course re-
quirements, she resorted to the Ohio judicial system as she sought admis-
sion on equal terms.
In the South, black citizens  were simply barred from admission into white 
schools. Elsewhere, enrollment generally proved no par tic u lar obstacle, but 
discrimination within the institution did. Ohio State University officials used 
a local version of separate but equal to accommodate a black se nior looking 
to complete the requirements for her degree. Drawing in large part on the 
separate- but- equal language of Plessy v. Ferguson, the Ohio Supreme Court 
saw no conflict with the  Fourteenth Amendment.42
Nor was Ohio State by any means unique among northern land- grant 
institutions in setting barriers to full black participation in school operations 
and activities. Rather, Doris Weaver’s experience was recapitulated across 
41Mark D. Hersey, My Work Is That of Conservation: An Environmental Biography of George 
Washington Carver (Athens, Ga., 2011), pp. 17–48. If Carver had an opportunity to stay on at 
a predominantly white institution, more typical of the experiences of black gradu ates of 
northern land- grant schools during the half  century  after 1890 is George Washington 
Owens, Kansas State class of 1899. Owens went to work with Carver at Tuskegee and 
then, in 1908, moved to  Virginia Normal and Industrial Institute to direct the agriculture 
program at what, in 1920, became  Virginia’s black land- grant school.
42State ex. rel. Weaver v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University, 126 Ohio St. 290 (1933); 
Pritchard, “The Negro Experience at the Ohio State University,” pp. 119–34; Tyran Kai 
Steward, “Time Not Ripe: Black  Women’s Quest for Citizenship and the  Battle for Full 
Inclusion at Ohio State University,” Ohio History 121 (2014):4–34.
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the land- grant system (much as it was at flagship schools that  were not also 
land- grant colleges). At some institutions, such impediments  were long stand-
ing; at  others, they proved innovations. At the University of Nebraska, on- 
campus residence facilities  were closed to black students  until around the 
end of World War II. At Cornell, where black  women had long been allowed 
to live in the dorms, for some years beginning in the 1920s such was no lon-
ger the case.43
The  legal scholar A. Leon Higginbotham Jr., in a magisterial book pub-
lished in 1978 on race and the law, recounted an experience at Purdue in 
1944. As a sixteen- year- old freshman, he, together with the eleven other 
black students, had to live off campus in the unheated attic of a  house. One 
frigid winter morning he had had enough and made an appointment to 
speak to Purdue president Edward C. Elliott. He requested rooms for the 
twelve in a heated on- campus dormitory, even a segregated wing. The re-
ply, as he recalled it all  those years  later: “Higginbotham, the law  doesn’t 
require us to let colored students in the dorm, and you  either accept  things 
as they are or leave the University immediately.” The young man left Pur-
due for a more welcoming collegiate environment— and changed his  career 
choice from engineering to law.44
At the University of Minnesota, black students found themselves excluded 
from both home economics and nursing, in part  because both had residen-
tial requirements, and dormitories  were unavailable to black students. In 
fact, at the University of Minnesota, Frances McHie and her supporters  were 
preparing a court challenge to her exclusion from the nursing program  until 
the institution relented, and she graduated in 1932. Yet it took a huge effort 
to line up po liti cal backers before Martha Murphy,  daughter of the publisher 
of the Baltimore Afro­American, could gain entrance into the university’s resi-
dence halls in 1938. Exclusion from housing— and therefore sometimes from 
programs of study— was widespread, discrimination blatant, albeit not quite 
as categorical or interminable as at white southern schools.45
43Breaux, “ ‘We Must Fight Prejudice Even More Vigorously in the North,’ ” p. 181; 
“Early Black  Women at Cornell: Part and Apart, 1890s–1930s,” http:// rmc . library . cornell 
. edu / earlyblackwomen / introduction / index . html.
44A. Leon Higginbotham Jr., In the  Matter of Color: Race and the American  Legal Process— 
The Colonial Period (New York, 1978), pp. vii– ix; http: // www . discoverlbj . org / item / oh 
- higginbothama - 19761007 - 1 - 84 - 47.
45Breaux, “ ‘We Must Fight Prejudice Even More Vigorously in the North,’ ” 
pp. 181–89.
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Intercollegiate athletics provided another significant marker for calibrat-
ing black inclusion in the predominantly white land- grant schools of the 
North. Jesse Owens’s time at Ohio State supplies a glimpse of black inclu-
sion from the 1930s. Yet in basketball and football, to take two notable ex-
amples, though  there  were instances of black participation from the late 
nineteenth  century on, the modern era of increasing black inclusion dates 
in general from the post– World War II years.46
Race and ethnicity appeared in vari ous configurations across the land- 
grant system. Patterns of race in a black- white context  were complex enough, 
but then  there was the  matter of  people who, though typically classified as 
nonwhite,  were also not black, and therefore might have access to institu-
tions of higher education from which African Americans  were barred. Okla-
homa law expressly classified Native Americans as “white”  unless they had 
some African ancestry, so, from early on, Oklahoma Indians attended Okla-
homa State. Many land- grant institutions,  whether in the South or not, 
including VPI, admitted Asians or Asian Americans in the 1920s or 1930s, 
although Chinese Mississippians did not begin enrolling at Mississippi State 
 until the close of World War II.47
By the end of World War I, the two “best ideas” had each emerged in a 
form that went far beyond its origins in the 1860s. The national parks origi-
nated with the Yosemite Grant, forerunner of Yosemite National Park, in 
mid-1864—or during the Civil War albeit two years  after the Land- Grant 
College Act— and of Yellowstone National Park, established in 1872. Many 
parks  later, Congress created the National Park Ser vice in 1916, or in be-
tween the two major new initiatives— the 1914 Smith- Lever Act and the 
1917 Smith- Hughes Act— that propelled the growth of the land- grant sys-
tem during the Progressive Era.48
46Ibid., pp. 271–316; William J. Baker, Jesse Owens, An American Life (1986; reprint ed., 
Urbana, Ill., 2006), pp. 33–53; Charles H. Martin, “The Color Line in Midwestern 
College Sports, 1890–1960,” Indiana Magazine of History 98 (2002):85–112.
47Kopecky, Equal Opportunity at Oklahoma State, pp. 233–45; China Institute in Amer i ca, 
A Survey of Chinese Students in American Universities and Colleges in the Past One Hundred Years 
(New York, 1954), esp. pp. 26–32, 40–50, 63; Peter Wallenstein, Higher Education and the 
Civil Rights Movement: White Supremacy, Black Southerners, and College Campuses (Gainesville, 
Fla., 2008), pp. 6–8, 16 n.13.
48Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md., 2010), 
pp. 95–96.
The Morrill Land­ Grant College Act of 1862    107
By the 1920s and 1930s, the land- grant institutions had long featured sig-
nificant research functions, mostly of an applied kind related to mining 
and engineering and agriculture. And they had, for some years, set out to 
enhance rural life, to upgrade the reliable availability of inexpensive and 
nutritious food for urban as well as rural dwellers, and to promote the de-
velopment of high school curricular offerings,  whether as preparation for 
collegiate studies or as preparation to go out into the world as farmers and 
mechanics in the absence of a post– high school education.
By that time, the land- grant system had grown up. Although  people might 
be categorically excluded from some institutions on account of their race or 
gender, all states had made some kind of provision for  people of  every race 
and both genders. The funds went much further than the nineteenth- century 
legislation had gone,  whether dating from 1862, 1887, or 1890. And the mod-
ern  triple mission of teaching, research, and ser vice had clearly emerged.
Congressional initiatives, as they unfolded from one generation to the 
next, profoundly  shaped the course of higher education in  every state, from 
the foundational Morrill Act of 1862 on. When the United States entered 
World War II, the land- grant system had been evolving for nearly eight de-
cades. The system’s first quarter  century, from 1862 to 1887, had brought 
some implementation of the Morrill Act, with mixed results: vibrant begin-
nings at some institutions, faltering at  others, and restrictions often placed 
on white  women or on any African Americans. Between the beginnings of 
the next phase in the system’s development— the Hatch Act of 1887 and the 
Morrill Act of 1890— and the expansion of the New Deal years, the land- 
grant colleges had realized far greater growth in size of student populations, 
in curricular offerings, in constituencies accommodated, in research, and 
in outreach.
Yet the system in the 1920s or even the 1930s had reached only something 
of a halfway mark on the road to what it would become by the 1970s, espe-
cially in the South but also elsewhere. The quarter  century  after World War 
II brought tremendous additional change.
Convergences, 1938–72
During the quarter  century  after World War II, all of American higher ed-
ucation underwent vari ous transformations, and the stand- alone land- grant 
108    Peter Wallenstein
schools in par tic u lar had relatively far to go to reach university status. 
Transitions took place in the varied sorts of land- grant institutions, as well 
as at the flagship universities that  were not land- grant schools, such that by 
the 1970s they had very much converged.
Policy changes at the federal level  were central to change on such varied 
fronts as race, gender, and research. At midcentury, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled in ways that made it ever more difficult for state segregation laws and 
practices to pass constitutional muster, at least with regard to higher educa-
tion. In par tic u lar, black exclusion from gradu ate and professional programs 
came  under fire when other wise qualified black applicants  were turned away 
on racial grounds and then filed suit, usually in federal court, to plead their 
case.49 Moreover, the Court’s 1954 and 1955 rulings in Brown v. Board of Educa­
tion each spurred change, mostly in the Border South.50 Race was only one 
of several main fronts on which change had to come before land- grant in-
stitutions could reach university status in terms of both a breadth of cur-
ricular offerings and an end to categorical exclusion from enrollment in 
 those programs.
Time and again, Congress intervened to shape the course of higher edu-
cation in general and of the land- grant schools in par tic u lar. Such interven-
tions included the GI Bill of 1944, the National Defense Education Acts of 
1958 and 1964, the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the Higher Education Act of 1965, and Title IX in 1972. Fed-
eral dollars for research in the interests of national defense came during 
World War II and then all through the Cold War years, embodied most 
clearly in the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 and the 1958 Na-
tional Defense Education Act.51 The land- grant institutions played very 
49Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, 
1936–1961 (New York, 1994), pp. 126–49; Cheryl Elizabeth Brown Wattley, A Step  toward 
Brown v. Board of Education: Ada Lois Sipuel Fisher and Her Fight to End Segregation (Norman, 
Okla., 2014); Gary M. LaVergne, Before Brown: Heman Marion Sweatt, Thurgood Marshall, and 
the Long Road to Justice (Austin, Tex., 2010).
50Wallenstein, Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement, pp. 33–34.
51Edward Humes, Over  Here: How the G.I. Bill Transformed the American Dream (Orlando, 
Fla., 2006); Wayne J. Urban, More Than Science and Sputnik: The National Defense Education Act 
of 1958 (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 2010); Erinn McComb, “Taking Off: National Security, Identity, 
and Aerospace Engineering at Land- Grant Universities, 1957–1972,” in Alan I. Marcus, 
ed., Ser vice as Mandate: How American Land­ Grant Universities  Shaped the Modern World, 1920–2015 
(Tuscaloosa, Ala., 2015), pp. 192–215; Clay Risen, The Bill of the  Century: The Epic  Battle for 
the Civil Rights Act (New York, 2014); Andrew Fishel and Janice Pottker, National Politics and 
Sex Discrimination in Education (Lexington, Mass., 1977). For a comparison of the research 
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impor tant roles in that research, and by the same token  those research funds 
propelled the land- grant schools  toward an even greater emphasis on re-
search,  whether pure or applied.
Other impulses for change, outside of the policy framework, came in 
the postwar baby boom, which reached higher education in the 1960s; in the 
postwar prosperity that directed ever- greater proportions of young  people, 
young  women as well as young men,  toward college; and in the social and 
cultural shifts in the 1960s on both race and gender.
It serves  here to distinguish once again several variants among the con-
stellation of institutions of higher education discussed in this chapter. One 
model is the stand- alone colleges of 1862, such as Purdue University, Kan-
sas State, Michigan State, Iowa State, and Utah State or—in the officially 
segregated states— the institutions that grew into  Virginia Tech, Texas 
A&M, North Carolina State, Oklahoma State, Mississippi State, Auburn, 
and Clemson. Another is the category of institution that served both as land- 
grant institution and as the state’s flagship public university, such as the 
Universities of Vermont, Maine, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Idaho, and California—or Louisiana State University and the Universities 
of Delaware, Mary land, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, 
and Arkansas. Yet a third is the colleges of 1890 group, the historically black 
land- grant schools of the seventeen historically segregated states, including 
Langston University in Oklahoma, Lincoln University in Missouri, and 
the institutions that became  Virginia State, South Carolina State, and 
Florida A&M.
The stand- alone state universities between the 1860s and the 1960s pro-
vided a model of a fairly broad curriculum, often including programs in law 
or medicine, though with highly variable entrance criteria as to race or gen-
der. The University of  Virginia, for example, long made no space available 
for students who  were not both white and male. Absolute exclusion on the 
basis of gender began to recede in the 1920s, though complete access for 
female enrollment did not come  until the 1970s. Categorical exclusion of 
African Americans from any curriculum what ever persisted into the 
1950s— when it eased in law, medicine, and engineering— and still longer 
profiles of “nonflagship land- grant” and other universities in the quarter  century  after 
World War II, see Hugh Davis Graham and Nancy Diamond, The Rise of American Research 
Universities: Elites and Challengers in the Postwar Era (Baltimore, 1997), pp. 1–12, 26–50, 79–83, 
144–59.
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for most programs. Yet by the 1970s the University of  Virginia qualified for 
membership in the club of public research institutions that  were, at the same 
time, comprehensive, coeducational, and nonsegregated. So the very insti-
tutions that exemplified the model in the 1970s— the model  toward which 
all the diff er ent types of land- grant institutions  were evolving— went through 
tremendous change themselves along  every dimension during the  century 
following the 1862 passage of the Morrill Act.52
The emergence of the 1970s model of American higher education can be 
vividly seen at Texas A&M University. Before the 1960s, none of the Aggies 
 were African American, very few  were female, and all entering male under-
graduates had to participate in the Corps of Cadets. The curriculum itself 
continued to reflect the school’s historical name, Texas Agricultural and 
Mechanical College. But in the single year 1963, the institution abandoned 
the hallmarks of both its restricted constituency and its narrow curriculum. 
 Under the leadership of President James Earl Rudder, the school accepted 
its first black students that year and  adopted a new model of coeducation as 
well, thus beginning the pro cess of moving away from both types of exclu-
sion. More than that— despite fervent resistance against what one opponent 
termed the “curriculum- broadeners”— Texas A&M attained university sta-
tus that year. In one final big move away from the traditional model, in 
1965 the newly designated Texas A&M University ended mandatory par-
ticipation by male freshmen in the Corps of Cadets.53
So this stand- alone land- grant from the far western end of the former 
Confederacy depicted the dominant pattern in the South’s quite- sudden and 
virtually simultaneous transition on race and gender as well as military 
organ ization at its colleges of 1862, not to mention the development of a com-
prehensive research university out of an agricultural and mechanical col-
lege. The institution’s governing board declared the school in 1971 to be “a 
coeducational university admitting all qualified men and  women to all aca-
demic studies on the same basis without regard to race, creed, color or na-
tional origin.”54 Thus it implied the school’s extended range of “academic 
52Peter Wallenstein, Cradle of Amer i ca: A History of  Virginia, 2nd ed., rev. (Lawrence, 
Kans., 2014), pp. 301–2, 307, 365–66, 402–3.
53Dethloff, Texas A&M University, pp. 555–79, quote p. 571; Wallenstein, Higher Education 
and the Civil Rights Movement, p. 45.
54Dethloff, Texas A&M University, p. 570.
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studies” even as it expressly stated the newly inclusive criteria for joining 
 those programs’ constituencies.
At the stand- alone land- grant institutions outside the South, curricular 
changes of the sort that Texas A&M exhibited had to come about before 
 those schools could begin to approximate what the flagship campuses, in-
cluding  those that shared a designation as their state’s land- grant school, 
had long been developing. Kansas State University is a good example of such 
an institution. In the quarter  century between 1950 and 1975, during the 
presidency of James A. McCain, Kansas State went a  great distance  toward 
shedding its traditional identity, or at least acquiring key characteristics of 
its flagship counterpart, the University of Kansas. The proportion of fac-
ulty with doctorates  rose significantly, and the institution gained authority 
in 1956 to grant the bachelor of arts degree in the humanities and social sci-
ences. In 1959, Kansas State College of Agriculture and Applied Science 
took on a new public identity as Kansas State University.55
Changes came along vari ous paths. Curricular offerings at land- grant in-
stitutions in the segregated South could  either spur or retard the begin-
nings of black enrollment at historically white schools, but  either way black 
applicants for admission to white schools propelled the emergence of some 
portion of the new paradigm.
In 1935, when Lloyd Gaines graduated from Lincoln University, Mis-
souri’s black land- grant school, he applied for admission to the state’s only 
law school, which was at the University of Missouri, an institution that com-
bined the roles of flagship university and historically white land- grant 
school. Gaines was rejected on racial grounds.  After the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled in 1938 that Missouri had to provide him access to a law school cur-
riculum, the legislature established a new law program at Lincoln, rather 
than permit his enrollment at the state university. A similar set of develop-
ments, spurred by black applicant Lucile Bluford, led to Lincoln Universi-
ty’s establishment of a gradu ate program in journalism. But in 1950, three 
additional black applicants to the University of Missouri, among them pro-
spective gradu ate student Gus T. Ridgel, went to court to gain entrance to 
55Already, or fi nally, in 1949, football player Harold Robinson became the first African 
American to represent Kansas State in intercollegiate athletics. Carey, Kansas State 
University, pp. 181–85, 198–216, 259–62.
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one program or another not available at Lincoln, and the judge in their case 
directed the university to admit them.56
Five black applicants in this one state had collectively changed both the 
curricular offerings at the black land- grant school and then the racial pro-
file of students at the white school. Efforts in the late 1930s and the early 
1950s had diff er ent outcomes, but each set brought some change. Brown v. 
Board of Education  later in the 1950s spurred further change at the University 
of Missouri, as did congressional action in the 1960s.
In most states in the Deep South, no change what ever took place on the 
racial front at the colleges of 1862 before the 1960s, but even  there the offi-
cial response in Missouri to Lloyd Gaines had its counter parts at some col-
leges of 1890. A new law school at South Carolina State, established  after 
S.C. State gradu ate John Howard Wrighten III applied in 1946 to the Univer-
sity of South Carolina to study law, supplies one example.57
A more comprehensive example unfolded in Florida, where five black 
citizens applied in 1949 to the University of Florida, each to a diff er ent 
program. Rather than open the state’s college of 1862 to black enrollment, the 
legislature authorized new programs at Florida’s college of 1890 and in fact 
upgraded and reincarnated the school as Florida Agricultural and Mechanical 
University. A particularly per sis tent candidate for admission, Virgil Hawkins, 
eventually won a court order that opened the law school at the University 
of Florida to its first black student in 1958. But the university still refused to 
enroll him (it raised the minimum test score to just above his) and instead 
admitted a few other black students into a variety of gradu ate or professional 
programs that year and the next.58
Missouri in 1938 and Florida  after 1949 supplied one model for change— 
that is, change at the black land- grant school rather than the white one. 
56Wallenstein, Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement, pp. 22, 201–2, 266–69; 
James W. Endersby and William T. Horner, Lloyd Gaines and the Fight to End Segregation 
(Columbia, Mo., 2016).
57Another example was the creation of a new gradu ate program at S.C. State in 
education, similarly a response to Cleveland M. McQueen’s application to the state 
university for such a program. Peter Wallenstein, “Higher Education and Civil Rights: 
South Carolina, 1860s–1960s,” History of Higher Education Annual 23 (2003–4):1–22.
58Wallenstein, Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement, pp. 41–43; Samuel Proctor 
and Wright Langley, Gator History: A Pictorial History of the University of Florida (Gainesville, 
Fla., 1986), pp. 47–48. Supplying an internal explanation for the change is Leedel W. 
Neyland and John W. Riley, The History of Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University 
(Gainesville, Fla., 1963), pp. 237–53.
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But change might come at a state’s white institution, in the way that Lloyd 
Gaines had sought, albeit without success, and that Gus Ridgel had actu-
ally achieved.
The “mechanical” component of the A&M curriculum provided an en-
tering wedge for breaking up the categorical exclusion of black students from 
some of the segregated states’ colleges of 1862. The first black undergradu-
ates at the Border South’s Universities of Mary land (Hiram Whittle), Dela-
ware (Elbert C. Whisner), Kentucky (Holloway Fields), and Missouri (Elmer 
Bell Jr. and George Everett Horne), as well as at Oklahoma State (Dolphin 
Al Wharton Jr. and Glenn Bernarr Wharton), had applied for the engineer-
ing curriculum.59
So did the pioneer black students throughout the 1950s at  Virginia Tech, 
never more than four at one time, beginning with Irving L. Peddrew III, 
whose admittance in 1953 reflected the unavailability of an engineering pro-
gram at  Virginia State. The story at VPI illustrates how  simple change might 
compound. Peddrew never would have applied to VPI except that one of his 
high school teachers in Hampton told him she had heard that some white 
schools in  Virginia (the University of  Virginia and the College of William 
and Mary) had begun admitting black students. Hearing of Peddrew’s 
enrollment, John Perry, a physics teacher at Booker T. Washington High 
School “across the  water” in Norfolk, recruited three black se niors— Lindsay 
Cherry, Floyd Wilson, and Charlie Yates—to join Peddrew in the VPI en-
gineering program.60 Peddrew would be more likely to survive, Perry no 
doubt thought, if he had the companionship of fellow black students, and 
regardless of  whether he left, the experiment must continue. And it did.
In view of the lack of a similar opportunity at their state’s black land- 
grant school, in each of  these states  these pioneers had been admitted to the 
historically white institution in a manner consistent with the newly emerg-
ing constitutional understanding at midcentury of the old separate- but- equal 
formula. Segregation persisted, but at school  after school one or more black 
students took their limited place on a campus that previously would have 
excluded them. On  every such campus,  under the new gradu ate and pro-
fessional program exception, apartheid had been compromised, even for an 
occasional undergraduate.
59Wallenstein, Higher Education and the Civil Rights Movement, pp. 26, 28–30, 33, 266–68.
60Ibid., pp. 36–41.
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Meanwhile, like the colleges of 1862, the colleges of 1890 moved  toward 
university status. Florida A&M’s trajectory from college to university was 
matched in degree in the other southern states. To take one example, 
 Virginia Normal and Industrial Institute grew into the  Virginia State Col-
lege for Negroes, then  Virginia State College, and eventually (in 1979) 
 Virginia State University.
Despite the re sis tance to racial change in the historically white land- grant 
institutions of the South, without exception they  were admitting black 
undergraduates by 1965.61 Black per sis tence, court action, and congressio-
nal legislation had combined to push the pro cess along. From the outer 
edges of the former Confederacy, both Texas A&M and VPI illustrated the 
partial yet significant transformation.
One man’s pilgrimage through the land- grant cir cuit embodies the ways 
the system operated and how it was changing in fundamental ways in the 
third quarter of the twentieth  century, both within the South and outside 
it, as—or soon  after— the system turned one hundred years old. T. Mar-
shall Hahn Jr. grew up in Lexington, Kentucky, where his  father taught 
physics at the University of Kentucky. The ju nior Hahn raced through his 
undergraduate work  there before heading off for a tour in the U.S. Navy at 
the end of World War II,  after which he quickly completed his doctorate at 
another land- grant school, MIT. He returned to the University of Kentucky 
and taught physics  there, looking, however, for a place where he might 
quickly advance. He found such a position in 1954 as department head in 
physics at yet another land- grant school, VPI. But seeking still a bigger pond 
to oversee, he moved in 1959 to Kansas, where that state’s land- grant school 
was just that year becoming Kansas State University. Hahn served as dean 
of the College of Arts and Sciences.62
Recruited in 1962 to return to VPI, he served as president  there for a 
dozen years. His tenure began just as the new College of Arts and Sciences 
was coming onstream— with bachelor’s degrees and, soon, master’s pro-
grams as well, in the social sciences and the humanities— and on the very 
cusp of congressional enactment of major legislation on both civil rights and 
61For accounts of Clemson, Auburn, and Mississippi State, see ibid., pp. 17–20, 35–36, 
209.
62Warren H. Strother and Peter Wallenstein, From VPI to State University: President T. 
Marshall Hahn Jr. and the Transformation of  Virginia Tech, 1962–1974 (Macon, Ga., 2004), 
pp. 5–14.
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higher education. He cultivated state po liti cal leaders and the VPI board of 
visitors, appointed new deans, and lined up the other stakeholders whose 
cooperation he had to have. In addition to leading the way in redirecting 
the institution  toward a greater emphasis on faculty research and a tremen-
dous growth in gradu ate studies, his administration’s major policy initiatives 
included adopting full coeducation (1964), making optional the participation 
by all male undergraduates in the Corps of Cadets (also 1964), and actually 
recruiting black undergraduates (young  women as well as young men), with 
the promise of financial assistance, into any program of study (1966). In 1970 
the school’s name was changed to  Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University.63
From its new birth in 1872, VPI, the state’s historically white land- grant 
institution, embodied a transformation that reached across the South and 
indeed the nation. And by 1966 it had been transformed into the state of 
 Virginia’s first institution to showcase all of  these features, not just some: an 
arts- and- sciences curriculum, a commitment to research, and a wide range 
of gradu ate programs, together with active recruitment of undergraduates 
across lines of both race and gender.
The evolution, even transformation, of the land- grant schools—as well 
as the convergence of structures, functions, and identities— can be seen in 
the orga nizational changes in national associations representing the diff er-
ent types of schools. In the late nineteenth  century, institutional leaders of 
higher education formed vari ous associations to promote their common in-
terests. In 1919, two such organ izations— the Land- Grant College Engi-
neering Association and the Association of American Agricultural Colleges 
and Experiment Stations— merged to form the American Association of 
Land- Grant Colleges, which itself underwent a name change in 1928 to the 
Association of Land- Grant Colleges and Universities. In 1954 (a few weeks 
before Brown v. Board of Education), the association’s executive committee ap-
proved inviting the colleges of 1890 to become members (all but Lincoln Uni-
versity promptly accepted the invitation). That same year, looking  toward 
an eventual merger with a counterpart association for non- land- grant uni-
versities, the group changed its name to the American Association of Land- 
Grant Colleges and State Universities. The merger itself took place in 1963 
with the formation of the National Association of State Universities and 
63Ibid., pp. 14–15, 45–92, 111–19, 151–70, 289–96, 310–11, 376–86.
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Land- Grant Colleges. In 2009, the group took a new name, the Associa-
tion of Public and Land- Grant Universities.64
A Democracy at Work in Higher Education
In the  middle of a gigantic, consuming war, Congress passed, and the pres-
ident signed, a peacetime kind of law that promised—or at least promoted— 
the establishment of a new kind of college in  every state. Amer i ca’s “best 
idea” continued to develop across the next  century and beyond. State poli-
tics and policies  shaped local developments, as did institutional leadership 
and other groups and individuals, but the federal government— mostly 
Congress— intervened time and again to nudge the system ahead, often 
along new paths.
The land- grant colleges evolved across the hundred years between 
1862/1872 and 1962/1972 into a complex, an American system of public 
higher education, that had nowhere been envisioned at the time the Civil 
War was raging, but that a war time mea sure made pos si ble as conditions 
changed, new impulses developed, and new leadership took hold: large, co-
educational, multiracial, comprehensive research universities. The land- grant 
institutions did so in stages that can be seen as central tendencies, within 
regions or across regional bound aries: the first quarter  century of tentative 
beginnings, down through around 1887; the launching of major new di-
mensions, by both race (most notably in the South) and function and fund-
ing (throughout the nation), between 1887 and World War II; and then a 
surge across all manner of dimensions into the 1970s.
This chapter has traced the tremendous long- term historical significance 
of the 1862 Morrill Land- Grant College Act— the origins of the mea sure, 
as well as its early post– Civil War reception, including the beginnings of 
three southern variations on the national pattern: a greater emphasis than 
outside the South on a military regimen, a legislated mandate for racial seg-
regation, and a rejection of coeducation at the white land- grant schools. At 
greater length this chapter has explored how what typically began as 
64Hugh Hawkins, Banding Together: The Rise of National Associations in American Higher 
Education, 1887–1950 (Baltimore, 1992); Association of Land- Grant Colleges and 
Universities, 68th annual convention (November 1954), Proceedings, p. 86; “History of 
APLU,” http:// www . aplu . org / about - us / history - of - aplu / .
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teaching institutions emphasizing engineering, agriculture, and the mili-
tary, often with an entirely white male constituency, developed into public 
research universities, each with a comprehensive curriculum and a coedu-
cational, multiracial, and largely (if not exclusively) civilian constituency.
Over half of the fifty states feature land- grant schools that are also their 
state’s flagship school. Many of  those combination universities— among them 
Maine, West  Virginia, Tennessee, Minnesota, Nebraska, and California—
had their origins in a state’s putting the land- grant resources  under the 1862 
Morrill Act to effective use. Even when the two types of institutions have 
diff er ent identities and locations, the flagship school has come to look like 
the land- grant school as much as the other way around.
In one of the many ways that the land- grant institutions have proved sig-
nificant, they came, by the closing de cades of the twentieth  century, to re-
flect American society in a far more robust and au then tic manner than at 
any time before the Morrill Act’s centenary in 1962. Moreover, work done 
at, by, and through the nation’s land- grant institutions has increased agri-
cultural productivity so much as to contribute mightily to feeding a rapidly 
growing  human population, not only within the nation but around the globe. 
The work done in science and technology outside agriculture has been tre-
mendously consequential as well. So,  after a slower start, has the depth and 
breadth of research in the humanities and the social sciences.
But this chapter has emphasized the social laboratory of a democracy at 
work that the land- grant colleges inaugurated with one act of Congress in 
1862. Across the years, from one generation to another, the “best idea” that 
started out as an ideal in embryo took its place in an institutionalized form 
as a real ity crucial to higher education in  every state in the nation.
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Military Conflict on the 
Minnesota Homefront
Lincoln’s Humanitarian Concerns, Po liti cal Pressures,  
the Dakota  Pardons, and the  Future of U.S. Military Law
As t h e Ci v i l  war raged along the border between slavery and free-dom, it was easy for Americans to forget that for most of American 
history, military activities had taken place on the frontier, usually between 
native populations and the ever- expanding white population. Even the War 
of 1812, which was ostensibly against  Great Britain, had involved  battles with 
Indians in the Mississippi, St. Lawrence, and Ohio valleys.1 But the war to 
preserve the nation for the most part took the nation’s eyes off the West. 
One major exception was the Dakota War in the late summer and early fall 
of 1862, which forced the Lincoln administration to shift some of its atten-
tion and resources to Minnesota, the scene of the most violent and bloody 
conflict between Indians and white settlers since the colonial period.2 As 
I initially wrote this chapter while I held the John Hope Franklin Chair in  Legal 
History at Duke Law School and published an early version in the William Mitchell Law 
Review. I thank Daniel W. Stowell, the Papers of Abraham Lincoln; Shawn Rounds, the 
state archivist of Minnesota; the staff of the Minnesota Historical Society; and Jenny 
Bourne, Eric Carpenter, Jill Dupont, Amy S. Erickson, Tim A. Garrison, Meave E. Glass, 
Candace Gray, Alysa Landry, Karen  Needles, H. Jefferson Powell, David Nichols, and 
Colette Routel for their perceptive readings of this chapter.
1See, for example, Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars (New York, 
2001) for a discussion of the Creek War. On conflict in the Ohio Valley, see Roger L. 
Nichols, Black Hawk and the Warrior’s Path, 2nd ed. (Chichester, UK, 2017).
2More Indians died in the Second Seminole War and the Red Stick Creek War, but 
 these  were essentially conflicts between the military and the Indians, rather than 
Indian– settler conflicts. The other exception in the Civil War was the Sand Creek 
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many as 600 or more white settlers, a few hundred soldiers, and somewhere 
between 100 (or less) and 300 Indians— almost all members of the Dakota 
nation (called Sioux at the time)— died in this conflict.3 At the time, po liti-
cal and military leaders in Minnesota asserted that at least 1,000 whites 
died. While this number was an exaggeration, the fact that most white lead-
ers believed the death toll was this high heightened emotions and increased 
demands for postwar punishments of the Dakota. Thus,  after the war 300 
or so Dakota would die, some through execution, but many more through 
harsh conditions in postconflict confinement.
As the conflict in Minnesota died down, General Henry Hastings Sibley 
(fig. 1) appointed a military commission that eventually tried 393 Indians 
for “crimes” connected to the conflict.4 The  trials began on September 28, 
1862, and by November 5 the military commission had convicted 323 of the 
defendants. The speed of  these  trials was shocking. On the first day alone, 
sixteen men  were tried, with ten being convicted and sentenced to death. 
This would have been one trial  every thirty minutes, assuming eight full 
hours of hearing. As the  trials wound down in November, the commission 
tried eighty- two men over two days.5 Some of  these  trials must have lasted 
less than ten minutes. Some of the defendants spoke no En glish, and none 
Massacre, which was shocking in its brutality, but did not involve nearly as many troops or 
as much time or have as  great an impact on the national government.
3David A. Nichols, “The Other Civil War: Lincoln and the Indians,” Minnesota 
Historical Magazine 44 (1974):2–15. Estimates of the dead vary from 400 to 800 (or more) 
white civilians and 200 or so soldiers. Philip Weeks, Farewell My Nation: American Indians and 
the United States in the Nineteenth  Century, 3rd ed. (Chichester, UK, 2016), p. 132. Curtis A. 
Dahlin, The Dakota Uprising: A Pictorial History (Edina, Minn., 2009), p. 1 (“Estimates of the 
number of whites killed vary widely, with 600 being a conservative estimate”). Many 
sources estimate Dakota deaths at 300, although this may be too high. Carol Chomsky, 
citing a 1923 account of the events, puts the deaths at “77 American soldiers, 29 citizen- 
soldiers, approximately 358 settlers, and an estimated 29 Dakota soldiers.” Carol 
Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota War  Trials: A Study in Military Injustice,” Stanford 
Law Review 43 (1990):13, 21–22. Chomsky also cites another source for fewer Dakota killed. 
I believe that Chomsky’s figures, at least for the deaths of settlers, are far too modest.
4 There is a large lit er a ture on the vio lence in Minnesota, but very  little of it focuses on 
the  trials, and even less on the  pardons. The best work on the  legal aspects of the  trials is 
Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota War  Trials,” and Maeve Herbert, “Explaining the 
Sioux Military Commission of 1862,” Columbia  Human Rights Law Review 40 (2009):743, 780. 
On Dakota- white relations from the seventeenth  century to the outbreak in 1862, see Gary 
Clayton Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind: Dakota– White Relations in the Upper Mississippi 
Valley, 1650–1862 (St. Paul, Minn., 1984). See also David A. Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians: 
Civil War Policy and Politics (Columbia, Mo., 1978).
5Chomsky, “United States– Dakota War  Trials,” p. 25.
Fig. 1. Henry Hastings Sibley, 1862 photo graph, Whitney’s Gallery. (Minnesota Histori­
cal Society)
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of them  were afforded counsel. The commission sentenced 303 men to death 
and provided lesser punishments for twenty  others who  were convicted only 
of looting but  were not involved in any combat or attacks on white settlers. 
Even before the  trials  were over, President Abraham Lincoln exercised his 
authority, and his obligation,  under the Militia Act of 1862, ordering that 
no executions take place without his approval.6 On November  7, Major 
General John H. Pope (fig. 2), the recently appointed commanding general 
of the brand new Department of the Northwest, sent Lincoln the list of  those 
sentenced to death.7
Much to the shock of the military and civilian leaders in Minnesota, the 
president did not rubber- stamp  these convictions and sentences. Instead, on 
November 10, Lincoln told General Pope to “forward as soon as pos si ble 
the full and complete rec ord of their convictions” and to “have a careful 
statement” indicating “the more guilty and influential of the culprits.”  After 
hearing of Lincoln’s response, Minnesota Governor Alexander Ramsey 
(fig. 3) immediately expressed his “hope” that “the execution of  every Sioux 
Indian condemned by the military court  will be at once ordered.” The gov-
ernor warned the president that if all of the condemned Indians  were not 
executed, “private revenge would . . .  take place.” Local sentiment clearly 
favored executions and perhaps vengeance on top of that, with one paper 
demanding “death to the barbarians.”8
6“Act to Amend an Act Calling Forth the Militia to Execute the Laws of the Union, 
Suppress Insurrections, and Repel Invasions, Approved February Twenty- Eight, 
Seventeen Hundred and Ninety- Five and the Acts Amendatory Thereof, and for Other 
Purposes [Militia Act of 1862],” Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 597–598 (1862). Section 5 of 
the act provided that “no sentence of death, or imprisonment in the penitentiary,  shall be 
carried into execution  until the same  shall have been approved by the President.”
7Major General John Pope told General Henry Hastings Sibley, “The President directs 
that no executions be made without his sanction.” Pope to Sibley, Oct. 17, 1862, quoted in 
Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, p. 96; Message of the President of the United States in Answer to A 
Resolution of the Senate of the 5th Instant in Relation to the Indian Barbarities in Minnesota, Dec. 11, 
1862, 37th Cong., 3d sess., Ex. Doc. 7, p. 1 (hereafter Message of the President); John Pope to 
Abraham Lincoln, Friday, Nov. 7, 1862 (tele gram reporting the names of the 300 Sioux 
sentenced to death), Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress (hereafter 
Lincoln Papers, LC). This collection is only available online, at http:// memory . loc . gov 
/ ammem / alhtml / malhome . html; Lincoln to Major General Pope, Nov. 10, 1862 
(acknowledging receipt of the list of condemned men), in United States War Department 
et al., The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Rec ords of the Union and Confederate 
Armies (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 787 (hereafter O.R.).
8Lincoln to Major General Pope, Nov. 10, 1862; Alex. Ramsey to His Excellency 
Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 10, 1862; John Pope to His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 11, 
1862, all in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, pp. 787–88; Stillwater Messenger, Nov. 11, 1862, quoted in 
Fig. 2. “Portrait of Brig. Gen. John Pope, officer of the Federal Army (Maj. Gen.  after 
Mar.  21, 1862),” Brady National Photographic Art Gallery (Washington, D.C.), 
ca. 1860–65. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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Fig.  3. Alexander Ramsey in a photo graph prob ably taken during his senatorial 
 career (1863–75), Brady- Handy Photo graph Collection. (Library of Congress Prints and 
Photo graphs Division)
On November 11, General Pope assured Lincoln he would send the trial 
rec ords, but in fact they did not arrive  until the end of the month. Perhaps 
Pope hoped that during this delay the president would let the  matter drop 
Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota War  Trials,” p. 29; see also Nichols, Lincoln and the 
Indians, pp. 101–11.
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and allow the executions to move forward. Meanwhile, Pope lobbied Lin-
coln, assuring him that “the only distinction between the culprits is as to 
which of them murdered most  people or  violated most young girls. All of 
them are guilty of  these  things in more or less degree.” Pope noted that in 
addition to the prisoners, he had in custody about “1,500  women and  children 
and innocent old men prisoners”; and if the condemned Indians  were not 
executed,  there would be “an indiscriminate massacre” of  those  people. Pope 
said if civilians attacked the Indians in his custody, he did not believe he 
could control his own troops, who  were “entirely new and raw, and are in 
full sympathy with the  people on this subject.”9 It is hard to imagine how 
Lincoln reacted to General Pope’s open admission of his incompetence to 
command the army  under him. Pope had been sent to Minnesota  after he 
had disgraced himself in the Second  Battle of Bull Run, suffering about 
15,000 casualties with nearly 1,800 men killed. Lincoln must have wondered, 
given Pope’s admission in this letter,  whether Pope was capable of any 
command.
Perhaps  because he realized that confessing incompetence in command-
ing his troops was not productive for his military  career, Pope sent the pres-
ident a tele gram, suggesting an alternative solution to the prob lem. He 
proposed that instead of the army executing the Sioux, “the Criminals 
be turned to the State Govt to be dealt with.” In Pope’s mind, this would 
take the onus off the president and resolve the issue. At the end of the month 
Governor Ramsey made a similar offer, telling the president, “If you prefer 
it turn them over to me & I  will order their Execution.”10 Both the general 
and the governor  were desperate to see the Indians executed. Neither under-
stood that Lincoln’s concerns for due pro cess and fairness— and his dis-
comfort with  needless killing— would not be eliminated by substituting a 
state executioner for a federal hangman. Nor did  either man apparently 
understand that Lincoln was not the kind of leader who would shift respon-
sibility to someone  else so that he would not have to make a distasteful 
decision.
Lincoln did not respond to the absurd idea of shifting the responsibility 
for the Dakota prisoners to Governor Ramsey and state authorities. Nor was 
9Message of the President, p. 1; John Pope to His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 11, 
1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 788.
10Telegraph from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 11, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC; 
telegraph from Alexander Ramsey to The President, Nov. 28, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC.
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he impressed by the threats of vigilante vio lence against Indian  women, 
 children, and old men or pressures from Minnesota newspapers. Lincoln 
had seen so many newspaper attacks on him since he began his run for the 
presidency that he was likely unaffected by the wild harangues of Minne-
sota editors. However, he surely must have wondered why the major gen-
eral he had appointed to command the newly created Department of the 
Northwest was incapable of preventing an unruly mob of civilians from at-
tacking the Indians who  were in his custody. He similarly might have won-
dered why Governor Ramsey was unable to prevent vigilante vio lence in 
his state. Ultimately, Lincoln would reprieve the overwhelming majority of 
the convicted Dakota, despite the pressure of his generals, the po liti cal 
leadership of the state, and the public press. Eventually all of  those reprieved 
would go  free,11 and  there would be no mob retaliation.
On December 26, 1862, the United States Army hanged thirty- eight 
Dakota men in Mankato, Minnesota, in the largest mass execution in 
American history (fig. 4). Many scholars and much of the general public 
focus on this horrific event. The event is made more horrific by the fact 
that many, perhaps most, of  those executed  were guilty of nothing that was 
recognizable as a war crime, and some had done nothing more than carry 
a weapon into  battle. Furthermore, the  trials themselves lacked any sense 
of due pro cess or fairness. Modern scholarship has exposed that the  trials 
of the Dakota  were a horrendous miscarriage of justice that led to the 
hangings.
This chapter focuses on a narrow slice of  those events: the decision by 
President Lincoln to prevent the execution of about 87  percent of  those who 
 were condemned to die. Lincoln’s intervention and his decision to reprieve 
265 Dakota— seven out of  every eight who  were condemned— constitute the 
largest mass clemency of  people sentenced to death in American history.
11Technically Lincoln did not  pardon any of the Dakota prisoners but merely refused to 
authorize their execution. However, at the time every one understood that  these  were 
 pardons, and contemporaries used that term in describing them. In real ity, once the 
prisoners  were reprieved, they  were effectively pardoned and eventually released from 
custody. For use of the term “ pardon,” see, for example, a letter in which Judge Advocate 
General Joseph Holt told Lincoln that if he certified some of the convicted men to be 
executed, it was “merely an approval of the sentences, and a refusal to  pardon.” Joseph 
Holt to Abraham Lincoln, Dec. 1, 1862, in Lincoln Papers, LC.
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Po liti cal Considerations and the  Pardon Issue
With the Civil War raging, Lincoln focused almost all of his attention on 
defeating the Confederacy and preserving the Union. With U.S. casualties 
already exceeding 100,000,12 the fate of a few hundred Indians in Min-
nesota should not have been very significant to Lincoln. If anything, Lin-
coln had as much reason as the  people in Minnesota to be furious at the 
12Casualties refer to  those killed, wounded, and missing. By the end of 1862 more than 
15,500 U.S. soldiers had been killed in major  battles ( those in which the United States had 
more than 500 casualties), more than 69,000 U.S. soldiers had been wounded, and more 
than 52,000  were missing or captured. Tens of thousands of other soldiers had died or 
 were incapacitated from disease related to the war. With high mortality rates from wounds 
and disease, many of  those who had not died in  battle would die  later, as would many who 
 were captured and sent to Confederate prison camps. A few thousand more soldiers had 
been killed or wounded in smaller engagements, including the  battles in Minnesota. See 
Frederick Phisterer, Statistical Rec ord of the Armies of the United States (New York, 1885), 
pp. 213–15.
Fig. 4. “Execution of the Thirty- Eight Sioux Indians, at Mankato, Minnesota, De-
cember  26, 1862,” color lithograph, Milwaukee Litho. & Engr. Co., 1883. (Library of 
Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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Dakota who made war on the United States. They had been living peace-
fully in the state, they  were reasonably well integrated into the society, and 
many of them knew and regularly interacted with whites. Thus, General 
Sibley asserted they  were not “wild and ignorant savages” who could be ex-
cused for be hav ior that offended American law and culture.13 What ever 
their grievances, murderous attacks directed mostly at innocent civilians 
could hardly be justified.
The vio lence in Minnesota also threatened the larger security of the 
nation. The acts of the Dakota warriors forced Lincoln to devote troops, 
 horses, arms, money, and time to pacify the frontier when he desperately 
needed  these military assets for the ongoing war for the Union. In the 
end, the United States diverted only a few thousand troops to Minnesota, 
but when the vio lence began, Lincoln had no idea how many troops he 
would have to send  there, and how long they would be  there. Three days 
 after the vio lence in Minnesota broke out, the United States suffered a 
humiliating defeat at the Second  Battle of Bull Run. Lincoln faced a crisis in 
the military—as he searched for a new commander for the Army of the 
Potomac, to replace the disgraced Major General John H. Pope, who had 
been relieved  because of his disastrous leadership at the Second  Battle of 
Bull Run. The Indian conflict in Minnesota was an unanticipated compli-
cation for Lincoln that had the potential to divert huge resources from the 
war against the Confederacy.
The administration initially feared the events in Minnesota  were part of 
a Confederate conspiracy to open up a new front on the western frontier.14 
Horace Greeley, the influential but not always accurate editor of the New 
York Tribune, published an unsigned editorial asserting that the Dakota  were 
“stimulated if not bribed to plunder and slaughter their White neighbors” by 
agents “sent . . .  by the Secessionists.” Similarly, the New York Times reported 
that the “Indians are in league with the rebels.”15 While this proved not 
to be true, when the conflict began, the administration could not be certain 
13Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota War  Trials,” pp. 91–92.
14The secretary of the interior made such claims in his report to Congress in 
December 1862. “Report of the Secretary of the Interior,” in Message of the President of the 
United States to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the Session of the Thirty­ Seventh 
Congress, Dec. 1, 1862, 37th Cong., 3d sess., Ex. Doc. 1, vol. 2, pp. 8–9.
15Gerald S. Henig, “A Neglected Cause of the Sioux Uprising,” Minnesota History 45 
(1976):109 (quoting the New York Tribune, Aug. 25, 1862, and the New York Times, Oct. 2, 
1862, editorial titled “Are the Indians Allies of the Rebels?”).
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that this was not a Southern conspiracy. Even  after the war in Minnesota 
was over, some  people in the administration continued to believe it was part 
of a Confederate conspiracy that might break out again. On December 1, 
Secretary of the Interior Caleb Smith reported to Congress that “the chief 
cause” of the events in Minnesota “is to be found in the insurrection of the 
southern States.”16 Smith was certain that “southern emissaries”17 had con-
vinced the Dakota to go to war against the United States and the settlers. In 
retrospect, we know  these claims  were completely unfounded, but at the 
time some in the administration believed the events in Minnesota  were part 
of a Confederate plot that harmed not just the  people in Minnesota but the 
 whole nation.
The vio lence in Minnesota also threatened Lincoln’s larger goals for the 
nation. At the time of the outbreak Lincoln had written the Preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation and was waiting for a decisive military victory 
to provide him with an opportunity to announce his plans for ending slav-
ery in the Confederacy.18 Shifting troops and resources to Minnesota could 
potentially have prevented Lincoln from winning a major  battle that would 
allow him to announce emancipation. The events in Minnesota  were not 
simply a distraction for the president: they threatened to derail—or at least 
delay— a major policy shift. For Lincoln, the outbreak of war on the Min-
nesota plains could hardly have come at a worse time. In the end the con-
flict in Minnesota did not require as many troops as Lincoln feared, and 
the administration needed only a few thousand troops to defeat the Dakota. 
But, shifting troops to the West, creating a  whole new military district, and 
then focusing on the  trials of the Dakota and their pending executions  were 
distractions Lincoln could ill afford.
Lincoln also had strong po liti cal reasons for supporting the executions. 
On September 17, 1862, Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proc-
lamation. The war in Minnesota ended a week  later. The  trials in Minne-
sota began shortly  after that. Just as the  trials of the Dakota  were winding 
16“Report of the Secretary of the Interior.”
17Ibid.
18Paul Finkelman, “Lincoln’s Long Road to Freedom: How a Railroad  Lawyer 
Became the  Great Emancipator,” in Paul Finkelman and Donald R. Kennon, eds., Lincoln, 
Congress, and Emancipation (Athens, Ohio, 2016), pp. 162–210; Paul Finkelman, “Lincoln, 
Emancipation, and the Limits of Constitutional Change,” Supreme Court Review 2008 
(2008):349, 361–62. See also Louis P. Masur, Lincoln’s Hundred Days: The Emancipation 
Proclamation and the War for the Union (Cambridge, Mass., 2012).
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down, Lincoln and his party had been badly bruised in the 1862 midterm 
elections, losing twenty- two House seats and holding control of the House 
of Representatives only with the help of a block of  unionist Demo crats. The 
Republicans lost control of state legislatures in Illinois and Indiana and the 
New York governorship. This backlash was caused by war weariness and 
the general weakness of the U.S. war effort in the East. Opposition to Lin-
coln’s plans for emancipation, announced in late September, hurt the Re-
publicans in some places, especially in the lower Midwest and among Irish 
Americans in New York City.  Under  these circumstances Lincoln could 
hardly afford to risk alienating voters in Minnesota, who at this time  were 
overwhelmingly Republican. In Minnesota  there was enormous popu lar 
support for executing all of the convicted Indians. In the calculus of good 
and evil, suffering and redemption, Lincoln might have easily concluded that 
the lives of a few hundred Indians— all of whom appeared to have made 
war on settlers— was a small cost to shore up support for saving the nation 
and reshaping the ongoing national conflict into a war for freedom and 
emancipation.
Yet, Lincoln rejected  these obvious reasons for simply allowing the exe-
cutions to go forward. Instead, he and his staff reviewed all of the convic-
tions and concluded that many of the charges against the Dakota  were 
exaggerated or bogus. As one historian has noted, “Early accounts of the 
uprising seized upon the occasional instances of torture and mutilation, 
exaggerated them, and conjured up a picture of  wholesale atrocities unpar-
alleled in the history of Indian warfare.”19 Minnesota Senator Morton S. 
Wilkinson and the state’s members of the House detailed how the Indians 
had committed “fiendish brutality,” murders in “cold blood,” and gang 
rapes.20 Lincoln politely replied to  these three fellow Republicans that  these 
“statements of fact”  were “not found in the rec ords of the  trials.”21 Indeed, 
as the historian Roy Meyer notes, “[l]ike Falstaff’s story of the men he bat-
tled . . .  the closer  these stories are scrutinized, the less foundation  there 
seems to be for them.”22 Similarly, General Pope had told Lincoln, although 
19Roy W. Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux: United States Indian Policy on Trial (Lincoln, 
Neb., 1967), p. 120.
20M. S. Wilkinson, Cyrus Aldrich, and Wm. Windom to The President of the United 
States, in Message of the President, pp. 2–4.
21Message of the President, p. 1.
22Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux, p. 120.
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he knew better, that all of the men sentenced to death had murdered civil-
ians and ravished  women and girls “in more or less degree.”23  After his ex-
amination of the rec ord, Lincoln discovered that the per sis tent assertions 
of rape and the slaughtering of  women,  children, and captives throughout 
the conflict and its aftermath  were vastly overstated and mostly false. Lin-
coln concluded that only two of the condemned men had actually raped 
anyone,24 although a number of other convicted men had killed civilians, 
including  women and  children. Ultimately, Lincoln refused to authorize the 
executions of 265 of the 303 men sentenced to die, effectively pardoning 
them.
On December 26, 1862, the army hanged thirty- eight Dakota men.25 
Some of  those executed had in fact killed civilians needlessly, murdered cap-
tured prisoners, defiled dead bodies, and raped captured  women and girls.26 
 Under the rules of war at the time, the men who committed  these acts  were 
legitimately executed for what  today we would call war crimes. However, 
the overwhelming majority of  those sentenced to death, and many of  those 
actually executed,  were almost certainly innocent of such offenses. Despite 
the war crimes committed by some of  those executed, the  whole episode is 
rightly condemned as a barbaric blot on the nation. It is remembered as the 
largest mass execution in American history.
Given racial sensibilities in the nineteenth  century and cultural hostility 
to Indians, we should prob ably not be surprised by the attempt to perpe-
trate this  needless slaughter of Natives who  were already incarcerated. The 
23John Pope to His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 11, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, 
p. 788.
24Message of the President, p. 1. Other Dakota may have been involved in rape and other 
barbarities, but  either they  were killed in  battle or they escaped north with  Little Crow, 
the leader of the Dakota during the conflict, and  were not captured and tried at this time. 
Duane Schultz, Over the Earth I Come: The  Great Sioux Uprising of 1862 (New York, 1992), 
pp. 245, 249.
25H. H. Sibley to The President of the United States, Dec. 27, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 
13, p. 880 (“I have the honor to inform you that the 38 Indians and half- breeds ordered by 
you for execution where hung yesterday at Mankato, at 10 a.m. Every thing went off 
quietly, and the other prisoners are well secured.”)
26At least one of  those executed, a man named Chaskay, was clearly innocent; in fact, 
he had saved the lives of whites. Lincoln had attempted to reprieve him at the last minute, 
but another man with a similar name was reprieved instead. Meyer, History of the Santee 
Sioux, p. 130. This tragedy illustrates the arbitrary nature of the  trials, the absurd rush to 
judgment by the military, the failure of the military to assess individual guilt, and the 
generally slipshod nature of the rec ords of the  trials.
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303 death sentences  were more vengeance than justice. The military and 
po liti cal leaders in Minnesota, as well as a majority of whites in the state, 
might very well have agreed with this analy sis, but would have said that this 
vengeance was justified. As one “ humble private citizen” wrote to Lincoln, 
“Not only does justice require the blood of  these savages, but vengeance  will 
have it,” and if the Indians  were not hanged, “[e]very man  will become an 
Avenger.”27 Thus, the more in ter est ing question is not why so many men 
 were sentenced to die, or even why so many  were executed, but why so 
many— seven times as many— were not executed. While we remember this 
as the largest mass execution in American history, it is worth considering 
why this was also the largest mass pardoning of condemned prisoners in 
American history. What was it about President Lincoln that led him to 
effectively  pardon 87  percent of  those who  were sentenced to die?
What We Call the Conflict, and Why That  Matters
Any discussion of the conflict in Minnesota in August and September 1862 
is complicated by language, perception, and cultural values. Indeed, even 
what we call the conflict is contested. When the conflict began, the politi-
cians and military leadership in Minnesota called it a war. But when the 
conflict was over it became known as the  Great Sioux Uprising. Most mod-
ern scholars use the terms the “Dakota War” or the “U.S.– Dakota War.” 
This takes the emphasis off the conflict as an uprising and implies that it 
was a war between two sovereignties.28
How we categorize the conflict affects how we see the  trials. If it was an 
“uprising,” then the Indian combatants  were not “soldiers” but hooligans 
or criminals, a well- armed mob randomly causing vio lence and death. An 
uprising is a criminal act, perpetrated by malcontents who know they are 
acting illegally. Participants in an uprising are subject to trial and punish-
ment. On the other hand, if it was a “war” between two sovereign nations, 
27Thaddeus Williams to Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 22, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC 
(emphasis added). Williams was a physician in St. Paul. His hysterical letter described 
numerous atrocities against settlers, including the beheading of prisoners,  people nailed to 
trees, disemboweling of  people, and other horrors that in fact had not taken place.
28For example, Minnesota History Center calls the conflict the U.S.– Dakota War. 
http:// www . usdakotawar . org / .
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then the captured Dakota soldiers should have been “treated as legitimate 
belligerents.”29 Once defeated, they  were prisoners of war and not subject to 
criminal prosecution,  unless they had actually committed war crimes.
None of  these terms adequately describe the events of that fall. The vast 
majority of the Dakota in Minnesota did not take part in the conflict. “The 
Sioux  were at no time united, at no time committed as a nation to the pur-
poses of the hostile minority.”30 Most of the Dakota in Minnesota opposed 
resorting to vio lence on ethical grounds or practical reasons  because they 
understood that a war with the United States was essentially suicidal. By 
this time, many Dakota had converted to Chris tian ity,  adopted Western 
dress and customs, become farmers, and  were unwilling to return to their 
past lives. Most of the fighting was done by members of the lower Sioux, 
but “most of the principal chiefs of both the lower and upper Sioux, such as 
Wabasha, Wacouta, Traveling Hail (who had won the election for speaker), 
Red Iron, and Standing Buffalo,  were opposed to the uprising and  either 
took no part or joined very reluctantly in a few  battles, meanwhile giving 
all the aid they safely could to white victims.”31  Because the Dakota Nation 
did not authorize the war and most leaders of the Dakota opposed it, it can-
not exactly be seen as a war between two sovereignties. Thus, designations 
such as the Dakota War, or the U.S.– Dakota War might imply much greater 
support among the Dakota than  there actually was.32
Nevertheless, the conflict had all the attributes of war,  whether it was de-
clared or not, and thus the term “war” seems far more accurate than “up-
rising.” On the other hand,  because the war involved only the Lower Sioux 
(and not even most of them) and was emphatically opposed by the Upper 
Sioux, the postwar response of the United States was clearly illegal and im-
moral.  After the conflict was over, the military would punish all the Dakota 
in Minnesota, even  those who had protected whites and did not join in the 
29Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota War  Trials,” p. 15.
30Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux, p. 118.
31Ibid.
32An analogous naming issue can be seen in the “Red Stick War” of 1811, between the 
“Red Stick” Creeks and the United States. In that war the Lower Creeks, as well as the 
Choctaw and Cherokee,  were allied with the United States against a separatist group of 
Creek known as the “Red Sticks.” While earlier historians called this the Creek War, it is 
more properly called the Red Stick War or the Creek Civil War, recognizing that the 
Creek themselves  were deeply divided in this conflict. For more information on the Red 
Stick War, see Remini, Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars.
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conflict. This is rightly condemned as punishing the group for actions of a 
small minority within the group, and more than that, punishing a large 
group— the Upper Sioux— who had absolutely nothing to do with the war. 
Oddly enough,  because the United States punished the entire Dakota nation, 
it seems that the United States in fact recognized the right of the Dakota 
Nation “to make war.”33 Thus, trying the Dakota soldiers— and hanging 
thirty- eight of them— clearly  violated the accepted law of war.
The army talked about it as a war and behaved accordingly during the 
war, but then immediately abandoned the law of war and accepted norms 
for the treatment of prisoners  after the war. The events in Minnesota stood 
in marked contrast to the ongoing Civil War. In Minnesota, neither side fol-
lowed accepted rules of be hav ior in a war. The Dakota killed mostly civil-
ians and fought only a few engagements with the army. Similarly, as the 
conflict came to an end, the army rounded up thousands of noncombatants, 
including  those who did not support the vio lence, and destroyed their crops 
and homes.  There  were three or four skirmishes between the Dakota war-
riors and the U.S. Army, and one decisive military engagement, the  Battle 
of Wood Lake, on September 23, when somewhere between 700 and 1,200 
Dakota  were forced to retreat from a force led by Col o nel Henry H. Sib-
ley.34 While a few hundred soldiers may have died in the war, most of the 
whites killed  were civilians, including a significant number of  women and 
 children.  These do not seem to be the statistics or the demographics of a 
traditional war. On the other hand, given the massive use of the army, 
and  battles between combatants, it clearly was a war, and thus the United 
States was obligated to respond to the events according to existing rules 
of warfare.
 After the war, the army  violated almost  every acceptable standard of be-
hav ior for the treatment of prisoners and civilians. Leaders in Minnesota, 
including General Pope, General Sibley, and Governor Ramsey, spoke of 
exterminating the Dakota, and while not actually embarking on a campaign 
of genocide, they hinted that this was their ultimate goal. Dakota civilians 
who had nothing to do with the conflict  were rounded up, their crops  were 
burned, their housing destroyed, and they  were interned in camps that 
33Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 583 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring).
34Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux, pp. 115–23; Kenneth Carley, The Sioux Uprising of 1862 
(St. Paul, Minn., 1961), pp. 58–59.
134    Paul Finkelman
 were precursors of how the British would treat the Boers in South Africa a 
half  century  later.35 Much of the be hav ior of the army  after the war can be 
described only as racist vengeance perpetrated on innocent civilians who 
had taken no part in the conflict, and some of whom had provided shelter 
for fleeing white settlers. Meanwhile, in violation of the traditional rules of 
war, the military tried soldiers (including many who voluntarily surren-
dered to the army  after the war was over) and, with no semblance of due 
pro cess or even defense attorneys pres ent, convicted the vast majority of them 
and sentenced them to death.
Alternatively, it might be more precise to call this  Little Crow’s War,  after 
the Dakota chief who led the relatively small minority of the Dakota in their 
brief war.36  Those Dakota who followed  Little Crow (fig. 5) may have seen 
themselves as citizens of a sovereign nation fighting for their in de pen dence 
and defending their very existence against callous policies by agents of the 
U.S. government. They may have believed their actions  were justified by 
desperate circumstances.
What ever the terminology,  there is yet one more way to analyze the 
events. The Dakota who fought against the army  were involved in warfare, 
even if they represented only a minority of the Dakota Nation. Even if the 
technical rules of international law and conventional declarations of war 
 were not pres ent, the United States should have treated the Dakota soldiers 
as legitimate belligerents, just as it was treating Confederate soldiers, who 
fought an undeclared war for a putative nation that no other country in the 
world recognized as a legitimate sovereign state. The army never tried and 
hanged captured white Confederate soldiers merely for their participa-
tion in the War of the Rebellion. But the army applied diff er ent rules to 
Indians.
35The British used the term “concentration camp” for the facilities used to intern 
Afrikaan civilians during the Boer War. The camp at Pike Island, which held about 1,600 
Dakota civilians, may in fact have been the world’s first concentration camp. About 300 
Dakota in this camp died from disease and malnutrition. Mark Joy, “U.S.–Dakota War of 
1862,” in Paul Finkelman and Tim Alan Garrison, eds., Encyclopedia of United States Indian 
Policy and Law, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 2009), 2:804.
36This would mirror the name of a handful of other wars between the United States 
and vari ous Indian nations, such as Tecumseh’s War (1811–13), Blacks Hawk’s War (1832), 
Red Cloud’s War (1866–68), Geronimo’s War (1881–86), and the Posey War (1923), the last 
U.S.– Indian War.
Fig. 5.  Little Crow, photographic print, ca. 1862. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo­
graphs Division)
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What Caused the Conflict?
The Dakota who fought believed they had no choice,  because their very 
existence was threatened by white settlers, Indian agents in Minnesota, and 
the policies of the national government. The initial cause was the delay in 
the annuity payments and the real ity that the Dakota  were facing starvation. 
As the Dakota leader Robert Hakewaste  later recalled, “We  were starving 
and in a desperate state of mind.”37  There  were many under lying  causes, 
including the corruption of the Indian agents and the often dishonest prac-
tices of the Indian traders, who per sis tently appeared to cheat the Indians 
out of much of their annuities. Beyond  these economic issues  were cultural 
conflicts. The Dakota who fought— mostly young men of the Mdewakan-
ton band associated with  Little Crow— felt squeezed by settlers and gov-
ernment policies, and they saw no  future for themselves or their  people. 
Dakota Chief Big Ea gle (fig. 6), who opposed the vio lence, recalled that “the 
whites  were always trying to make the Indians give up their life and live 
like white men,” and this was something many Dakota had no interest in 
 doing. Big Ea gle thought the demands for change  were coming too quickly 
and  were accompanied by enormous white arrogance and racism.38  These 
ongoing issues, combined with imminent starvation, the delay in annuity 
payments, and callousness on the part of the Indian agents and traders, led 
to the vio lence.
 Under the treaties of 185139 and 185840 the Dakota had ceded most of 
southern Minnesota to the national government in exchange for annual “an-
nuity payments” for fifty years. The Dakota  were slowly transitioning to a 
37Evidence for Defendants, Sisseton & Wahpeton Bands v. United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 172 
(1904) (No. 22524), reprinted in Gary Clayton Anderson and Alan R. Woolworth, Through 
Dakota Eyes: Narrative Accounts of the Minnesota Indian War of 1862 (St. Paul, Minn., 1988), 
p. 32. However, historian Gary Clayton Anderson argued that in mid- August the Dakota 
began to harvest what was the most abundant crop in memory, that they had an abundance 
of food, and that the serious food shortage that existed just a few weeks before no longer 
existed. Gary Clayton Anderson, “Myrick’s Insult: A Fresh Look at Myth and Real ity,” 
Minnesota History 48 (1983):198, 200.
38Jerome Big Ea gle, A Sioux Story of War, Collections of the Minnesota Historical 
Society 6, 1894, pp. 382–400, reprinted in Anderson and Woolworth, Through Dakota Eyes, 
p. 23.
39“Treaty with the Sioux” (Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands), July 23, 1851, 10 Stat. 
949–51 (1855).
40“Treaty between the United States of Amer i ca, and the Yancton Tribe of Sioux, or 
Dacota,” Apr. 19, 1858, 11 Stat. 743–49 (1859).
Fig. 6. Waumacetanka (Big Ea gle), carte de visite photo graph by Simon & Shepherd, 
ca. 1863. (Minnesota Historical Society)
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farming culture, and they lacked the land to survive by hunting and fish-
ing.41 They depended on the annuity payments for their very survival, but 
they  were often cheated out of some of their money by corrupt Indian agents 
and Indian traders. In 1862, for instance, the Indian traders claimed half 
of the annuity for payment of goods previously given to the Dakota, even 
though some Dakota, such as Joseph Wabasha, had never agreed to this 
transfer of funds.42 Although he opposed the vio lence, like many other 
Dakota, Wabasha believed he had been cheated out of his annuity by the 
Indian traders. He recalled that “the young men of the tribe . . .  felt very 
angry” and “would not submit to having half of their annuity taken from 
them.” 43 The conflict began in August 1862 at least in part  because the an-
nual payments “ were months late in arriving.” 44 Rumors  were rife that 
they might never be paid  because the federal government was bankrupt or 
 because the Confederates had so disrupted the economy that  there was no 
money to send.45  There  were also rumors that rather than being paid in 
gold, the Dakota annuities would be paid in newly printed greenbacks, which 
the Indian traders reportedly might not accept.46 Gold coin had to be sent 
from Washington, but the Civil War impacted all government operations, 
including shipping gold west. The focus of the administration was on the 
ongoing War of the Rebellion. Transportation west was complicated by mil-
itary requirements, and of course gold itself was more scarce than usual. 
Thus, the allotments the Dakota depended on for their very survival  were 
very late. By late August they  were desperately  running out of food.47
The Upper Indian Agency at Yellow Medicine, fearful of vio lence from 
the Indians, and perhaps out of compassion for the Indians who faced star-
vation, began to distribute food in advance of the annuity payments. Offi-
cials at the Lower Agency at Redwood, however, lacked such foresight or 
41Henig, “A Neglected Cause of the Sioux Uprising,” p. 107.
42Anderson and Woolworth, Through Dakota Eyes, pp. 12–13.
43Papers Relating to Talks and Councils Held with the Indians in Dakota and Montana Territories 
in the Years 1866–1869 (Washington, D.C., 1910), pp. 90–91, reprinted in Anderson and 
Woolworth, Through Dakota Eyes, p. 30.
44Ibid., p.13.
45Henig, “A Neglected Cause of the Sioux Uprising,” p. 108.
46Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux, pp. 112–13; Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota 
War  Trials,” p. 17.
47Ironically, the gold for the annuities arrived in St. Paul on August 16 and arrived at 
Fort Ridgley on August 18, by which time the conflict had begun and a number of white 
settlers  were dead. Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux, p. 113.
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compassion. Even though the Lower Agency had plenty of food on hand to 
distribute to the Indians, the officials refused to allow the Dakota to pur-
chase food on credit, in advance of the allotment. Some traders did not trust 
the Dakota to pay their debts, while  others had absolutely no sympathy for 
the desperation of the Dakota. This attitude was famously expressed by an 
Indian trader named Andrew Myrick, who declared: “So far as I am con-
cerned, if they are hungry, let them eat grass.” 48  Little Crow’s followers re-
sponded to this callousness with vio lence.
Frustrated and hungry, a few Dakota attacked a white farmstead near 
Acton, in Meeker County, on August 17, 1862, killing Robinson Jones, his 
wife, his  adopted  daughter, and two other white men.49 Within a day the 
rebellion was in full force. Dakota swept through isolated farms and small 
towns. By mid- September large numbers of settlers— prob ably no fewer than 
600 and perhaps as many as 800 to 1,000— had been killed, much of the town 
of New Ulm had been destroyed, and as many as 20,000 settlers in west-
ern Minnesota had fled to St. Paul.50  These farmers, who  were innocent 
of hostile acts  toward the Dakota, lost their crops, which they had to aban-
don in the fields, and suffered enormous hardships. More than a hundred 
other settlers, the majority of them  women and  children,  were captured by 
the Dakota. A few  were murdered  after capture, and some of the  women 
may have been raped. The conflict was effectively over on September 23, 
when the Minnesota militia and federal troops defeated the Dakota at the 
 Battle of Wood Lake.  After the  battle, hundreds of Dakota immediately 
surrendered, and most of the rest  were quickly captured, although their 
leader,  Little Crow, managed to escape into Canada.51
48Myrick was killed on the first day of the conflict, and grass was stuffed into his 
mouth. Curt Brown, “In the Footsteps of  Little Crow: 150 Years  after the U.S. Dakota 
War,” St. Paul Star Tribune, Aug. 15, 2012. This quotation is found in almost  every account 
of the conflict. Anderson’s “Myrick’s Insult” provides a history of the story of Myrick’s 
insult and suggests that it may not have taken place or that it was not one of the 
precipitating events leading to the vio lence.
49Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux, p. 115.
50Hank H. Cox, Lincoln and the Sioux Uprising of 1862 (Nashville, Tenn., 2005), pp. 103–4, 
describes the burning of much of New Ulm. See also vari ous descriptions of the military 
conflict in Nichols, “The Other Civil War”; Dahlin, The Dakota Uprising: A Pictorial History, 
p. 1; Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux, p. 120; and Schultz, Over the Earth I Come, pp. 245, 
249.
51In July 1863,  Little Crow returned to Minnesota with his teenage son. While foraging 
for food he was shot and killed by a local farmer, Nathan Lamson, who received a $500 
bounty for killing  Little Crow and turning his scalp over to the state.  Little Crow’s son 
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The Politics of the Conflict
Almost immediately  after the conflict began, Governor Alexander Ramsey 
appointed Henry Hastings Sibley to or ga nize a defense of the state. Sibley 
had been the first governor of the state of Minnesota, and in 1862, and at 
the outbreak of vio lence, he was appointed a col o nel in the state militia, mak-
ing him the highest- ranking military officer in the state.52 On August 21, 
Governor Ramsey telegraphed Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton asking 
for help53 while Minnesota’s secretary of state asked Assistant Secretary of 
War Christopher P. Wolcott for authorization to raise a cavalry force of 1,000 
men and to purchase a sufficient number of  horses for them to  ride into 
 battle.54 Five days  later, Governor Ramsey begged Major General Henry W. 
Halleck, the general in chief of the army, to create a military district in the 
Northwest as a prelude to sending sufficient troops and leadership to fully 
crush the Indians in the region.55 Halleck bluntly told the governor that 
the “War Department is not prepared at pres ent to create a new military 
department in the West.”56
But Halleck missed the po liti cal significance of this issue, which Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln did not miss. Facing midterm elections, Lincoln 
doubtless saw creating a military department in Minnesota as po liti cally use-
ful even if it was not fully necessary to restore peace on the northwestern 
frontier. Governor Ramsey asked Lincoln to order the War Department to 
supply  horses or mounted troops for the conflict, arguing that this “is not 
our war, it is a National War.”  There is some evidence that Lincoln and 
 others in the administration initially may have agreed with Ramsey, believ-
ing, or at least fearing, that the Indian vio lence was the result of Confederate 
(Wowinape, also known as Thomas Wowinape Wakeman) was captured and scheduled for 
execution, but this never happened. Ultimately he was released from custody, perhaps 
reflecting that even in Minnesota  people lacked the stomach to execute a child for the 
“crimes” of his  father. Wowinape  later founded the first Sioux YMCA.
52Kenneth Carley, “The Sioux Campaign of 1862: Sibley’s Letters to His Wife,” 
Minnesota History 38 (1962):99. By the end of September, Sibley had been promoted to 
brigadier general of volunteers within the regular army. Sibley would  later be promoted to 
brevet major general and command the Department of the Northwest. Ibid., pp. 109, 114.
53Alexander Ramsey to Hon. E. M. Stanton (by telegraph), Aug. 21, 1862, at 4:00 p.m., 
in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 590.
54J. H. Baker to Hon. C. P. Wolcott, Aug. 21, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, pp. 590–91.
55Alexander Ramsey to Major- General Henry Halleck (by telegraph), Aug. 26, 1862, at 
2:00 p.m., in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 597.
56H. W. Halleck to Governor Ramsey, Aug. 29, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 605.
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machinations, and thus a stronger military presence in Minnesota might 
be truly necessary for the safety of the nation. Minnesota’s secretary of state 
told Assistant Secretary of War Wolcott that the Dakota vio lence was the 
result of a “deep- laid plan.” This was actually not true, but the Lincoln ad-
ministration could not know this at the time, and feared that Confederate 
agents  were trying to start a  wholesale Indian war in the West. Secretary 
of Interior Caleb B. Smith  later claimed to have evidence that “southern 
emissaries” had encouraged the Dakota.57 Thus, for both military and po liti-
cal reasons, Halleck was forced to do a quick about- face, and on September 6, 
Secretary of War Stanton ordered Major General John H. Pope to “proceed 
immediately” to St. Paul, where he was to assume command of the newly 
created Department of the Northwest and “take such prompt and vigorous 
mea sures as  shall quell the hostilities and afford peace, security, and pro-
tection to the  people against Indian hostilities.”58
The decision to send Pope to Minnesota was curious, but perhaps pre-
dictable. Pope was a West Point gradu ate who had had some initial success 
in the West, defeating Sterling Price in Missouri and helping capture a key 
island in the Mississippi. He was then transferred to the East, where he suf-
fered a humiliating defeat at the Second  Battle of Bull Run just days  after 
the outbreak of vio lence in Minnesota. His failure at Bull Run, combined 
with his almost insufferable arrogance, made it impossible to put him in 
combat against the Confederates. At the same time, Pope did have combat 
experience and logistical skills. The new department in the Northwest pro-
vided General Halleck with a place to send Pope while enhancing Lincoln’s 
support in the West. Pope initially saw his removal to Minnesota as a de-
motion (which  after Bull Run he should have expected), but quickly used 
the new post to lead an aggressive campaign against the Dakota that he 
doubtless hoped would lead to a new command in the real war against the 
Confederates.
Pope and Sibley quickly or ga nized a defense of the state, and within a 
few weeks defeated the Dakota. The conflict was essentially over  after the 
 Battle of Wood Lake, on September 23. Hundreds of Dakota  were soon 
57Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln, Sept. 6, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC; J. H. 
Baker to Hon. C. P. Wolcott, Aug. 21, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, pp. 590–91; Nichols, 
“The Other Civil War,” p. 5; see also Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, p. 78.
58Edwin M. Stanton to Major- General John Pope, Sept. 6, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, 
p. 617.
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surrendering to the army, and  those who had not participated in the con-
flict  were coming forward with whites they had sheltered or rescued from 
other Dakota who had captured them. Sibley continued to pursue some 
Dakota into early October, rounding up Indians who had not been involved 
in the conflict. Indeed, the Indian population of Minnesota suffered more 
 after peace was restored than during the conflict. On October 9, General 
Pope sent a dispatch to General Halleck stating that “[t]he Sioux war may 
be considered at an end.”59
The  Trials
Following the restoration of peace, the army tried 393 Indians for the “crime” 
of  going to war with the United States. On October 3, Col o nel Sibley, who 
by then was actually a brigadier general,60 reported that a military tribu-
nal was already at work “engaged in the trial of between 20 and 30 of the 
Indians . . .  suspected of participating in the murders and outrages commit-
ted on the frontier.”61 Sibley admitted that 90  percent of the Indians in his 
custody “have not been actively engaged in the war,” but he had to ferret 
out  those who had. Sibley already assumed he would execute  those found 
guilty, but would not order any executions  until he could persuade all the 
Indians not in his custody to surrender. He understood that if they heard 
about death sentences “they might be deterred from returning.” General 
Pope agreed with this strategy, telling General Halleck “it  will be necessary 
to try and execute many of  those engaged in the late horrible outrages, and 
also some of the Winnebagoes.”62
59John Pope to Major General Halleck, Oct. 4, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 709, 
noting that Sibley was still pursuing Indians and that he wanted to disarm the 
Winnebagoes, which Pope and Sibley incorrectly asserted had been “engaged in the 
recent outrages with the Sioux.” See also H. H. Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope, Oct. 5, 
1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, pp. 711–12, describing his attempts to capture all remaining 
Sioux, disarm them, and arrest “the men, except the older ones.” John Pope to Maj. Gen. 
H. W. Halleck (by telegraph), Oct. 9, 1862, at 10:45 p.m., in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 722.
60Sibley did not find out about this promotion  until October 7. See H. H. Sibley to Maj. 
Gen. John Pope, Oct. 7, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 717. Technically he was brevet 
brigadier general  until April 7, 1864, when Congress confirmed this promotion. Carley, 
“The Sioux Campaign of 1862,” p. 109.
61Col. H. H. Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope, Oct. 3, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 707.
62Ibid.; John Pope to Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck (by telegraph), Oct. 7, 1862, at 1:30 p.m., 
in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 716.
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 These  trials  were swift and summary. The Dakota  were not provided with 
counsel, as would have been done in a true court martial, and most of the 
 trials  were shams. Without counsel the defendants lacked any due pro cess 
protections, since none of the Dakota had any experience with American 
 legal procedure. Some of  those prosecuted knew  little or no En glish, but 
this did not deter the military from trying them without defense counsel. 
But even  those who  were fluent in En glish prob ably did not understand 
the proceedings or that they  were even on trial for their lives. None of the 
 defendants seemed to have had any idea of the  legal right against self- 
incrimination. Indeed, many prob ably believed that honest answers would 
lead to fair treatment. This would have comported with Native American 
notions of justice and with the understanding of Indian soldiers operating 
in a traditional honor culture. Thus, many of the defendants admitted to 
something, such as firing a weapon, for example, or riding with  Little Crow, 
the leader of the rebellion. However, they  were not always given the oppor-
tunity to explain what they did—in effect to testify on their own behalf and 
explain their circumstances.63
 These admissions  were used to convict many defendants. Generals Pope 
and Sibley believed that any participation in the rebellion was enough to 
merit a conviction. This logic flew in the face of General Pope’s own asser-
tions to Lincoln  after the  trials: “[T]hat the only distinction between the 
culprits is as to which of them murdered most  people or  violated most young 
girls. All of them are guilty of  these  things in more or less degree.”64 In fact, 
Pope knew better. But it did not  matter,  because the military tribunal es-
sentially operated on the assumption that any participation in the rebellion 
was an offense and that  there was no meaningful distinction between  those 
who committed what might be regarded as war crimes and  those who  were 
merely soldiers or fellow travelers in  Little Crow’s makeshift army.
In the next six weeks the army tried 393 men, convicting 323 and sen-
tencing 303 to death. Many of  these hearings—it would be too much to call 
them  trials— lasted no more than five or ten minutes. On the first day alone, 
sixteen men  were tried, with ten being convicted and sentenced to death. 
On November 3, forty- two men  were tried,65 and on November 5, the last 
63Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota War  Trials,” pp. 52–53. See also Herbert, 
“Explaining the Sioux Military Commission,” and Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, p. 100.
64John Pope to Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 11, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 788.
65Ibid., p. 27.
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day of the proceedings, forty men  were tried. Assuming an eight- hour day, 
with no pauses between hearings or recesses, this meant that each trial lasted 
an average of twelve minutes or less. The standard of guilt was quite  simple: 
anyone who fired a  rifle in any form of combat was considered guilty and 
subject to a death penalty.66
Sibley’s motivations are not clear. Some scholars suggest that the  trials 
 were mostly an act of vengeance by a victorious army.67 Surely  there is an 
ele ment of that. The soldiers  under Sibley had just fought for a month, many 
of their comrades  were dead or wounded, and revenge is a common  human 
emotion. This level of vengeance was also pres ent in the civilian commu-
nity in Minnesota, as refugee settlers streamed into St. Paul and it became 
apparent that hundreds of white settlers had been killed. The civilian com-
munity was also inundated with stories (mostly untrue) of “outrages” com-
mitted against settler  women and girls. All of this was enough to lead to calls 
for vengeance and executions.
But the  trials and attempted executions went beyond mere vengeance. 
 These procedures also dovetailed with Sibley’s larger goal of removing or 
killing all the Dakota in Minnesota. Sibley, who had been one of the first 
white settlers in Minnesota and had served as the first governor of the state,68 
expressed the hope, from the very beginning of the conflict, that his forces 
would “overtake and kill a thousand or more of the savages . . .  and drive 
the remainder across the Missouri [River] or to the dev il.”69 He told his 
66Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, pp. 99–101; Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota 
War  Trials,” pp. 25, 27; Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux, p. 127; Herbert, “Explaining the 
Sioux Military Commission.”
67See Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, pp. 125–26.
68In the late 1830s and early 1840s, Sibley had been virtually, although not legally, 
married to an Indian  woman, Red Blanket  Woman, and fathered a child with her, Helen 
Hastings Sibley. This relationship, known as a marriage “a la façon du pays,” lasted two 
or three years, and Sibley never denied his paternity of Helen. He paid for her education, 
helped support her, and gave her away at her wedding in 1859. Sibley  later married Sarah 
Jane Steele, the  daughter of a commanding general at Fort Snelling. Sarah Sibley 
apparently hated that her husband maintained a relationship with his half- Dakota 
 daughter. It is difficult to know how this earlier relationship affected his views of Indians. 
It is pos si ble that given his earlier relationship with the Dakota, Sibley felt he had to go to 
extra lengths to prove his bona fide hostility to the Dakota  after the rebellion began. Jane 
Lamm Carroll, “Who Was Jane Lamont? Anglo- Dakota  Daughters in Early Minnesota,” 
Minnesota History 59 (2005):192–93.
69Henry H. Sibley, Col o nel, Commanding Military Expedition, Minn. State Militia, 
to Sarah Sibley, Aug. 24, 1862, in “Extracts from General Sibley’s Letters to his Wife, 
Written on the Indian Campaign” (R. J. Holcombe, ed., 1893), microform in Henry H. 
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wife, “My preparations are nearly completed to begin my work upon them 
with fire and sword, and my heart is hardened against them beyond any 
touch of mercy.” He referred to them as “miserable hounds,” “fiends,” and 
“dev ils in  human shape.” On September 10 he vowed to “pursue” the “red 
dev ils” with “fire and sword.”70 As the conflict was coming to an end, Sibley 
asked General Pope to replace him with a “strictly military commander” who 
“would be better fitted” to “follow up the Indians vigorously and extermi-
nate them.”71 The  trials  were a first step in Sibley’s larger goal of extermi-
nating the Dakota. Executing a large number of young men would clearly 
undermine and weaken the entire Dakota society.
Major General John H. Pope also supported the  trials and executions 
 because they dovetailed with his larger goals. Near the end of the Dakota 
War, Pope predicted that he had the firepower to “put a final stop to Indian 
trou bles by exterminating or ruining all the Indians engaged in the late 
outbreak.”72  After the decisive  Battle at Wood Lake, Pope told Sibley that 
“[n]o treaty must be made with the Sioux.” Instead, Pope was determined 
to “utterly . . .  exterminate the Sioux if I have the power to do so and even 
if it requires a campaign lasting the  whole of next year.” Calling the Sioux 
“wild beasts,” he asserted they deserved “punishment beyond  human power 
to inflict,” and urged Sibley to “[d]estroy every thing belonging to them.”73 
During the  trials, Pope wrote the secretary of war that he was “anxious to 
execute a number of them.” Pope had destroyed the crops of not only the 
offending Dakota but also other Dakota who had not been involved in 
the combat and also the Winnebagoes, who had nothing to do with the 
conflict.74
When faced with the real ity of the postconflict  trials, Sibley vacillated 
between wanting swift punishment and having mild concerns about fairness. 
With over 250 prisoners in his care he admitted that “[s]ome of them are 
prob ably innocent” but believed “by far the greater part  will be found guilty 
Sibley Papers, Film M164, Reel 11 (Yale University), quoted in Herbert, “Explaining the 
Sioux Military Commission,” p. 753.
70Sibley to his Wife, Aug. 24, 1862; Sibley to his Wife, Aug. 28, 1862; Sibley to his Wife, 
Sept. 10, 1862, all quoted in Carley, “The Sioux Campaign of 1862,” pp. 99, 101, 102, 106.
71H. H. Sibley to General John Pope, Sept. 27, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 680.
72John Pope to H. H. Sibley, Sept. 17, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 649.
73John Pope to H. H. Sibley, Sept. 28, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 686.
74Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles: Secretary of the Navy  under Lincoln and Johnson, 
2 vols. (Boston, 1911), 1:171.
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of murder, rape,  etc.” This was a significant change from his assertion to 
General Pope just a week earlier that the vast majority of the captured In-
dians  were innocent of any crime. At this point he was planning to send most 
of  these captured men to Fort Snelling and regretted that he would “be 
deprived of the gratification of strangling the guilty ones.” Two days  later 
he told his wife that “the Indian prisoners are being tried as fast as a due 
regard for justice  will permit. I have to review all the proceedings and 
decide the fate of each individual.”75
As a young man, Sibley had read law  under the tutelage of his  father, 
Solomon Sibley, the first chief justice of the Michigan Territory. Henry Sib-
ley was the first justice of the peace in the Minnesota Territory.76 But, for 
all this  legal background, Sibley clearly had no re spect for due pro cess or 
fair  trials, as he reviewed  trials that lasted a few minutes and sentenced men 
to death for noncapital offenses on the basis of virtually no evidence. His 
earlier  legal training and his practical experience served him poorly in 1862 
and again afterward when he tried to justify his actions.77 At the beginning 
of the  trials he did not bother to review the findings of his commission, tell-
ing General Pope that “the proceedings . . .  may not be exactly in form in 
all the details,” but he fully expected him to approve all the sentences and 
“hang the villains.” Pope would have agreed. He had already told Sibley 
that he doubted it was pos si ble to assess individual guilt and “discriminate 
between Indians who say they are and have been friendly, and  those who 
have not.”78
75Henry H. Sibley to his wife, Oct. 13, 1862, in Carley, “The Sioux Campaign of 1862,” 
p. 110; H. H. Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope, Oct. 5, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, pp. 711–12 
(noting that most of the Indians in his custody  were not guilty of anything); Henry H. 
Sibley to his wife, Oct. 17, 1862, in Carley, “The Sioux Campaign of 1862,” pp. 110–11.
76See Robert J. Sheran and Timothy J. Baland, “The Law, Courts, and  Lawyers in the 
Frontier Days of Minnesota: An Informal  Legal History of the Years 1835 to 1865,” 
William Mitchell Law Review 2 (1976):6 n. 33.
77See Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota War  Trials,” p. 93 (arguing that Sibley’s 
 legal training led him to use military commissions to provide a semblance of due pro cess); 
Herbert, “Explaining the Sioux Military Commission,” pp. 794–97 (describing Sibley’s 
postexecution justifications and his desire to bring new hearings and have new executions 
in March 1863).
78Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier General, to John H. Pope, Major General, Oct. 7, 1862, 
in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 717; John H. Pope, Major General, to Henry H. Sibley, Brigadier 
General, Oct. 2, 1862, quoted in Herbert, “Explaining the Sioux Military Commission,” 
p. 774.
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Sibley admitted to his wife that the “power of life and death is an awful 
 thing to exercise,” telling her “it makes me shudder” to “think [that] more 
than three hundred  human beings are subject to that power.” But, shudder 
or not, he was prepared to do his “duty” and make sure that “judgment 
[would be] visited upon the guilty.”79 By the end of the  trials, Sibley had 
long abandoned any notion of due pro cess. “A military commission,” he told 
Bishop Henry Whipple, “is not expected to enter into details of a technical 
character” or function like “ordinary criminal tribunals” or even like “reg-
ular courts- martial.”80 This was certainly how Sibley set them in motion, 
with Pope’s acquiescence. But this was not in fact how they  were supposed to 
operate. In Missouri, the scene of the most violent guerilla warfare in the 
Civil War, the army declared that military commissions “should be . . . 
constituted in a similar manner and their proceedings be conducted accord-
ing to the same general rules as courts- martial in order to prevent abuses 
that might other wise arise.”81 Congress applied this logic to the entire 
nation in the Militia Act of 1862 by providing for the “same post- conviction 
review in both military commissions and courts- martial.”82
Some scholars suggest that Sibley and Pope used the  trials to “protect” 
the incarcerated Dakota from lynching by the local populace. Pope and Sib-
ley made this argument, claiming that without the summary  trials, mobs of 
civilians would have massacred many Dakota  women,  children, and old men 
in Sibley’s custody. By this time more than 1,000 Indians  were  under mili-
tary control. Trying and executing a sufficient number of combatants might 
have been enough to satisfy the bloodlust of most Minnesotans, as articu-
lated by one newspaper’s demand that the Indians be “exterminated.”83 
Sibley and Pope may have believed this was what they  were  doing, but their 
arguments  were transparently self- serving. The Indian noncombatants  were 
79Henry H. Sibley to his wife, Oct. 17, 1862, in Carley, “The Sioux Campaign of 1862,” 
p. 111.
80Henry H. Sibley to Henry B. Whipple, Dec. 4, 1862, quoted in Herbert, “Explaining 
the Sioux Military Commission,” p. 771.
81Gen.  Orders No. 1, Headq. Dept. of the Missouri, Jan. 1, 1862, in O.R., ser. 2, vol. 1, 
p. 248.
82Militia Act of 1862, Sec. 5–8, 12 Stat. 597–598; Louis Fisher, “Military Commissions: 
Prob lems of Authority and Practice,” Boston University International Law Journal 24 (2006):15, 
27 n. 97.
83Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota War  Trials,” pp. 93–94; Schultz, Over the Earth 
I Come, p. 243. See Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux, p. 124, for other examples of popu lar 
demands for “extermination” of the Dakota.
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in custody only  because Sibley had been so busy rounding them up and forc-
ing them off their lands. Moreover, the military was surely power ful enough 
to protect the Dakota. That Sibley and Pope made  these arguments illus-
trates their own vacillation over the fate of the Dakota. Both Sibley and Pope 
had been calling for the extermination, annihilation, or total removal of the 
Dakota. Yet, when faced with the real ity of the slaughter of  women,  children, 
and old men, they stepped back. They may have wished for genocide, but 
they lacked the stomach for it.
Sibley complained that the newspapers thought he was too “tender 
hearted” and that the  trials and executions  were not moving fast enough. 
He insisted he would not “murder any man, even a savage, who is shown to 
be innocent of the ‘ great transgression,’ or permit of the massacre of  women 
and  children.”84 But in fact he was pushing the  trials along as fast as 
pos si ble and showed  little concern for due pro cess, fairness, or  actual guilt. 
Sibley may have been annoyed at pressure from newspapers or the civil-
ian public, and he may have formally opposed killing native  women and 
 children, but he was still planning further military expeditions to force  these 
 women and  children to leave Minnesota; and he had  little regard for any 
fair investigation of the alleged “crimes” of their husbands,  fathers, sons, and 
 brothers, whom he was planning to execute as quickly as pos si ble.
General Pope told Lincoln that vigilantes  were preparing to massacre the 
Dakota. Governor Ramsey similarly warned Lincoln in a tele gram that 
“[n]othing but the Speedy execution of the tried and convicted Sioux In-
dians  will save us  here from Scenes of outrage.”85 Civilians made two 
attempts to attack Indian prisoners in November, but the army easily 
prevented any significant vio lence, capturing some of the vigilantes and 
forcing them to march with the Indians to Mankato.86 The fears of Pope 
and Ramsey  were clearly exaggerated, and Lincoln did not take them at 
face value. He must have intuitively understood that both Pope and Ramsey 
 were trying to force him to let the executions go forward. Clearly, the mili-
tary had more than sufficient force to protect all Indian captives from 
84Henry H. Sibley to his wife, Oct. 20, 1862, quoted in Carley, “The Sioux Campaign 
of 1862,” p. 111.
85John H. Pope to Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 24, 1862, quoted in Nichols, “The Other 
Civil War,” p. 10 n. 34; Alexander Ramsey, Governor, State of Minnesota, to Abraham 
Lincoln, President, United States of Amer i ca, Nov. 28, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC.
86Attacks by civilians on the Indian prisoners are described in Carley, “The Sioux 
Campaign of 1862,” pp. 112–13.
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vigilantes, and Pope, as a  career officer, should have had the skill and back-
bone to make sure his soldiers did their duty.
Another reason for the  trials, the demands for mass executions, and the 
incarceration of even friendly and cooperative Indians involved land and 
money. Final removal of the Indians would open more land to settlers and 
remove any fear of  future vio lence.87 Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles 
believed that the vengeance against the Dakota was part of a larger plan to 
remove other Indians from the state. This was especially the case when it 
came to the arrest of non- Dakota. He noted that “the Winnebagoes have 
good land which white men want and mean to have.”88
In real ity  there was no need for the  trials. Once the Dakota had surren-
dered and  were  under military control they certainly posed no threat to the 
 people of Minnesota. The conflict was over, and  there was no chance it could 
resume, given the army’s decisive victory and the overwhelming military 
force General Pope had in Minnesota. The threats from civilian vigilantes 
 were exaggerated. The U.S. Army could surely have protected the Indians 
from a mob of angry farmers, and in fact it did so. Governor Ramsey’s fear 
of “[s]cenes of outrage” was  either an admission of his utter incompetence 
as a chief executive (which seems unlikely) or an exaggeration of the threats 
to pressure Lincoln to allow the executions to take place as quickly as pos-
si ble. Ramsey was surely using the threats of vio lence to accomplish his real 
goal: highly popu lar vengeful executions. Indeed,  after civilians attacked In-
dians  under army guard, and  were repulsed, Ramsey issued a public proc-
lamation “to avert the disastrous consequences of a collision” between the 
 people of Minnesota and the United States.89 He urged all citizens to re-
frain from attacking U.S. troops or Indians in the custody of the troops, and 
 there  were no more outbreaks of vigilante vio lence.
The terminology for the events comes directly into play when we con-
sider the motivations for the  trials. Throughout the military campaigns 
against the Dakota, both Pope and Sibley referred to the “war” with the 
Dakota. Pope was a military man at war with the  enemy. As such, he and 
Sibley should have known that trying prisoners— except for very specific 
war crimes— was not acceptable be hav ior. It was not a “crime” to go to war 
87Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux, pp. 124–25.
88Welles, Diary, 1:171.
89Alexander Ramsey, “Proclamation to the  People of Minnesota,” Dec. 6, 1862, 
Lincoln Papers, LC.
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against an  enemy. Many Dakota  were convicted of shooting at U.S. soldiers. 
This was surely not a crime  under normal rules of war.
While Pope and Sibley did not understand their own hy poc risy, Secre-
tary of the Navy Gideon Welles did. As Lincoln contemplated what to do 
with the convicted Dakota, he had to cope with letters from Pope and Sib-
ley, editorials, and the demands of Minnesota’s congressional del e ga tion 
that the sentences be swiftly carried out against all the convicted Indians. 
Secretary Welles was especially annoyed by the be hav ior of Senator Mor-
ton S. Wilkinson and the state’s two representatives. He wondered how  these 
“Representatives of a State can deliberately besiege the Government to take 
the lives of  these ignorant barbarians by  wholesale,  after they have sur-
rendered themselves prisoners.” He thought the aggressive and almost 
bloodthirsty “sentiments of the Representatives  were but slightly removed 
from the barbarians whom they would execute.”90 The point was clear to 
Welles—if the Indians  were soldiers who had surrendered, they could not 
then be executed for having been soldiers. It was a position President Lin-
coln would accept as well.
The Administration and the Dakota  Trials
When President Lincoln received General Pope’s list of condemned men, 
he immediately asked for the full rec ords of the  trials. Lincoln was a war-
time president, and by the end of 1862 he was no longer shocked by the 
 human cost of warfare. But he was also deeply troubled by unnecessary 
killing. Throughout his presidency he often commuted sentences of soldiers 
charged with desertion or other infractions. He understood that warfare cost 
lives, but he was also always reluctant to be the instrument of death for  people 
already in custody who posed no threat to anyone. He reviewed about 1,600 
court- martial cases and, much to the annoyance of his generals, issued 
 pardons or commutations to almost all the enlisted men charged with de-
sertion or most other military offenses. He also issued at least 331 clemency 
 orders for civilians convicted in federal courts.91
90Welles, Diary, 1:186.
91“ Pardons & Clemency,” Mr. Lincoln’s White House, http:// www 
. mrlincolnswhitehouse . org / inside . asp ? ID​=​226&subjectID​=​3. P. S. Ruckman Jr. and 
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Many of Lincoln’s military and civilian  pardons  were clearly part of his 
own military strategy. His humane attitude  toward the troops certainly in-
creased morale. For example, Lincoln never signed a warrant for the exe-
cution of a common soldier convicted of falling asleep while on guard duty.92 
In 1864 he issued a  wholesale  pardon for “all deserters, who have been con-
demned by Court Martial to death.” He  later issued a  wholesale  pardon to 
all deserters who  were not in custody if they would return to their units 
within two months of his proclamation.93 Lincoln almost always asked 
himself the pertinent question whenever a military execution came up: 
“[W]hether this soldier can better serve the country dead than living.”94 
While Lincoln almost never signed an execution warrant for soldiers 
charged with military infractions like desertion or sleeping on duty, and 
regularly pardoned deserters, he rarely commuted sentences for nonmili-
tary crimes, such as murder or rape. Lincoln famously issued  pardons 
when lobbied by members of Congress, state politicians, and other “re-
spectable” and “honorable” citizens. He was equally susceptible to the en-
treaties of  mothers, wives, and  sisters seeking to save a son, husband, or 
 brother. Attorney General Edward Bates complained he was “unfit to be 
trusted with the pardoning power.” However, it is also clear that Lincoln 
signed death warrants “only  after he had examined the facts of each case 
and determined that the sentence was appropriate.”95
Given this rec ord of issuing  pardons, it is perhaps not surprising that Lin-
coln wanted more information from General Pope before he was willing 
to authorize the executions of 303 men. Lincoln was troubled by a single 
execution, and so the thought of 303 at one time must have boggled his 
mind. He worried about blood on his hands from the shooting of a teenage 
deserter; he was surely concerned about the blood of more than 300 men.
David Kincaid, “Inside Lincoln’s Clemency Decision Making,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 
29 (1999):84.
92Ruckman and Kincaid, “Inside Lincoln’s Clemency Decision Making,” pp. 84–85.
93E. D. Townsend, “Order Commuting Sentence of Deserters,” General  Orders 
No. 76, Feb. 26, 1864, in Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. 
(New Brunswick, N.J., 1953–55), 7:208 (hereafter CW ); Abraham Lincoln, “Proclamation 
Offering  Pardon to Deserters,” Mar. 11, 1865, in CW, 8:349–50.
94“ Pardons & Clemency”; CW, 8:349–50.
95Townsend, “Order Commuting Sentence of Deserters”; Lincoln, “Proclamation 
Offering  Pardon to Deserters”; Ruckman and Kincaid, “Inside Lincoln’s Clemency 
Decision Making,” pp. 85, 88–90.
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But  these  were captured enemies, not American soldiers who failed to 
fully do their duty. They  were accused of barbaric treatment of civilians— 
Lincoln’s own constituents— and they had also killed a substantial number 
of American soldiers before they  were fi nally subdued. And they  were Indi-
ans, not whites. Lincoln’s relationship with Indians was complicated. His 
grand father had been killed by Indians in Kentucky, and his only military 
experience—in which he never saw combat— was in Black Hawk’s War.96 
As a  lawyer in Illinois, Lincoln had had black clients, which helped him 
better understand the need for emancipation and a reduction in discrimi-
natory laws. But in Illinois he had had very few, if any, interactions with 
Indians. They  were truly foreign to him.
Po liti cally,  there was  little advantage to issuing  pardons. The Indians 
 were not constituents. Lincoln could not score points with voters or soldiers 
by issuing  pardons. Indeed, he would offend voters and soldiers in Minne-
sota and perhaps Wisconsin. Lincoln had received po liti cal pressure from 
the army, the civilian leadership in Minnesota, Senator Wilkinson, and the 
state’s congressmen. Had Lincoln made a narrow and expedient po liti cal 
calculation, he would have approved all the executions and ordered General 
Pope to move swiftly to eliminate the prob lem of the Indian prisoners.
Instead, Lincoln remained consistent in his general opposition to execu-
tions and military  trials, and insisted on reviewing  every one of the trial rec-
ords. The many military  pardons Lincoln had already issued had convinced 
him that military  trials  were notoriously unfair and often without any mean-
ingful due pro cess. As a trial  lawyer, the president was particularly sensitive 
to the unfairness of military  trials. In addition, Lincoln and members of 
his cabinet  were skeptical of the reports of many generals, who constantly 
wanted more troops and equipment, consistently overestimated Confeder-
ate troop strength, and then did not perform in  battle. General Pope, who 
had just embarrassed the administration with his disastrous defeat at the 
Second  Battle of Bull Run, had  little credibility with the administration. His 
reports of Indian atrocities in Minnesota did not impress Secretary of the 
Navy Welles, who believed the tales of Indian “barbarities”  were “greatly 
exaggerated.”97
96Nichols, “The Other Civil War,” p. 3.
97Welles, Diary, 1:186.
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While the generals, politicians, and citizens from Minnesota pressed Lin-
coln to let the executions go forward, Lincoln also heard from a few  people 
on the other side of the issue.  There was a memorial from a group of Quak-
ers in Pennsylvania, but that was to be expected. Most scholars who write 
about the  pardon pro cess assert that Bishop Henry B. Whipple (fig. 7), the 
head of the Episcopal Church in Minnesota, convinced Lincoln to  pardon 
most of the convicted Dakota.98
How much influence Bishop Whipple had over Lincoln is uncertain. 
Scholars cite Whipple’s autobiography, in which he describes his meeting 
with Lincoln while he was in the East to attend the Episcopal General Con-
vention. At the meeting with Lincoln, Whipple discussed the corruption of 
the entire Indian Agency system, explaining how Indian agents, Indian trad-
ers, and  others systematically cheated the Indians while lining their own 
pockets. Whipple claims in this book that Lincoln was “deeply moved” by 
their conversation, and that  later Lincoln told someone that Whipple “talked 
to me about the rascality of the Indian business  until I felt it in my boots.”99 
However, this meeting took place in mid- September, before the conflict in 
Minnesota was over, and of course before any Dakota had been put on trial. 
Whipple was in Washington at about the time of the  Battle of Antietam, 
where he preached to the First Minnesota Volunteer Regiment and met 
General George B. McClellan.100
 Because this meeting took place before the conflict was over and before 
any Indians  were being tried for crimes, Whipple could not have lobbied 
98See speech of Senator Wilkinson, Congressional Globe, Dec. 5, 1862, 37th Cong., 3d 
sess., p. 13; see also Herbert, “Explaining the Sioux Military Commission,” p. 780; 
Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota War  Trials,” p. 30; Nichols, “The Other Civil 
War,” p. 9.
99Henry B. Whipple, Lights and Shadows of a Long Episcopate (New York, 1899), pp. 136–37. 
Many historians quote this story, but  there is no source for it beyond Whipple’s 
recollection. However, Whipple wrote about this in 1899, thirty- seven years  after the 
events took place.
100Bishop Henry Whipple Diary, box 42, Whipple Papers, Minnesota History Center 
(hereafter WP/MHC). The Abraham Lincoln papers at the Library of Congress contain 
an undated calling card from Secretary of the Trea sury Salmon P. Chase to Lincoln, 
introducing Lincoln to Bishop Whipple. Chase was active in the Episcopal Church and 
would have been a natu ral contact for Whipple. The library erroneously dates this calling 
card as “December 1862.” This dating is incorrect since Whipple was in Minnesota at that 
time. The footnote to this document also erroneously claims Whipple talked to Lincoln 
about the Dakota prisoners at this time; however, this would have been impossible, 
 because  there  were no prisoners yet and  because the meeting would have taken place in 
September, not December.
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Fig. 7. Bishop Henry Whipple, photo graph by J. Russell & Sons, ca. 1860. (Minnesota 
Historical Society)
Lincoln to  pardon anyone. His conversations prob ably touched on the cause 
of the conflict in Minnesota. But they  were mostly about general Indian poli-
cies and the corruption of Indian agencies. This would have comported 
with a long letter Whipple sent Lincoln in March 1862 about the failures of 
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Indian policies and the dishonesty of Indian agents. In that letter he com-
plained that Indian agents  were “often men without any fitness, sometimes 
a disgrace to a Christian nation; whiskey- sellers, bar- room loungers, 
debauchers.”101 When Whipple met with Lincoln in September, with the 
conflict in Minnesota still raging, he prob ably continued to denounce the 
entire system of Indian agents. But,  there is one oddity about this meeting 
with Lincoln: Whipple made no mention of meeting the president in his per-
sonal diary,102 although he did rec ord many of the  people he met, including 
General McClellan, noted churches he preached at, and towns he visited. 
It seems incomprehensible that he would not have noted this meeting in his 
diary. Thus, his discussion of this meeting in his memoirs, published thirty- 
seven years  later, makes one won der  whether the meeting actually took place. 
Moreover, in Whipple’s memoirs he offers no source or explanation of how 
he heard that Lincoln said Whipple had made Lincoln feel the “rascality” 
of the Indian agencies in his “boots.”103 Whipple’s discussions of the cor-
ruption of the Indian agency system would prob ably have affected Lincoln’s 
views of the  causes of the vio lence in Minnesota, but Whipple could not have 
been lobbying Lincoln for leniency before any  trials took place.
 After the  trials Whipple lobbied Lincoln from a distance, but he was 
clearly ambivalent about what should happen to the convicted Dakota war-
riors. He wrote to Senator Henry M. Rice on November 12, asking him to 
deliver a letter to Lincoln on the proposed executions. He praised Rice as 
“the only public man who has at all times recognized the wickedness of our 
Indian system.” He told Rice: “We cannot hang men by the hundreds.” 
Whipple argued that the captured Indians  were “prisoners of war” and that 
it would violate “our own premises” to hang them.104 But it does not appear 
that this letter was directly about the executions and  trials. On November 20, 
Senator Rice sent Lincoln a petition from eigh teen Episcopal bishops and 
twenty or so other leaders of the church,105 asking for a comprehensive re-
form of American Indian policy. The petition began with a reference to the 
101Bishop Henry Whipple to The President of the United States, Mar. 6, 1862, in 
Whipple, Lights and Shadows, pp. 510–14.
102Bishop Henry Whipple Diary, box 42, WP/MHC.
103The lack of any mention in his diary or in any other source corroborating this meeting 
does not prove Bishop did not meet with the president, but it does weaken the case for it.
104 There does not appear to be an  actual copy of this letter in existence, only the cover 
letter Whipple sent Rice. Whipple to Rice, Nov. 12, 1862, box 40, letterbook 4, WP/MHC.
105Henry M. Rice to Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 20, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC.
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“recent Indian attack” but then immediately went to a discussion of needed 
reforms in Indian policies. What ever Whipple and the other bishops thought 
about the executions, they wanted the tragedy to lead to significant re-
forms.106 Rice delivered the petition to Lincoln, met with the president, 
and on November 27 reported back to Whipple that the president would 
advocate reform of the Indian agency system in his annual message to 
Congress. However, Rice did not indicate that he discussed the convictions 
of the Dakota soldiers with the president.107
A few days  later Whipple reiterated his “demand” for “a reform” of the 
entire Indian agency system.108 But then Whipple clarified his views on the 
 trials and executions, which Rice had apparently misunderstood from 
Whipple’s earlier objection to “hang[ing] men by hundreds.”109 Whipple 
flatly declared that when it came to the convicted Dakota soldiers he did 
not “desire to screen the guilty murderers.” He objected to the irregulari-
ties in the commission’s work and feared for the many innocent Dakota 
in federal custody  because of the public “cry to exterminate  every one who 
had a red skin.” But “as a law abiding man” he was prepared to “bow to 
the supremacy of all decisions lawfully conducted.” His only concern was 
 whether the convicted Dakota had been given fair  trials “such as to care-
fully scrutinize between the guilty and the innocent.”110 Thus, even the most 
committed friend of the Indians in Minnesota was, in the end, not troubled 
by executing some Dakota soldiers, even though he had initially argued that 
the captured Indians  were “prisoners of war” and that it would violate “our 
own premises” to hang them.111
Whipple’s concerns  were mostly about the Indian system, and only tan-
gentially about the condemned Dakota. On December 4, Whipple wrote 
Lincoln directly, thanking him for supporting a reform of the entire Indian 
106Protestant Episcopal Church to Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 20, 1862, in Lincoln Papers, 
LC.
107Senator Henry M. Rice to Bishop Henry B. Whipple, Nov. 27, 1862, box 3, WP/
MHC.
108Bishop Henry B. Whipple to Senator Henry M. Rice, Nov. 29, 1862, box 40, bk. 3, 
WP/MHC.
109Bishop Henry B. Whipple to Senator Henry M. Rice, Nov. 12, 1862, box 40, bk. 4, 
WP/MHC.
110Bishop Henry B. Whipple to Senator Henry M. Rice, Nov. 29, 1862, box 40, bk. 3, 
WP/MHC.
111Bishop Henry B. Whipple to Senator Henry M. Rice, Nov. 12, 1862, box 40, bk. 4, 
WP/MHC.
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system, which was “a stupendous piece of wickedness.” Whipple enclosed a 
“history of the  causes of the late fearful massacre,” but he did not urge Lin-
coln to  pardon the Dakota.112
The petition from Whipple and the other Episcopal bishops surely had 
some impact on Lincoln’s thinking. By this time Lincoln fully understood 
that the Indian agents and traders in Minnesota had been outrageous in 
their greed, incompetence, and callous indifference to Indian welfare. He 
also fully understood that many of  those sentenced to die  were innocent of 
any “outrages.” Along this line, Lincoln received a letter from Stephen R. 
Riggs, a missionary and the chaplain to General Sibley’s command. He 
noted that “among  those condemned  there are vari ous grades of guilt from 
the men who butchered  women and  children to the men who simply fol-
lowed with a party for the purpose of taking away spoils from the homes 
of settlers who fled.” But Riggs also admitted that most of the convicted 
men “ were condemned on general princi ples, without any specific charges 
proved.” Riggs told Lincoln “ there is room for the exercise of your clemency.”113 
Riggs then suggested some specific men who should be pardoned.
The petitions of Whipple and the other clergymen, Senator Rice’s con-
versations, and other communications condemning the  trials doubtless af-
fected Lincoln. He told Rice he would raise the issue of Indian reform in 
his annual message to Congress (the nineteenth- century equivalent of the 
State of the Union Address), which led Bishop Whipple to profusely praise 
and thank Lincoln.114 But communications on the other side, including lob-
bying by Governor Ramsey, Senator Wilkinson, and General Pope, urging 
speedy execution of all the Dakota also must have weighed on Lincoln’s 
mind.115 Bishop Whipple, and to some extent Rev. Riggs, argued for justice 
112Bishop Henry B. Whipple to Abraham Lincoln, Dec. 4, 1862, box 40, bk. 3, WP/
MHC. The  actual letter to Lincoln is found in Rec ord Group 48: Rec ords of the Office of 
the Secretary of the Interior, Entry 649: Rec ords of the Indian Division, 1828–1907, 
General Rec ords, 1838–1907, Letters Received, 1849–1880, National Archives College 
Park, College Park, Md.
113Stephen R. Riggs to Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 17, 1862, in Lincoln Papers, LC 
(emphasis in the original).
114Bishop Henry B. Whipple to Abraham Lincoln, Dec. 4, 1862 (see note 112 for full cite).
115M. S. Wilkinson, Cyrus Aldrich, and Wm. Windom to Abraham Lincoln, President 
of the U.S., in Staff of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 37th Cong., Message of the 
President, pp. 2–4 (Comm. Print 1862). Morton S. Wilkinson was a U.S. senator from 
Minnesota, and Aldrich and Windom  were the state’s two House representatives. All three 
 were Republicans.
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and humanitarian concerns for the Dakota; Ramsey and  others argued for 
justice for the dead settlers and for the good of the Republican Party in the 
state. Ultimately, however, the concerns of  those in Minnesota  were only 
part of the pro cess that led Lincoln to  pardon the overwhelming majority 
of the Dakota soldiers who  were sentenced to death.
Francis Lieber, the Law of War, and the Dakota War
The Dakota  trials and Lincoln’s effective  pardon of the vast majority of  those 
sentenced to death must also be seen in the context of the emerging law of 
war within the administration. On April 24, 1863, the administration would 
promulgate General  Orders 100, known since then as Lieber’s Code.116 This 
code, or even a draft of it, was not available to Lincoln in December 1862. 
Lieber (fig. 8) began the proj ect just as Lincoln was dealing with the Da-
kota convictions, but did not have a draft of the code  until February, and 
therefore had nothing to give the president before the  pardons  were issued.117 
However, Lieber influenced Lincoln in other ways.
 After the First  Battle of Bull Run, on July 21, 1861, the administration 
was uncertain what to do with captured Confederate prisoners. If secession 
was illegal, as Lincoln contended, then the Confederates  were  little more 
than brigands, or perhaps some form of land- based pirates, making war on 
the general populace, and might be sent to hard  labor, imprisoned, or even 
summarily executed. Such a solution, however, would lead only to retalia-
tion by the Confederacy against U.S. soldiers and encourage barbaric be-
hav ior on both sides. But if the captured Confederates  were treated as soldiers 
in  battle, Lincoln and Attorney General Edward Bates worried this would 
be a de facto recognition of the Confederacy as a legitimate nation.
116“Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, 
Revised by a Board of Officers, General Order 100, April 24, 1863,” in Daniel C. Gilman, 
ed., The Miscellaneous Writings of Francis Lieber, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1881), 2:245.
117Richard Shelly Hartigan, Lieber’s Code and the Law of War (Chicago, 1983), pp. 13–14, 20.
Paragraph 5, Special  Orders No. 399, War Department, Adjutant General’s Office, 
Washington D.C., Dec. 17, 1862, in O.R., ser. 3, vol. 2, p. 951; see also John Fabian 
Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History (New York, 2012), p. 3; Paul 
Finkelman, “Francis Lieber and the Modern Law of War,” University of Chicago Law Review 
80 (2013):2071–132.
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On August 19, 1861, Lieber published a letter to consider the nature of Con-
federate prisoners. He examined the treatment of captured Confederates— 
whether they  were soldiers or pirates— and also how captured U.S. soldiers 
might be treated. In arguing that traditional rules of war should be applied 
Fig. 8. “Prof. Francis Lieber,” ca. 1855–65, Brady- Handy Photo graph Collection. 
 (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
160    Paul Finkelman
to prisoners, he asserted that this was not a formal or diplomatic recognition 
of the Confederacy but was merely “the recognition of real ity.” Lieber of-
fered an analogy that set the issue out clearly: “When a highway robber 
asks my purse, and I, being unarmed, consider it expedient to give it, I 
certainly recognize the robber, it is no more than recognition of a fact.” For 
humanitarian reasons it was also impor tant that Confederate prisoners be 
treated as legitimate belligerents  under international law. This would not 
be a recognition of the Confederacy and would not even prevent a subse-
quent prosecution for treason. But it would be a practical solution to the prob-
lem, since both sides had captured each other’s soldiers. Eventually Lieber’s 
theory would lead to prisoner exchanges. In this letter Lieber noted, but 
dismissed, the idea of executing prisoners of war. Executing prisoners 
would in effect reduce the United States to the level of the Jacobins during 
the French Revolution, who “guillotined . . .  the prisoners they made.”118 
Lieber’s point was clear: civilized, humane nations did not execute prisoners 
of war.
In a subsequent essay published in 1862, Lieber set out rules for dealing 
with guerrilla soldiers and other irregular forces.  Here he argued that “guer-
rillamen, when captured in fair fight and open warfare, should be treated 
as the regular partisan is,  until special crimes, such as murder, or the kill-
ing of prisoners, or the sacking of places, are proved upon them.” Lieber 
argued that this was the pre ce dent of “the most humane belligerents in 
recent times.”119
 These two theories  were available to Lincoln when he considered the 
cases of the Dakota warriors. Lincoln acted on both theories. In reviewing 
the cases, Lincoln made a sharp distinction between Indian soldiers, who 
simply participated in combat, and  those who raped, killed  women and 
 children, or killed prisoners. This last point would have been particularly 
impor tant to a careful and logical attorney like Lincoln. If it was wrong (a 
war crime) for Indians to kill prisoners, then would it not have been equally 
wrong (equally a war crime) for the United States to execute prisoners?
118F[rancis] L[ieber], “The Disposal of Prisoners,” New York Times, Aug. 19, 1861, p. 5.
119Francis Lieber, Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of  
War, Written at the Request of Major­ General Henry W. Halleck (1862), reprinted in Lieber, 
Miscellaneous Writings of Francis Lieber, vol. 2: Contributions to Po liti cal Science (Philadelphia, 
1881), pp. 275, 290.
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“I Could Not Afford to Hang Men for Votes”
In the end, Lincoln was pulled in many directions by the Dakota conflict. 
A humane chief executive, he was unable to even consider the mass hang-
ing of hundreds of men.120 The Civil War was bloody enough, and  there 
was no end in sight. Lincoln had no stomach for what the generals and 
politicians in Minnesota wanted. From the moment he heard of the push for 
mass executions, he made it clear that he was skeptical about the idea.
Lincoln first heard about the possibility of mass executions in mid- 
October. On October 9 General Pope informed General Halleck that the 
“Sioux war may be considered at an end,” but that the bloodletting was not 
over. Pope reported that he had 1,500 prisoners and that many of them  were 
being “tried by military commission . . .  and  will be executed.” He re-
ported that he had seized “a number of Winnebagoes” and that he had 
“destroyed all the fields and property of the Sioux,” even though most of 
the Sioux had not participated in the vio lence and the Winnebagoes had not 
been involved at all. He told Halleck he planned to renew his attacks on the 
Sioux in the spring and that “[t]he Indians are greatly terrified.”121 How-
ever we characterize the events of the fall of 1862— insurrection, war, or 
rebellion— Pope was planning to escalate the vio lence. For Pope, the mass 
execution of prisoners was the beginning of a pro cess that can be described 
only as a war of genocide.
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton presented Pope’s report to the cabi-
net on October 14. Secretary of the Navy Welles was “disgusted” with Pope’s 
report, the “tone” of which was “discreditable.” It was at this meeting that 
Welles noted that the Winnebagoes had “good land which white men want 
and mean to have.”122 Welles also observed that  there was nothing in the 
reports to indicate why this vio lence had erupted, and he suspected— 
correctly— that the Indians in Minnesota had legitimate grievances.
We do not know what the rest of the cabinet thought about this, but Lin-
coln immediately informed the military authorities that  there would be no 
hasty executions. A disappointed General Pope told General Sibley that 
120Alexander Ramsey, Diary (Nov. 23, 1864), quoted in Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, 
p. 118.
121Jno. Pope, Major Gen., to H. W. Halleck, Major Gen., Oct. 9, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, 
vol. 13, p. 722.
122Welles, Diary, 1:171.
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“[t]he President directs that no executions be made without his sanction.”123 
When the Dakota  were sentenced, Pope dutifully sent Lincoln a list of  those 
to be executed, and as we know, Lincoln immediately asked that all the rec-
ords of the  trials be forwarded to him.
Meanwhile, Lincoln was pressured to approve the executions. We have 
seen how Governor Ramsey, Senator Wilkinson, and Minnesota’s congress-
men urged the president to facilitate speedy executions. Even Chaplain Riggs, 
who urged Lincoln to exercise clemency, expressed “a  great necessity . . . 
to execute the  great majority of  those who have been condemned by the 
Military Commission.”124
The more moderate advice of Bishop Whipple and other clergymen re-
minded Lincoln of the corruption of the Indian system, the failure of the 
allotments to arrive, and the real threat of starvation among the Indians. 
Their desperate situation may not have justified killing civilians, but  going 
to war with the United States was not totally unjustified. Lincoln also heard 
from William P. Dole, the commissioner of Indian Affairs, whom he sent 
to Minnesota. Dole communicated to Secretary of the Interior Caleb B. 
Smith,125 who passed the letter on to Lincoln, “concurring in the humane 
views” of Dole.126 In his letter, Dole condemned the “indiscriminate pun-
ishment of men who have laid down their arms and surrendered themselves 
as prisoners.” He suggested that the  trials and the planned executions  were 
merely “revenge” rather than “the infliction of deserved punishment,” and 
thus they  were “contrary to the spirit of the age, and our character as a  great, 
magnanimous and christian [sic]  people.” Dole urged Smith to pass his 
letter on to Lincoln to “prevent the consummation of an act which I cannot 
believe would be other wise than a stain upon our national character, and 
source of  future regret.”127
In pardoning the vast majority of  those condemned to death, Lincoln ac-
cepted the recommendation of his own Indian commissioner. It dovetailed 
with his own per sis tent opposition to  needless killing and his lifelong com-
mitment to due pro cess of law. Lincoln was doubtless shocked by the lack of 
123John Pope to Henry Sibley, Oct. 17, 1862, quoted in Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians, 
p. 96.
124Stephen R. Riggs to Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 17, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC.
125William P. Dole to Caleb B. Smith, Nov. 10, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC.
126Caleb B. Smith to Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 11, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC.
127William P. Dole to Caleb B. Smith, Nov. 10, 1862, Lincoln Papers, LC.
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specific evidence for many of  those convicted, the lack of due pro cess and 
re spect for  legal rules in the  trials, and the apparent unwillingness of the 
military to even attempt to treat the prisoners individually and assess their 
guilt or innocence on an individual basis.128 In the early stages of the  trials, 
General Sibley had admitted that “the proceedings . . .  may not be exactly 
in form in all the details.”129 But this lack of due pro cess clearly did not bother 
him. Perhaps if only a handful of Dakota had been sentenced to death  after 
such proceedings, as Confederate guerillas had been in Missouri,130 Lin-
coln might not have been too concerned  either. But Lincoln refused to ap-
prove the bloodbath that Sibley, Pope, and Ramsey wanted on the basis of 
such shoddy evidence and suspect proceedings.
Lincoln also understood that  there was a significant difference between 
the war in Minnesota and the guerilla warfare in Missouri. Missouri gue-
rillas fought secretly, without uniforms, and then  after their attacks on sol-
diers and civilians melted back into their community to strike again.131 But 
in Minnesota the Dakota War was over. Almost the entire Dakota nation 
was in military custody or had fled the state.  There was no chance of a re-
vival of hostilities, and  there was no need to execute the Dakota to prevent 
them from resuming the conflict.
Lincoln’s decision to review the proceedings and spare the lives of the 
overwhelming majority of  those convicted also comported with the emerg-
ing views of the War Department on the role of law in military affairs. 
Lieber’s arguments about prisoners of war and guerillas prob ably played 
into this. So too did the realization that the nature of the Civil War itself 
was changing. On July 17, Lincoln had signed two laws that allowed for the 
enlistment of black troops: the Second Confiscation Act and the Militia Act 
of 1862.132 A week  later, Secretary of War Stanton authorized General Rufus 
128At least one of  those who was eventually executed, a man named Chaskay, was 
clearly innocent, and was reprieved, but was nevertheless executed when a man with a 
similar name was reprieved. Meyer, History of the Santee Sioux, p. 130. This tragedy 
underscored the arbitrary nature of the  trials and the inability or unwillingness of the 
military authorities in Minnesota to distinguish one prisoner from another.
129Henry H. Sibley to John H. Pope, Oct. 7, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 13, p. 717.
130Herbert, “Explaining the Sioux Military Commission,” pp. 791–93 (discussing 
drumhead prosecutions and summary executions of guerillas in Missouri).
131Daniel E. Sutherland, A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Roles of Guerrillas in the American 
Civil War (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2009).
132Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589, 592 (1862), secs. 11 and 12; Militia Act of 1862, secs. 
12 and 13, 12 Stat. 599.
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Saxton, who was based at Hilton Head, South Carolina, to begin to enlist 
black troops.133 Now that the United States was enlisting and training black 
soldiers, Lincoln had to be even more concerned about the fate of captured 
prisoners. Confederates might soon seek to execute or enslave black soldiers 
they captured. This would turn the war into one of unmitigated barbarism 
as the United States would then have to retaliate by executing captured Con-
federates.  These  were real possibilities. Executing  enemy soldiers— even 
Indian  enemy soldiers— not only was immoral but also would set a danger-
ous pre ce dent. If Lincoln allowed the execution of Indian soldiers on the 
grounds that the Indian attacks on the frontier  were barbaric, then the Con-
federates could respond that from their perspective putting  free blacks and 
former slaves in uniform and giving them guns was also barbaric. The mili-
tary and civilian authorities in Minnesota wanted to execute the Dakota 
 because they believed such executions would prevent  future frontier warfare 
and thus save the lives of civilians and soldiers. But Lincoln’s view from the 
White House was the opposite. Executing Indian prisoners of war would 
serve only to justify Confederate executions of black U.S. soldiers (and their 
white officers). Rather than saving lives, a mass execution in Minnesota 
could have cost lives in the larger Civil War that was more impor tant to 
Lincoln.
On December 1, Lincoln asked Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt of 
the U.S. Army for advice on how to deal with the convicted men. He was 
clearly planning to  pardon many of the Indians. He asked Holt “ whether I 
should conclude to execute only a part of them, I must myself designate 
which, or could I leave the designation to some officer on the ground?”134 
Holt replied that day, telling the president he could not delegate his  pardon 
power “and that the designation of the individuals, which its exercise in-
volves, must necessarily be made by yourself.” Holt said that he knew of no 
instance where any president had attempted “the del e ga tion of this delicate 
and responsible trust.” Holt then made the observation that was obvious to 
 others in the administration, including Lincoln, that “[i]n view of the large 
amount of  human life involved in  these proceedings, [it would] be well—
if this step has not already been taken—to submit them to the Attorney 
133Edwin M. Stanton to Brigadier- General Saxton, Aug. 25, 1862, in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 
14, pp. 377–78.
134Abraham Lincoln to Joseph Holt, Dec. 1, 1862, in CW, 5:537–38.
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General for the purpose of more satisfactorily determining the question of 
their regularity.”135 The point seems clear: the leaders of the army  were con-
cerned about the lack of due pro cess, the rush to judgment, and the large 
amount of life at stake. In the midst of Amer i ca’s bloodiest war, even the 
leaders of the army  were concerned about executing more than 300 men 
 after  trials that on their face  were, at best, parodies of the  legal pro cess.
Lincoln, following his own humanitarian instincts and his lawyerly train-
ing, and backed by members of his cabinet, his commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, and the judge advocate general of the U.S. Army, moved to miti-
gate, as much as pos si ble, the barbarism of hanging more than 300 men, 
especially when it was obvious that most of them  were not guilty of any 
crimes. Thus, the president ordered his subordinates to divide the convicted 
Dakota into two groups:  those “who  were proven to have participated in 
massacres,” which  were “distinguished from participation in  battles.”136 In 
 doing so, Lincoln was forced to accept some of the findings of the military 
commission, even though he knew  those hearings  were deeply flawed and 
jurisprudentially scandalous. Carol Chomsky argues that Lincoln’s “judg-
ments” to allow any executions  were “questionable”  because all the  trials 
 were “flawed.”137 But this argument ignores the fact that some of  those 
executed had openly bragged about killing civilians, and that some of the 
evidence for what amounted to war crimes was persuasive and compelling. 
Moreover, in the world of 1862, with the Civil War raging, with a miniscule 
staff, and with the issues of the real war constantly pressing him, Lincoln 
may have done as much as he could have done— and spent as much time as 
he could afford—to correct the miscarriage of justice that took place in 
Minnesota.
Furthermore, Lincoln tried to balance justice with military concerns, is-
sues involving the ongoing War of the Rebellion, and fear of renewed vio-
lence in Minnesota. As he told the Senate, he was “[a]nxious to not act with 
so much clemency as to encourage another outbreak, on the one hand, nor 
with so much severity as to be real cruelty, on the other.”138 In the end, he 
spared seven out of  every eight of the convicted men. In hindsight, he should 
have pardoned more and required new  trials— fair  trials— for anyone  going 
135Joseph Holt to Abraham Lincoln, Dec. 1, 1862, in Lincoln Papers, LC.
136Message of the President, pp. 1–2.
137Chomsky, “The United States– Dakota War  Trials,” p. 15.
138Message of the President, p. 1.
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to the gallows.139 Even if some of the Dakota  were guilty of war crimes, such 
as murdering civilians or raping  women, their crimes had not been proved 
in the military commission with its sham  trials. Clearly, Lincoln and his ad-
visers understood the many prob lems with the  trials and the lack of due 
pro cess. But the lack of due pro cess for  those who  were executed was swal-
lowed up by the complexities of the Civil War, the distance between 
Washington and St. Paul, and the myriad other demands on Lincoln’s time 
and attention. In December 1862 he had other  things on his mind— the on-
going campaign against the Confederacy and the implementation of the 
final Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863. Thus, on December 6, 
he sent General Sibley a list of forty men who would be executed.140 By 
the time of the executions this would be reduced to thirty- eight, as two more 
men  were reprieved.
Lincoln expected  there would be a huge po liti cal cost for this massive 
commutation. He may have allowed a certain amount of rough justice, and 
rough injustice, to  settle the  matter, but he fully understood that his mas-
sive commutation— which would effectively be a massive  pardon— would 
prob ably not satisfy the demands for vengeance and mass executions in Min-
nesota. But, Lincoln was willing to accept  these po liti cal costs  because the 
alternative was to acquiesce in the executions of over 300 men, most of whom 
had not committed any recognizable crime.
Ultimately, the po liti cal cost was not as  great as Lincoln had feared. 
Minnesota troops continued to fight bravely and gallantly against the Con-
federacy. The  people of Minnesota remained mostly loyal to the Union cause. 
In 1864 Lincoln carried Minnesota by 7,000 votes. This was not as large as 
his 10,000- vote majority in 1860, and given that the state had a larger pop-
ulation by 1864, the decline in his margin of victory was even greater. He 
had carried 63.5  percent of the popu lar vote in 1860 but only 59.1 in 1864.141 
This decline was noticeable, but hardly a threat to Lincoln or his party’s 
139At least one Dakota scholar sees the executions as “a po liti cal decision in order to 
appease the angry and vengeful Minnesota citizens.” Interview by Deborah Locke with 
Dr. Eldon Lawrence in New Ulm, Minn., Apr. 12, 2011 (transcript available at http:// 
collections . mnhs . org / cms / web5 / media . php ? pdf​=​1&irn​=​10248274).
140Abraham Lincoln to Brigadier General H. H. Sibley, Dec. 6, 1862, in CW, 5:543.
141Center for the Study of Politics and Governance, “Minnesota Presidential Election 
Results, 1860–2008,” Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, pp. 8–9, http:// lgi . umn . edu 
/ centers / cspg / research / election _ data _ archive / pdf / MN _ Presidential _ Election _ Results 
. pdf.
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power in the state.  After the results  were in, Alexander Ramsey, who by then 
was a U.S. senator, told Lincoln “that if he had hung more Indians, we 
should have given him his old majority.” It is difficult to know  whether 
Ramsey was attempting to make a joke, or  whether he was offering serious 
po liti cal advice. Lincoln replied with a more sober point that reflected his 
own  legal and moral standards: “I could not afford to hang men for votes.”142
142Diary of Alexander Ramsey, entry for Nov. 23, 1864, quoted in Nichols, Lincoln and 
the Indians, p. 118.
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Mon day,  Ma rch  4 ,  1861, was the busiest and certainly the most impor tant day in Abraham Lincoln’s life. He awoke early, as was his 
habit, in the National  Hotel, where the Lincoln  family had been staying ever 
since their arrival in Washington ten days earlier. The president- elect then 
waited at the  hotel  until his pre de ces sor, James Buchanan, escorted him to 
the still- domeless United States Capitol for the official ceremony. The two 
men rode stiffly side- by- side in the open carriage. At some point along Penn-
sylvania Ave nue the sixty- nine- year- old Buchanan turned to Lincoln and 
acknowledged that if Lincoln was as happy entering the White House as 
Buchanan was leaving it, then the new president was indeed a happy man.1
On the East Front portico of the Capitol, Lincoln delivered his wistful 
inaugural address, closing with words of reconciliation and poetic expres-
sion that fell on deaf ears in the South: “We are not enemies but friends. 
We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not 
break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from 
 every battlefield, and patriot grave, to  every living hearth stone, all over this 
broad land,  will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched as 
surely they  will be by the better angels of our nature.”2
1Jean H. Baker, James Buchanan (New York, 2004), p. 140.
2“First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln,” Monday, Mar. 4, 1861, The Avalon 
Proj ect, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, http: // avalon . law . yale . edu / 19th 
_ century / lincoln1 . asp.
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 After vari ous festivities— including a dinner for seventeen mostly Todd 
relatives and a short rest at the White House (by this time a relieved James 
Buchanan was long gone to his home in Lancaster, Pennsylvania)— the new 
president attended the eve ning’s sole inaugural ball. For the second time that 
day he heard the Marine Band play the stirring “Hail to the Chief” in his 
honor. By then he had also heard the ominous news from Fort Sumter 
in Charleston Harbor that the Union commander  there— Major Robert 
Anderson— needed more supplies. Even for a man of  great stamina, Abra-
ham Lincoln was surely exhausted when he fi nally tumbled into bed in the 
new home that he would inhabit for the next four years and five weeks— 
until that fateful night in April 1865 when he and Mrs. Lincoln went to Ford’s 
Theatre to see Laura Keene in Our American Cousin.
The subject of this essay is Lincoln and his  family in the White House— 
their lives  behind the scenes in what some nineteenth- century Americans 
called in homely demo cratic fashion the  People’s House.  Others dubbed it 
the Executive Mansion, and Lincoln sometimes called it the President’s 
House or the White House, though it would not officially be called the lat-
ter  until Teddy Roo se velt’s administration. I have no  grand theme to pres-
ent, only the idea that the White House, with its multiple functions as a 
 family residence, an executive office, and the location of endless ceremo-
nies and rituals, complicated the sixteenth president’s tenure in many, not 
always positive, ways.
And for his wife and three sons— one son, Eddie, had died in Spring-
field in 1850 before the Lincolns came to Washington— the presidential years 
magnified the anguish of what Mary Lincoln called “her vanishing circle.” 
While the found ers of the American republic had successfully divided 
po liti cal power and authority among vari ous institutions of government in 
the United States Constitution, they had done nothing to provide living 
quarters for the president and his  family that  were separate from his office 
and the  grand ceremonial rooms of the White House.
From its beginnings the White House (fig. 1) had been intended as a mag-
nificent structure, though George Washington, who wanted a stone build-
ing “designed for the ages” and who never lived in the Washington White 
House, had disagreed with Thomas Jefferson, who favored brick simplicity. 
In a  people’s republic that had just thrown off the yoke of a monarchy, the 
home of this new functionary called a president must not be too  grand. On 
the other hand, it must be spacious enough to symbolize the new nation’s 
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power in the dangerous international world of Eu ro pean governments un-
willing to surrender their expansive claims to territory in the Western Hemi-
sphere. The home of the president also must mirror the  future world- class 
expectations of the United States of Amer i ca.3
Yet, like the new instruments of government created by the Constitution, 
 there  were no pre ce dents to follow in the construction of what soon became, 
along with its neighbor, the Capitol, a national symbol for a new type of gov-
ernment. By Thomas Jefferson’s administration  there  were complaints that 
the  great stone  house designed by James Hoban, an Irish immigrant who 
had won the architectural design competition, was “big enough for two em-
perors, one pope and the  grand lama.” 4  Later the building was refigured and 
its grounds improved by the  great architect of the new republic, Benjamin 
Henry Latrobe. First inhabited by John and Abigail Adams, who moved in 
before it was completed, the building had its exterior structure in place by 
3Jean H. Baker, Benjamin Henry Latrobe: Architect and Engineer of the Republic (New York, 
forthcoming).
4Quoted in John Whitcomb and Claire Whitcomb, Real Life in the White House (New 
York, 2000), p. xix.
Fig.  1. “White House, Washington, D.C., 1861–1865,” Brady National Photographic 
Art Gallery. (Still Picture Rec ords Section, Special Media Archives Ser vices Division, National 
Archives and Rec ords Administration, College Park, Md.)
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1800, which remained unchanged during the nineteenth  century, save for 
the addition of the porticos on the north and south, some revision of its in-
ternal rooms, and its refurbishing  after its destruction during the War of 1812.
By the time of the Lincolns’ arrival, the interior of the White House was 
in deplorable condition— circumstances readily apparent to Mary Todd 
Lincoln and her cousin Lizzie Grimsley, both sharp- eyed and strong- voiced 
 house wives from Springfield, when they toured the mansion the day  after 
the inauguration. Still, its huge transverse halls, large win dows, high ceil-
ings, and the grandiose proportions of the East Room revealed its imposing 
possibilities. In the first de cade of the nineteenth  century Dolley Madison 
had made extensive improvements to the interior. But  after the British in-
vasion of Washington in 1814, on the interior only her red velvet curtains 
had survived the burning of the White House. Thereafter Congress proved 
stingy in providing appropriations.
By 1861  there was general agreement with Lizzie Grimsley’s determination 
that it resembled a “seedy and dilapidated” third- rate  hotel. Of course, the 
Executive Mansion was the grandest  house and with its thirty- one rooms 
the largest home the Lincolns and their  children had ever lived in. Such 
would be the case for all Americans. But for the president it was a far cry 
from the  humble wattle and daub cabins of his childhood and youth in Ken-
tucky, Indiana, and Illinois. And this president, with his  simple tastes, 
yearned for  little more than shelter, privacy, and modest meals.
But Mary Lincoln had grown up in aristocratic Lexington, Kentucky, and 
she, not her husband, noticed the stained upholstery, abominable furniture, 
and peeling wall paper, along with the threadbare rugs and faded curtains. 
Even Lincoln’s young secretary, John Nicolay, soon to reside in a small 
bedroom on the second floor of the East Wing of the White House, won-
dered how long “a  great nation would compel its ruler to live in a small 
dilapidated shanty and in such shabby genteel style.” Meanwhile, William 
Stoddard, another White House secretary, was reminded of an “old and un-
successful boarding  house.” And as for Washington correspondent Noah 
Brooks, he wanted Congress to appropriate enough money to buy paintings 
from American artists to hang in the White House. But Brooks’s visionary 
plan took another  century to reach fruition.5
5William Stoddard, Inside the White House in War time, ed. Michael Burlingame (Lincoln, 
Neb., 2000), p. 49; Harry Pratt and Ernest East, “Mrs. Lincoln Refurbishes the White 
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It soon became Mary Lincoln’s self- appointed proj ect—an especially 
impor tant one during the Civil War and one that she accomplished with 
distinction—to make the White House into an elegant statement of Union 
power. Even as the wives of other public officials fled home in the face of a 
pos si ble Confederate attack across the Potomac River, the First Lady traveled 
to New York within weeks of the inauguration to buy rugs and curtains. In a 
rec ord one day’s shopping at Alexander Stewart’s new department store, she 
spent $2,000 of the $20,000 allowance for White House repairs and refur-
bishing. The First Lady traveled to both New York and Philadelphia sev-
eral times during the year, always spending too much money, though it is 
worth remembering that she had no power of the purse.
Rather, it was the commissioner of public buildings, William Wood, and 
 later  after he was fired, Benjamin B. French, who signed the vouchers. Both 
men evidently approved of her new decorations and the reasons for them, 
though she took the blame for extravagance— however tasteful the results—in 
the press, among Washington officials, and  later to an unforgiving frater-
nity of historians. Ever oblivious to his surroundings, her husband, on the 
other hand, left such activities to his wife  until she overspent the bud get 
and made Lincoln angry: “It would stink in the nostrils of the American 
 people to have it said that the President of the United States had ap-
proved a bill over- running an appropriation of $20,000 for flub- dubs for this 
damned  house when the soldiers cannot have blankets.”6 While the Lincolns, 
who had been married twenty years, generally  were congenial partners 
despite his melancholy and her tempers, certainly one of the  things they 
argued about  behind the scenes during their years in the White House was 
her excessive spending.
In examining the private lives of Lincoln and his  family in the White 
House we must remember that peculiar American arrangement placing 
three essential purposes  under one roof in a way that no other nations do. 
Wisely, in Eu ro pean capitals, palaces  were never the location of all three 
functions. Yet the White House was— and still is— the place where the ex-
ecutive business of the nation takes place. Lincoln worked from home—in 
House,” Lincoln Lore 47 (February 1945):12–22; Mary Todd Lincoln to Alex Williamson, 
Jan. 26, 1866, in Justin Turner and Linda Turner, eds., Mary Todd Lincoln: Her Life and 
Letters (New York, 1972), p. 330; Elizabeth Grimsley, “Six Months in the White House,” 
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 19 (October 1926– January 1927):47.
6Jean H. Baker, Mary Todd Lincoln: A Biography (New York, 1987), pp. 188–89.
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an office he called “the shop,” which mea sured twenty- five feet by thirty feet 
and had a marble fireplace, large win dows that faced south, a desk between 
the win dows, and a stained carpet. (Years  later President Ronald Reagan, 
who was born in a small apartment over a general store in Tampico, Illi-
nois, told his wife when they moved into the White House that he was still 
living above the store.)7
At the beginning of the war, the flags of the Confederacy flying high atop 
the buildings in Arlington and Alexandria could be seen from Lincoln’s of-
fice. For four years Abraham Lincoln spent most of his time in this  simple 
room, furnished with a couch, a  table, enough chairs for his cabinet of seven, 
a few books including the Statutes of the United States, the United States 
Constitution, some Shakespeare plays, and a portrait of the Demo cratic 
president Andrew Jackson on the wall— which Lincoln, an instinctive 
bipartisan soon to be the leader of a war time co ali tion called the Union Party, 
did not bother to replace.  There was also an uncomfortable, soiled  horse hair 
sofa. The only new furnishing that Lincoln requested was a large rack for 
the war maps that the president closely studied as he rapidly took on the 
role of an involved commander in chief and military tactician.
In this era before the commodious West Wing addition in the twentieth 
 century, Lincoln met in his office with the cabinet twice a week, discussed 
personnel  matters involving military appointments, and crafted the letters 
that carried his policy messages to private citizens.  Here he wrote both the 
preliminary and final Emancipation Proclamation, began the Gettysburg 
Address, and wrote in its entirety his Second Inaugural Address. He also 
interviewed Republican Party leaders intent on the federal patronage jobs 
that exploded from 1,200 in 1861 to nearly four times that number by 1865. 
Of course, partisans knew who dispensed  these po liti cal plums, which meant 
that the White House swarmed with men and a few  women seeking jobs. 
The president was an astute student of party politics and spent time making 
appropriate choices that would aid the new Republican Party and, in 1864, 
his own reelection.
Still, none of the  family knew whom they might encounter in the second- 
floor hallway when they left their bedrooms, as the job seekers overflowed 
the waiting room outside Lincoln’s anteroom. Even for the times, observers 
from Eu rope, where public buildings  were better protected and no one 
7Whitcomb and Whitcomb, Real Life in the White House, p. xvii.
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dreamed of walking into a minister’s home, noted the lack of security at 
the White House.  There was, concluded one En glish visitor, not a “dog on 
the watch,” as Edward Mc Manus and Thomas Burns, the porters, paid 
 little attention to monitoring the north portico entrance. When Napoleon’s 
nephew arrived for a state dinner, no one was at the front door, and so young 
Willie Lincoln did the honors,  after which the prince confided to his diary 
that “one goes right into the [White House] as if entering a café.”8  After all, 
according to an editor of the New York Times, the  people had paid for the 
 house and thereby earned the right to see him in it.9
In his second- floor office, Lincoln also met with del e ga tions of endless 
associations and groups from Sioux Indians to temperance advocates. In one 
instance he listened to the zealous advocacy of a temperance group, observ-
ing from the corner of his eye the attention that his tipsy carriage driver 
was giving to this call to abandon the temptations of alcohol. And it was in 
this office that shortly before he issued the Emancipation Proclamation, the 
president harshly harangued a del e ga tion of African Americans, proclaim-
ing that they would never be the equal of white men, that they  were the cause 
of the war, and that colonization was the best answer for their  future: 
“You and I are diff er ent races. . . .  It is better for us both therefore to be 
separated.”10 The president also gave his limited time to  widows seeking pen-
sions and  mothers who came with desperate pleas to save their deserting 
sons from the firing squad.
One of the criticisms of Abraham Lincoln’s presidency was that he lav-
ished far too much time, according to one of his secretaries, on “the endless 
requests of poor  widows who wanted to work in the Trea sury Department, 
the brigadiers who wanted a promotion, the inventors  after a contract, and 
the curiosity seekers with an autograph book.”11 For example, he spent 
hours on the especially troubling case of a civilian from Norfolk,  Virginia, 
Dr. David Wright, who had shot the white commanding officer of a black 
Union regiment  because the black soldiers had not moved off the sidewalk 
in Norfolk to make way for white civilians. This murder arrived on Lincoln’s 
8Baker, Mary Todd Lincoln, p. 199.
9James Conroy, Lincoln’s White House: The  People’s House in War time (Lanham, Md., 2017), 
p. 2.
10Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, N.J., 
1953–55), 5:370–75.
11Noah Brooks, Washington in Lincoln’s Time (New York, 1895), pp. 248–49.
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desk as “an unprovoked assassination,” followed by a guilty verdict and death 
sentence by a military commission. Eventually Lincoln declined to  pardon 
the man, but he carefully considered  whether Wright could be called insane 
and therefore not put to death, even sending an investigator to Norfolk be-
fore rejecting such a defense.12
Additionally, as president, Abraham Lincoln ran the nation’s foreign af-
fairs, defining its policies such as the naval blockade of the Confederacy and 
the proper reaction to the Trent affair and the Alabama— the cruiser built 
in Scotland and delivered to the Confederacy. Along with his secretary of 
state, he also oversaw the choice of personnel. Almost every one who knew 
Abraham Lincoln, particularly  those who worked with him, such as his 
secretaries, appreciated, as William Stoddard wrote, “his vast capacity for 
work and also the exceedingly valuable faculty of putting his work upon 
 others. He could load up to their limit or beyond it his cabinet officers, gen-
erals, legislative supporters and  others.”13 In an underappreciated trait of 
Lincoln’s leadership, this president knew how to delegate authority.
Lincoln’s executive office lacked the very  thing he might have appreci-
ated the most: a telegraph line. As a result, the president frequently left the 
White House to walk the block to the War Department, which was fitted 
out with a telegraph, the latest technological marvel. But given the perpet-
ual busyness of the White House, this sometimes became a blessing. Lin-
coln once told Thomas Eckard, chief of the War Department Telegraphic 
Division, that “he had been able to work at [Eckard’s desk] more quietly 
and command his thoughts better than at the White House, where he was 
frequently interrupted.”14  These interruptions, often from his wife and his 
two young sons and sometimes from the  house hold staff and frequently from 
patronage seekers, came from the failure to separate the functions of the 
White House.
Mostly, Lincoln worked in the White House and to that extent he had 
no private life beyond its walls and outside of his  family, though he did 
move in the late summers and early fall to the Old Soldiers Home, return-
ing daily to the White House. He visited hospitals in Washington and the 
12For an account of this case, see William Lee Miller, President Lincoln: Duty of a 
Statesman (New York, 2008), pp. 273–88.
13Ibid., p. 230.
14Harold Holzer, ed., Lincoln as I Knew Him: Gossip, Tributes, and Revelations from His Best 
Friends and Worst Enemies (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1999), p. 237.
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fortifications around the city. At Fort Stevens, one of the forts on the 
periphery of the city, both the president and the First Lady, standing on the 
parapet, came  under fire from advancing Confederates only 150 yards away 
during General Jubal Early’s raid in the summer of 1864. A young lieuten-
ant, prob ably Oliver Wendell Holmes, not recognizing his commander in 
chief shouted “get down, you damn fool, before you get shot.” “With his 
long frock coat and plug hat on,” concluded another observer, “he made a 
con spic u ous figure.”15
The president traveled several times to the  Virginia battlefront and, of 
course, as we all know, once to Gettysburg to consecrate the national cem-
etery  there. In 1864 he spoke briefly about the meaning of the word “lib-
erty” and the massacre of black soldiers at Fort Pillow at a fund- raising event 
for the Sanitary Commission in Baltimore.16 He took carriage rides with 
his wife, and he went to the theater over a hundred times during his years 
in Washington. But  there is no behind- the- scenes Lincoln who socialized 
with Washington society or, like Warren Harding, hosted poker games with 
friends in the  family quarters or talked politics, as Lincoln himself had 
done so avidly in his early years in Springfield at Joshua Speed’s store. He 
had no kitchen cabinet; he also had no privacy.
Instead, most mornings Lincoln got up early, ate an apple or a boiled egg, 
drank some coffee at 8:30 with his wife and sons, and then worked late into 
the night with breaks in his day only for a light lunch and a hearty dinner. He 
never drank wine or what this generation of Americans called spirits. Surely 
he was one of the hardest working and simplest—in his domestic demands—
of all our presidents. His wife once wrote a friend that she was “lucky if by 
eleven  o’clock he was ready to join me in my chamber.”17  Those who had 
known him in Springfield and saw him  later during the war recognized 
the toll that the presidency had taken physically, though Lincoln had al-
ways been gaunt and underweight.
Besides serving as the workplace for the president, in its second function 
the White House was where ceremonial occasions of the nation took place 
(figs. 2–4). Again, most Eu ro pean governments separated the two purposes 
to spare overworked officials from the commotions, pressures, and for some 
15David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York, 1995), p. 519.
16Basler, Collected Works, 7:301–3.
17Turner and Turner, Mary Todd Lincoln, p. 187.
Fig.  2. “New Year’s Reception at the White House, Washington,” Illustrated London 
News, Feb. 1, 1862. (Courtesy Donald R. Kennon)
Fig.  3. “ Grand Reception at the White House, January  1862,” Harper’s Weekly, 
Jan. 25, 1862. (Courtesy Donald R. Kennon)
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public officials, pleasures of social occasions. But in the United States, in 
the downstairs rooms of the White House— especially the  grand East Room, 
with its twenty- two- foot ceilings, but also the smaller Blue and Red Rooms, 
the latter, with its crimson and gold upholstery and curtains, being Mary 
Lincoln’s favorite— the president and his lady met “the  people” as well as 
congressmen, judges, and foreign dignitaries. Immediately  after the inau-
guration, the First Lady had initiated her expensive pro cess of White House 
rehabilitation and redecoration that eventually turned  these rooms into 
elegant public spaces.
Mary Lincoln did not wait to entertain  until  after the new, elegant pale 
green rug for the East Room had arrived, and in time she and her husband 
used all the  great rooms on the first floor for an array of receptions and pub-
lic events, to which a  great cross- section of Americans came. Their first 
Fig. 4. “ Grand Reception of the Notabilities of the Nation at the White House, 1865,” 
lithograph print of the reception for Lincoln’s second inauguration, Major and Knapp 
Engraving, Manufacturing and Lithographic Co., [1865]. (Library of Congress Prints and 
Photo graphs Division)
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function, on March 28, took place amid the smell of paint and varnish, 
as many of the downstairs public rooms  were undergoing a refurbishing. 
“Mrs. Lincoln bore the fatigue of the two and a half hour siege with  great 
patience,” wrote one observer. “She appeared remarkably well and per-
formed her part of the honors, in response to the  grand ovation paid to her 
as well as to her honored husband with an unreserved dignity which is much 
more becoming for the wife of a Republican president than it would be an 
attempt to ape the sycophantic haughty manner of Eu ro pean courts, as has 
been done in the past.”18
Soon the lines for public receptions stretched out the door, and the Wash-
ington pickpockets discovered their best targets in the unguarded White 
House coat rooms. “Mrs. Lincoln and the President,” wrote Commissioner 
of the Public Buildings Benjamin B. French about an event in 1863, “had 
such an event as I have never seen in the daytime. Mrs. L. appeared lively 
and gracious and received with an air of grace and dignity.”19
During the Civil War  these receptions took up private  family time and 
certainly some of the president’s energy, even as they sustained public mo-
rale. “I met the president and his lady,” wrote one soldier who, fresh from 
the  Virginia battlefield in 1862, was inspired by the president’s easy man-
ner and his wife’s graciousness. He was surprised that “ every person has a 
right to go through the rooms of the White House.”20 But this was the demo-
cratic way in the  People’s House.
Eu ro pean travelers  were surprised as well at the inclusiveness. Ernest 
Duvergier de Hauranne was astonished that no one needed a formal invi-
tation or a frock coat to be admitted, as was the case in his native France: 
“The servants  don’t have the authority to refuse admittance on the ground 
of muddy boots or disreputable clothes to any patriotic citizen  eager to meet 
his president.”21 Yet both Lincolns understood the importance of opening 
the White House to the public, and they did so with a frequency and a style 
that had not been seen since Dolley Madison’s tenure. As William Crook, a 
doorman who served in five administrations, wrote about the Lincoln White 
18Esther Singleton, The Story of the White House, 2 vols. (New York, 1907), 2:71–72.
19Journal of Benjamin French, Feb. 15, 1863, Benjamin French Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
20William C. Davis, Lincoln’s Men: How President Lincoln Became  Father to an Army and a 
Nation (New York, 1999), p. 59.
21Ernest Duvergier de Hauranne, A Frenchman in Lincoln’s Amer i ca, trans. and ed. 
Ralph H. Bowen (Chicago, 1947–50), p. 357.
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House, “by design no  matter what it did to the president’s concentration, 
never was the House so entirely given over to the public as during Lincoln’s 
administration. The times  were too tense to make of social affairs anything 
other than an aid to more serious  matters.”22
Thus, even on such social occasions that might have provided relaxation, 
the private Lincoln merged with the war time leader, always on call, always 
engaged in some public duty. At  these receptions, the president stood pa-
tiently for three and four hours shaking hands with the citizenry. But as the 
French visitor Hauranne noted, “Lincoln was a farmer and his hands can 
take the terrible punishment.”23 But  because the White House mixed private 
and public functions, the Lincolns  were on constant public display.
What Lincoln earlier thought frivolous now emerged as confidence- 
raising affairs intended to build the optimism of the  people and symbo-
lically show foreign ministers from Confederate- leaning nations like 
Britain’s Lord Lyons and France’s Henri Mercier that the United States 
was no weak, debilitated, failed nation that could not even pay for improve-
ments to the president’s home.  These social events— what the president 
called his “Handshake Days”— became moments when serious  matters of 
state  were discussed, and with a  simple handshake he could honor a soldier’s 
commitment to the nation.
But the largest events could not begin  until the soldiers who  were billeted 
during the spring of 1861 in the East Room, to Willie and Tad’s delight, had 
left and Washington seemed secure from a Confederate attack. Thereafter, 
with the Marine Band stationed in the hall and lanterns outside marking 
even the smallest Union victory, former Washington snobs who believed the 
Lincolns unmannered rural folk from the frontier agreed with French’s 
observation about Mrs. Lincoln’s grace and dignity.
At  these events the First Lady scintillated in her elegant dresses (figs. 
5–6)— some borrowed,  others created by her talented seamstress, Elizabeth 
Keckley. A reporter from Frank Leslie’s Illustrated News described her “lustrous 
white satin robe with a train a yard in length, trimmed with one deep flounce 
of the richest black chantilly lace. Mrs. Lincoln possesses that rare beauty 
which rendered the empress of the French so celebrated as a  grand dame 
22William Crook, Through Five Administrations: Reminiscences of Col o nel William H. Crook, 
ed. Margarita Spalding Gerry (New York, 1910), p. 17.
23Hauranne, A Frenchman in Lincoln’s Amer i ca, p. 357.
Fig. 5. Carte de visite photo graph of Mary Todd Lincoln standing, Brady’s National 
Photographic Portrait Galleries [1861]. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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 woman.”24 A senator from Oregon, James Nesmith, was more down to earth. 
Having met Mrs. Lincoln at an eve ning party, he described his hostess as 
having “a flower pot on her head and her milking apparatus on display.”25
24Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, Feb. 5, 1862.
25Senator Nesmith to my wife, Feb. 5, 1862, Ruth Randall Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress.
Fig.  6. Carte de visite photo graph of Mary Todd Lincoln seated holding flowers, 
Brady’s National Photographic Portrait Galleries [1861]. (Library of Congress Prints and 
Photo graphs Division)
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The third essential function of the White House was to serve as the home 
of the president’s  family—in this case his wife and the three surviving Lin-
coln sons: Robert, who was mostly away as a student at Harvard, eleven- 
year- old Willie, and the irrepressible nine- year- old Tad. The  family quarters 
of eight rooms  were on the west side of the second floor of the mansion, with 
the library or  family room and the parents’ adjoining bedrooms on the south 
side and the boys’ bedrooms across the hall on the north side. A staff of over 
ten African Americans served as cooks, cleaners, and doorkeepers. Lincoln 
had brought William Johnson, a young black man from Springfield, whom 
the president described as “honest, faithful, sober industrious and handy as 
a servant.”26 Most respected was William Slade, the keeper of the White 
House keys, a factotum who served as a messenger, arranged functions, and 
even brought his sons to play with the Lincoln boys.
The boys, considered spoiled and ill mannered by some visitors, roamed 
everywhere in their new home, once disrupting the bell system used to call 
the servants who staffed the White House. On another occasion the boys 
dressed Nannie and Nanko, their pet goats, in festive outfits and led them 
proudly through a reception in the East Room. And  there was the time when 
Tad somehow discovered a Confederate flag, climbed to the roof of the 
White House, and was seen waving the flag. But that was early in the war. 
The behind- the- scenes White House included episodes of hilarity with Tad 
and Willie, and at the time Americans reveled in reports of the antics of 
 these boys, for the Lincolns  were the first presidential  couple to bring young 
 children to the White House since John Tyler’s ten- year- old son had lived 
 there twenty years before.
The boys  were homeschooled by tutor Alexander Williamson, who came 
even on Sundays, and by their  mother. Like their parents they spent most 
of their days in the White House or on the grounds with their ponies. One 
of the few unalloyed pleasures the president had was being with his sons 
(fig. 7). He wrestled with them, he read to them, he chased them, and he 
never reprimanded them when they hid  under the  table when the cabinet 
was meeting, or in the provocative Tad’s case, pulled the beards of his cabi-
net officers. The motto of the Lincolns, according to one observer, was “Let 
the  Children have a good time.”27
26John Washington, They Knew Lincoln (New York, 1942), p. 127.
27Julia Taft Bayne, Tad Lincoln’s  Father (Boston, 1931), p. 107.
Fig. 7. Abraham Lincoln, seated and holding a book, with his son Tad (Thomas) lean-
ing on a  table, photo graph by Alexander Gardner, Feb.  5, 1865. (Library of Congress 
Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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Among the unfortunate legacies of this tricentric White House was the 
inability of the Lincolns to avoid the patronage seekers who  were often 
aligned on the  grand staircase with its mahogany handrail waiting to see 
the president in what Lincoln called “the  Great Beggar’s Opera.” It was nec-
essary for Mary Lincoln to climb over them on her way to her bedroom. 
The only structural change that Lincoln made to the White House was to 
cut a door between his anteroom and the library, which served as the  family 
living room on the south side of the mansion, so that, at least on the second 
floor, he could avoid the public. Given the location of  these functions in one 
building, it is obvious that the president could never expect the distance and 
privacy he might have attained in another setting.
Two episodes reveal the joys and sorrows of Lincoln’s life in the White 
House, just as they also reveal the interaction among Lincoln’s work, his so-
cial occasions, and his  family life. An impatient Lincoln had reason to be-
lieve that General George McClellan might never move his soldiers beyond 
the parade grounds, where all of Washington gathered to watch the snappy 
drills on what is now the Washington Mall. The Lincolns observed them as 
well from the south portico. In January 1862 the president signed a special 
command designated as the President’s War Order No. 1. It required a gen-
eral forward movement of the Union forces to take place on February 22.
Ignoring the president’s  orders, General McClellan instead deci ded on 
an oblique advance to Richmond by way of the peninsula between the York 
and James rivers. And so began the Peninsula Campaign—an intricate and 
in some ways foolish operation involving over 100,000 troops, by sea down 
the Potomac River to Norfolk and then by land to the Confederate capital 
of Richmond. Lincoln was apprehensive about the scale of an operation that 
left Washington undefended, and he was especially worried during the win-
ter months of 1862.
His wife had her own reasons to be ner vous. With her typical élan she 
was organ izing a  grand party to raise the spirits of  those in this dreary win-
ter, planned for February  5. She had invited officers, ambassadors, con-
gressmen, and their families. A caterer from New York had been hired, thus 
irritating the local Washington tradesmen, and the flowers came from Phil-
adelphia. The Marine Band played the new “Mary Lincoln Polka,” com-
posed especially for the occasion, along with se lections from operas. But 
 there was no dancing during war time at the White House. Instead, the hostess 
had planned a splendid scene in the dining room with vases of flowers and 
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delicacies made of sugar— one was a replica of Fort Pickens— roast pheasant 
and beef. Lincoln was suspicious of the scale of the party, but his wife, like 
other middle- class  women in the republic, nearly always made the decisions 
about social affairs in this age of domestic feminism.
 There was a  great deal of sickness in Washington during the Christmas 
season, and in late January 1862 Willie Lincoln fell ill with a cold that soon 
turned into fever and chills. Mary Lincoln wanted to cancel the party, but 
her husband discouraged this. On the day of the reception, Willie took a 
turn for the worse and both Lincolns sat by his bedside during most of the 
party. A local doctor encouraged the parents to go downstairs, though they 
 were as often in Willie’s room as at the party. The next day, along with some 
newspaper reports that it was inappropriate to have such an extravagant 
party during war time, one newspaper reporting on Willie’s illness included 
the news that his younger  brother Tad was sick as well.
For days the Lincolns sat by both boys’ beds, though it was Willie who 
was wasting away. Having already lost their second son Eddie from tuber-
culosis, the Lincolns  were especially apprehensive.  There  were remissions 
and relapses as typhoid fever cruelly assaulted the eleven- year- old boy’s body. 
Most likely the bacteria had come from the contaminated  water now piped 
into the mansion from the Potomac River, a supposed improvement that 
had turned lethal once the Union army began using the river as a latrine.
On February 20, 1862, Willie Lincoln died, and no one in the  family was 
ever the same. John Nicolay remembered the president coming to his bed-
side and saying, “ ‘Well, Nicolay, my boy is gone—he is actually gone!’ And 
then the president burst into tears.”28 While the president might meld his 
loss into the grief of other parents who  were losing their sons on the battle-
field, for Mary Lincoln  there would never be any consolation. And so on 
the grim, cold day of the funeral four days  later, Abraham Lincoln and his 
eldest son, Robert, helped Mary Lincoln down the stairs into the Green 
Room, where they stayed for half an hour, saying their private farewell to 
the dead boy. In Washington they gossiped that Mary Lincoln believed her 
son’s death a judgment for her party, but it was not gossip that she had turned 
to the spiritualists for comfort.
28Elizabeth Keckley,  Behind the Scenes; or, Thirty Years a Slave and Four Years in the White 
House (1868; reprint ed., New York, 1968), pp. 46–48.
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A  later episode also gives some of the flavor of the Lincoln White House. 
It too stands at the intersection of the ceremonial, familial, and executive 
functions of the White House. Throughout the war Mary Lincoln, with her 
Kentucky roots and drawl, had been accused of being a Southern spy. When 
the First Lady’s half  brothers joined the Confederate army and her half  sister 
married a Confederate general (earlier Lincoln had offered him a commis-
sion as an army pay master for the Union), the gossip intensified. Lincoln’s 
brother- in- law Ben Helm chose the Confederacy and was killed at the  battle 
of Chickamauga in 1863. Needing to go through Union lines to return home 
to Lexington, Kentucky, his  widow, Emilie Todd Helm, Mary Lincoln’s fa-
vorite half  sister, was required to take an oath of allegiance to the Union 
government— which she refused to do. Informed of this, Lincoln telegraphed 
“Send her to me.”
And so Emilie Helm, a rabid Confederate, arrived at the White House 
with a military escort in December 1863. It is a mea sure of Lincoln as a loyal 
 family man that he met his half sister- in- law “with the warmest affection.” 
In her diary Emilie wrote that “we  were all too grief- stricken at first for 
speech. I have lost my husband and they have lost their fine  little son 
Willie.”29 In the  family quarters Emilie provided some solace to Mary Lin-
coln, but  there  were po liti cal consequences to having a Confederate in the 
White House.
One eve ning two Union generals came to confer with Lincoln. One was 
General Daniel Sickles, the former congressman from New York who had 
lost a leg at the  battle of Gettysburg. Sickles was a notable womanizer who 
shared Mary Lincoln’s interest in séances and who wanted to meet the lovely 
Emilie in the  family quarters, perhaps even to flirt with her. But instead an 
angry exchange in the Blue Room between Emilie, Sickles, and Congress-
man Ira Harris, who had just lost his son in the Union army, ensued. Re-
sponding to a comment about recent rebel defeats at Chattanooga, Emilie 
retorted that this “was the example you set for them at Bull Run and Manas-
sas.” “If I had twenty sons they would all be fighting yours,” said Emilie as 
tempers flared.30
When Sickles and Harris complained to the president that he should not 
have a rebel living in the White House, Lincoln responded that “my wife 
29Katherine Helm, The True Story of Mary, Wife of Lincoln (New York, 1928), p. 221.
30Ibid., p. 230.
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and I are in the habit of choosing our own guests.”31 In this episode the 
configuration of the White House— its public rooms for entertainment, its 
position as the official office of the executive, and its  family rooms all located 
in the same building— denied privacy to the  family.
Certainly a separate home away from the business of the republic would 
have shielded Mary Lincoln from the intense scrutiny that included the re-
ports that she was having séances in the White House. A well- known spiri-
tualist had been seen entering the White House, and it was no secret that 
Mary Lincoln went to Georgetown to consult with spiritualists. On several 
occasions mediums or ga nized séances in the Green Room, and as Mary told 
Emilie Helm, Eddie and Willie sometimes returned as comforting spectral 
presences. As a Presbyterian, the First Lady believed that when she died she 
would join her two sons in heaven through the pro cess of resurrection, but 
in the meantime the mediums could place a bereaved  mother in immediate 
touch with her sons.
For the rest of her life Mary Lincoln accepted the essential doctrine of 
the spiritualist that  there was “a very slight veil separating us from the 
loved and lost” and that with the proper suggestion, attitude, and circum-
stances, the departed could return.32 Such convictions emerged as a popu lar 
phenomenon during the Civil War when the deaths of young soldiers encour-
aged bereaved families to try to communicate with the dead. But for other 
Americans, such goings-on in the White House sullied the dignity of the 
mansion and directed more criticism at the First Lady.
On April 14, 1865, Abraham Lincoln spent his last day in the White 
House. He had arisen early and breakfasted with his wife and his son Rob-
ert on nothing more than an apple. Then he returned to his office, where 
he conducted several interviews, signed papers, and met with the cabinet. 
It was a typical day, though his spirits  were high. The president had already 
traveled to Richmond, the defeated capital of the Confederacy, and he told 
his wife that he felt that the war was fi nally over. Lincoln ate no lunch, but 
in the after noon he and Mary took a carriage  ride. She noted how cheerful 
he seemed, and they spoke of their  future together with the terrible burden 
of the war lifted. Abraham Lincoln had an early dinner, and a  little  later 
picked up his top hat and joined his wife for their carriage  ride to Ford’s 
31Ibid., p. 231.
32Turner, Mary Todd Lincoln, p. 256; Baker, Mary Todd Lincoln, p. 220.
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Theatre. He never returned to the home where he had lived for more than 
four years.
In the last analy sis, when Mary and her two sons Tad and Robert left 
the White House six weeks  later in May 1865,  every member of the dimin-
ished Lincoln  family could remember their enjoyment of some aspect of the 
White House— its parties, its grounds, even the spacious grandeur of its 
rooms and corridors. One time Lincoln had reminded a regiment of sol-
diers on their way home to Ohio that he was not a permanent resident of 
the White House: “I happen temporarily to occupy this big White House. 
I am a living witness that any one of your  children may look to come  here 
as my  father’s child has. And like my  father’s son, your son may live  here.”33 
The constitutional arrangement that ensured a constant turnover of White 
House occupants was part of the nation’s birthright and one of the reasons 
Lincoln believed that the war was being fought. The states of the Confed-
eracy had,  after all, denied the legitimacy of his right to live  there.
In diff er ent ways,  these four years had devastated the  little band of five 
who had taken up residence in March 1861. One Lincoln son had died, leav-
ing his parents and younger  brother bereft. Meanwhile, Mary Lincoln had 
worked hard in her ceremonial role, only to lose a son and a husband dur-
ing her residence. And while Lincoln was not assassinated in the White 
House, its lack of security surely emboldened potential conspirators. Like 
thousands of other Americans during the Civil War, the Lincoln  family had 
endured war time casualties and, now depleted, faced a bleak  future beyond 
the White House.
33Basler, Collected Works, 7:512.
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Short ly  a f t e r noon on December 2, 1863, architect Thomas U. Walter ordered his construction crew to winch the last piece of the bronze 
statue Freedom to the top of the United States Capitol and bolt it into place 
(fig. 1). It was a cold, clear, still day: no wind, which was impor tant for Wal-
ter’s ironworkers, perched on a small wooden platform 300 feet above the 
Capitol’s front yard. When Walter first came to work at the Capitol in 1851, 
the Capitol grounds  were well manicured and elegant. Not now. On this 
day they  were a chill, muddy mess, churned up by countless wagons loaded 
with stone, lumber, pipe, bricks, and multi- ton pieces of cast iron. Derelict 
sheds, scattered marble boulders, piles of trash, and other assorted junk dot-
ted the grounds, seeming to underscore the grim real ity of a city beset by 
war for more than two and a half years.
Vicksburg and Gettysburg had put the Union in a better military posi-
tion than it had enjoyed for some time, but winter had brought no jubila-
tion in Washington, and Walter had no illusions. He had two sons in the 
Union army and one son who had repudiated the Union and joined the Con-
federate army. “Should that be the case,” he wrote to a friend, “I  shall 
never again acknowledge him as belonging to me.1
1Walter to John Rice, May 8, 1861, Thomas Ustick Walter Collection, Archives of 
American Art, Athenaeum, Philadelphia, roll 4140.
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By mid-1862 the prodigal had repented, but Walter would “let bygones 
be bygones,” he wrote, only if he took a loyalty oath.2 His wife and younger 
 children  were living in Philadelphia, leaving him to rent a beat-up  house at 
exorbitant rates. Housing in war time Washington was at a premium.
Civility was not. Neighbors routinely dumped garbage in the vacant lot 
next door to Walter’s digs. Teenage rock throwers had broken the win dows 
in his bathroom.3 A few months earlier a rabid dog had stumbled into his 
kitchen and terrorized the help.4 His  house man clubbed it to death in the 
cellar. Walter, a natu ral Panglossian, had once regarded the war as a petty, 
stupid dustup between headstrong  brothers. He knew better now. He no lon-
ger speculated on outcomes, but he expected a fight to the death.
With Walter’s considerable help, the Capitol during his tenure had tri-
pled in size from a glorified town hall to a rambling colossus that on this 
day dominated the D.C. landscape. Walter had designed the new Senate 
and House wings and the new cast- iron dome, and he well knew that the 
2Walter to Thomas Walter, Aug. 16, 1862, ibid.
3Walter to Amanda Walter, June 28 and July 22–25, 1862, ibid.
4Walter to Olivia Walter, June 11, 1863, ibid., roll 4141.
Fig. 1. “West front of the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., as it appeared the moment 
the statue [of Freedom] was completed, and placed in position by Charles F. Thomas,” 
December 2, 1863, photo graph. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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Capitol was the greatest achievement of his long and already illustrious 
 career. Mounting Freedom Triumphant in War and Peace 5 was the finishing 
touch, and he welcomed it. But he had told his workers  there would be no 
ceremony to mark the event. He did not like ceremonies as a rule, and he 
saw no justification for any sort of cele bration in  these difficult times. He 
would treat Freedom’s final assembly as part of the workday. He instructed 
his crew:  there would be no waving of hats, no speeches, no brass bands, no 
prayers. Lincoln would not show up. He was ailing and, of course, had other 
 things on his mind. Reporters wanted to write stories about the dome, but 
Walter had given no interviews. He did, however, make one concession. He 
put a notice in local papers for  those who  were interested: barring inclem-
ent weather, the crowning of the Capitol would take place at noon.
Now the moment had arrived. As Walter looked out his office win dows, 
he could see thousands of  people gathered silently in the muck below him, 
gazing upward as Freedom’s head and feathered headdress  rose to the highest 
point in Washington. When the last screw was bolted in place at 12:25 p.m., 
twelve forts around the city, taking turns, fired a succession of thirty- five- 
gun salutes: one gun for each state— including  those in the Confederacy.6
This starkly  simple display of solidarity and hard- bitten defiance marked 
the coming of age of a national icon. Henceforth the Capitol would serve as 
a rallying point and a symbol of the growing reach of the federal govern-
ment and the  people it served. Eventually it would become the most presti-
gious emblem of representative democracy in the world— one of the most 
easily recognized buildings on earth. December 2, 1863, was the day that 
course was set.
It had taken a long time to reach that starting point, and the travails 
under gone by the proj ect known as the Capitol Extension closely tracked 
the changing fortunes of the country it served and the changing attitudes of 
the three men who built it. When Walter (fig. 2) began work at the Capitol 
in 1851, he was a slavery sympathizer and had even briefly owned a slave. 
By 1863 he had become a fire- and- brimstone abolitionist who welcomed the 
opportunity to hire a young freedman to work on his beloved proj ect.7 
5Freedom Triumphant in War and Peace was the name sculptor Thomas Crawford gave to 
his statue. History would come to know it simply as Freedom.
6Guy Gugliotta, Freedom’s Cap: The United States Capitol and the Coming of the Civil War 
(New York, 2012), pp. 365–67.
7Ibid., p. 366.
Fig. 2. Thomas U. Walter, photo graph, ca. 1860–65, Mathew Brady Photo graphs of 
the Civil War, Rec ord Group 111: Rec ords of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. 
(National Archives and Rec ords Administration, Still Pictures, College Park, Md.)
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Montgomery C. Meigs (fig. 3) was a lowly captain in the Army Corps of 
Engineers when he was ordered to build the extension in 1853. Ten years 
 later he was quartermaster general of the Union army, a logistical genius 
who built the supply lines that enabled Grant and Sherman to destroy the 
Confederacy.
The third member of this triumvirate, oddly enough, was Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis (fig. 4), who had embraced the idea of a new, ex-
panded Capitol and had obtained the proj ect’s first appropriation in 1850 
as a ju nior U.S. senator from Mississippi. From that moment  until he left 
Washington forever in 1861, Davis drove the proj ect forward both as a sen-
ator and as secretary of war  under President Franklin Pierce. In Decem-
ber 1863 he was in Richmond, planning the Confederacy’s  future  after 
disastrous defeats at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge in Tennes-
see. Meigs had personally supervised logistics during the campaign. In 
Washington ten years earlier, Davis had mentored Meigs and the younger 
officer had esteemed Davis without reservation. Now Meigs wanted to see 
him hanged.
The proj ect that began in 1850 generated minimal enthusiasm at first. 
The United States at that moment was a loose agglomeration of disparate, 
selfish provinces and districts defined by parochial interests. Congress 
showed up a few weeks before Christmas for the legislative session each year, 
and usually managed to finish its business before the following summer, 
when Washington’s weather became intolerable. Congress regarded the 
Capitol as an uncomfortable but necessary evil— site of the public trough 
where members of the Senate and House obtained federal money to build 
post offices, dig canals, and dredge harbors. Congress’s only certifiably en-
during “national” concern at the time was the  future of slavery, and even in 
1850  there was enough bitterness to infect virtually  every impor tant ques-
tion of public policy from international trade (high tariffs to protect North-
ern industry or low tariffs to allow cheap imports to the rural South and 
keep markets in Eu rope open to Southern cotton?) to the annexation of states 
(if a  free state was admitted, should  there also be a new slave state to bal-
ance it?). Enlarging the Capitol was a sideshow with a virtually non ex is tent 
priority.
But in the ensuing fourteen years, the fortunes of the United States and 
its most impor tant building took divergent paths. The dispute over slavery 
worsened from irritation, to dismay, to despair, to desperation, and fi nally 
Fig.  3. “Quartermaster General Montgomery  C. Meigs of the U.S. Army General 
Staff in uniform, holding papers,” March 1861, carte de visite. (Library of Congress Prints 
and Photo graphs Division)
Fig.  4. Jefferson Davis, three- quarter- length portrait facing right, Mathew Brady 
photo graph, ca. 1858–60. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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to rage and civil war. At the same time, however, enthusiasm for the new 
Capitol grew among both free- staters and slave- staters.
Reasons for this change in attitude are difficult to quantify, but an argu-
ment can be made based on the very nature of the Capitol and its city, and 
on the increasingly frustrated impulses of the United States Congress, an 
institution filled with men interested in accomplishing  things, rather than 
simply  doing nothing.
The biggest disadvantage that the Capitol had during the initial phase 
of the expansion was that it was in the District of Columbia, which had no 
voice, no vote, and, thus, no politics. No senator or representative could get 
anything he could use by  doing something for Washington— and  favors for 
the District would simply mean less largesse for states and districts. The city 
was easy to ignore, and lawmakers paid no po liti cal price for  doing so.
But as the de cade wore on, this disadvantage became an advantage. 
Washington had no stake in the slavery dispute. It would be what ever the 
winners wanted it to be. As such, investing in the Capitol became attrac-
tive. Senators and representatives always wanted to build big  things and 
put their names on them, and the Capitol was the rare big  thing in the 
1850s that did not carry any po liti cal baggage. Lawmakers could go home 
during the recess and show their constituents that even if they could not 
agree on a transcontinental railroad (southern route or northern route?) or 
an isthmian canal (slavery in Nicaragua?) they could at least do some-
thing big somewhere.
And fi nally, as despair deepened during the late 1850s, the Capitol be-
gan to acquire the first hints of a mystique. As a seat of government and a 
large public work, it became a symbol of American aspirations and enter-
prise. Americans  were arrogant, and lawmakers, even if they acted petty 
and small, thought big, dreamed big, and built big. Also, during impossibly 
hard times, the new Capitol became an emotional statement of hope. This 
was what the United States could be, Congress seemed to say, if only “we” 
could resolve “our” differences.
 These attitudes evolved slowly. In 1850, Washington, D.C., had just 40,000 
inhabitants. It was a made-up place— a ten- miles- square grid of perpendic-
ular streets and diagonal ave nues designed by French- born city planner 
Peter L’Enfant (he changed his name from Pierre to Peter when he settled 
in the United States) and installed between the slave states of  Virginia and 
Mary land just across the Potomac River from George Washington’s Mount 
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Vernon home. The federal government moved to the District of Columbia 
in 1800, but greatness did not follow; and, as Charles Dickens noted during 
a visit in 1842, the “city” remained an amalgam of wide ave nues “that be-
gin in nothing and lead nowhere” and streets “that only want  houses, roads 
and inhabitants.”8
“Congress House” had been conceived in 1792 by President George 
Washington and then– Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, who immedi-
ately renamed the building the Capitol.9 Over the next thirty- six years a 
succession of designers, architects, and contractors built it and rebuilt it ( after 
British soldiers torched it during the War of 1812). It had a central rotunda, 
flanked by a Senate chamber and committee offices on the north side and 
a House chamber and committee offices on the south side. The building was 
faced with Aquia sandstone from  Virginia and topped with a copper- 
sheathed wooden dome that almost every one agreed was both hideous and 
too tall. By 1850 nothing of substance had been done to enhance the build-
ing for twenty- two years.
Mississippi Senator Jefferson Davis used three arguments to sell the Cap-
itol Extension to his congressional colleagues. The first was mundane yet 
compelling, at least to the House of Representatives. The House chamber 
was universally regarded as a beautiful room, but it had dreadful acoustics; 
they  were so bad that the place was almost unusable. Many years  later this 
feature would become an entertaining curiosity for tourists visiting what 
came to be known as Statuary Hall, but it was not amusing in 1850. A con-
gressman seated in the  middle of the chamber could easily overhear a lob-
byist talking to one of his House colleagues across the room, but a floor 
speech taking place ten feet in front of him would be drowned in a bed-
lam of shouting and white noise. Several congressional observers had 
suggested— and not in jest— that the reason that members  were routinely 
at one another’s throats over slavery was  because they spent most of their 
legislative day screaming in one another’s  faces in order to be heard.10 A 
8Charles Dickens, American Notes (1842; reprint ed., New York, 1992), pp. 156–61.
9William C. Allen, History of the United States Capitol: A Chronicle of Design, Construction, and 
Politics, Senate Doc. 106-29, 106th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C., 2001), p. 8.
10Robert Mills to the Senate and House of Representatives, Feb. 22, 1850, in Robert 
Mills, The Papers of Robert Mills 1781–1855, ed. Pamela Scott (Wilmington, Del., 1990), 
microfilm, reel 10, item 2731A.
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Capitol extension would bring a new chamber. Davis, not surprisingly, had 
plenty of House support.
The second reason for expansion was also obvious. The United States in 
1848 had won a huge new tract of territory as spoils of the recently concluded 
Mexican War. A year  later gold was discovered in the westernmost part of 
it. By 1850, California had 90,000  people and needed to become a state. That 
said nothing about the vast expanses of mostly empty, still unannexed ter-
ritory from the Louisiana Purchase.  There  were thirty states in the Union 
when 1850 dawned, and thirty- three by the end of the de cade (California, 
Minnesota, and Oregon), with several  others standing in line. Congress 
needed a bigger Capitol  because the existing building was simply too small.
 These arguments, however, did not kindle much urgency, especially in 
the Senate, which had good acoustics and plenty of room. Building a new 
Capitol put money in Washington and kept it out of individual states. It was 
self- evident that the United States would get bigger and that the government 
would inevitably grow, but  there was no reason to do anything now. Expand-
ing the Capitol was the sort of long- term necessity that could be easily 
ignored and—in typical congressional fashion— kicked down the road. Let 
somebody  else worry about it.
But it was Davis’s third reason that turned out to be prophetic, even 
though Congress hardly noticed it at the time, and greeted it with skepti-
cism, if not outright derision. The United States needed a bigger Capitol, 
Davis told his Senate colleagues,  because a  great nation needed a  great seat 
of government. As the Mexican War had proved, the country was putting 
on muscle  every day, and immigrants  were flooding in amid robust national 
economic growth. The United States could not have a House chamber that 
was unfit for intelligent debate, and it would not do to have increasing num-
bers of senators and representatives crammed into overstuffed committee 
rooms and chambers. The United States was destined to become a global 
force. It was time to act like it.
It is not clear that Davis intended to make this argument when his pro-
posal for an initial appropriation of $100,000 for the Capitol Extension came 
up for debate, and he did not articulate it in so many words. But  there was 
no mistaking his meaning. He was a forceful man, a formidable debater, 
and a vicious rhetorical counterpuncher. He did not easily abide  people who 
disagreed with him, and he was not shy about saying so.
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The debate opened on September 20, 1850, and lasted four days.  There 
was plenty of opposition. Michigan’s Lewis Cass, loser to Zachary Taylor 
in the 1848 presidential election and a sour- voiced Demo cratic Party elder 
statesman, remarked that the Capitol was the “worst building on the face 
of the earth for the purpose to which it is devoted,” and he had no interest 
“in voting for the creation of another like it.”11
Several senators reminded their colleagues that government programs, 
once born, seldom die, and what appeared to be a modest investment  today 
would inevitably be seen in retrospect as just the first drop in what would 
become a very big bucket.
Davis, who at first had carefully described his request as “just an esti-
mate” of the cost, but one that “ will approach very nearly the amount re-
quired,” then took the floor.12 He agreed with his critics. It was true that 
the final cost “ will be limited only by the degree of the extension.” But that 
was beside the point: “if this Union continues together, and this continues 
to be the seat of Government, I have no idea that any plan which may now 
be suggested  will fi nally answer all the wants of the country.” In the context 
of burgeoning U.S. power, he suggested, the Capitol represents who we 
are, and in the end Congress might need to “cover the  whole square with 
buildings, and I think it is likely.”13 He carried the vote, but it was a near 
 thing, 24–21.
From that day  until January 19, 1861, when he left Washington to join 
the Confederacy, Davis was the po liti cal driving force  behind the expan-
sion of the U.S. Capitol. It is prob ably safe to say that Davis is the reason 
the modern Capitol looks the way it does. What is not clear is how Davis 
came to this leadership position, and, even more puzzling, how he came to 
have such an overriding national vision at a time when the horizon for most 
Americans— including members of Congress— was the ridgeline that de-
fined the border of their county or state.
Virtually all of Davis’s personal correspondence was destroyed when 
Union forces raided his Mississippi plantation in 1863, so  there is no rec ord 
of how his thinking evolved during the period before the Civil War. But one 
11U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Documentary History of the Construction and 
Development of the United States Capitol Buildings and Grounds, House Rep. no. 646, 58th Cong., 
2d sess. (Washington, D.C., 1904), p. 442.
12Ibid., p. 441.
13Ibid., p. 443.
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aspect of his early biography seems instructive. He was the youn gest child 
of a frontier Mississippi planter, but spent perhaps half of the first forty years 
of his life away from home. His  family sent him to boarding schools, includ-
ing the United States Military Acad emy at West Point, and he spent a good 
piece of his early adulthood in the army,  either as a young subaltern on the 
western frontier or as the regimental commander of Mississippi volunteers 
during the Mexican War. By the time he arrived in the Senate in 1848, he 
had seen and lived in the South, the East, the Midwest, and the Southwest. 
He undoubtedly had a far better idea of the im mense territory and potential 
of the United States than the vast majority of his countrymen.14
He cultivated this national perspective and coaxed it forward through-
out the 1850s while overseeing the Capitol proj ect. At the same time, by con-
trast, he used the de cade to cement his reputation as an out spoken advocate 
for slavery and an eloquent opponent of federal encroachments on states’ 
rights. He did as much as anyone to promote the Union’s destiny as a  great 
nation; and he did as much as anyone to cripple the Union’s path to nation-
hood.  There is no evidence that he ever saw the contradiction in his two 
competing personae, and  there are no overt clues showing how he concluded 
that nationalism and sectionalism could coexist in defi nitely— which, in the 
end, they could not.
Once again, however,  there is a hint. Davis had a close, almost filial re-
lationship with his former father- in- law Zachary Taylor, his commander 
during the Mexican War and his dear friend up  until Taylor, elected presi-
dent in 1848, died suddenly two years  later. Although Taylor was one of the 
biggest slave  owners in the country, he was utterly convinced that slavery 
would never extend beyond the states where it already existed. He had flatly 
told Davis that he would never argue for slavery in new states.15 Davis cat-
egorically disagreed with Taylor’s stance but never challenged him pub-
licly, and perhaps harbored the wish that sectionalism and nationalism might 
fi nally find common ground— that the  future of slavery could somehow be 
resolved to every one’s satisfaction, or at least papered over somehow and 
ignored.
14See Gugliotta, Freedom’s Cap, pp. 39–42, for a discussion of Davis’s early travels.
15Zachary Taylor to Jefferson Davis, Aug. 16, 1847, in Lynda Lasswell Crist et al., eds., 
The Papers of Jefferson Davis, 15 vols. (Baton Rouge, La., 1971–2015), 3:208–15.
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Regardless of his motivations or hopes, it was quickly obvious that 
 Davis’s patronage was crucial in the Capitol Extension’s early years, for with-
out it, the proj ect nearly found ered.  After Congress passed the initial 
appropriation, Davis and,  later, President Millard Fillmore undertook con-
tests to choose a design and pick an architect to execute it. Davis went home 
when Congress recessed in March 1851 as this pro cess unfolded and  later 
allowed Demo crats to induce him to run for governor of Mississippi in an 
attempt to resurrect party fortunes  after a disastrous campaign by the ini-
tial candidate. Davis made up lost ground but could not overcome his early 
disadvantage and lost narrowly. He had resigned his Senate seat and so in 
late 1851 “retired” to his riverside plantation.
Both Davis and Fillmore advocated a horizontal design for the Capitol 
Extension, putting new Senate and House wings on the north and south ends 
of the existing building to create a rambling, broad facade— giving it a wel-
coming and open aspect, despite its im mense size. Fillmore, a Whig, hired 
Walter, also a Whig, as his architect.
The final design (fig. 5) was an amalgam of concepts developed during 
the contests. Walter had authored none of the preferred drawings, but he nev-
ertheless proved a masterful choice for the job. He was a brilliant draftsman, 
an innovative designer, a quick worker, and an able synthesizer, well equipped 
to turn the preferences and ideas of clients— including politicians— into art. 
The precocious son of a Philadelphia bricklayer, Walter, at forty- six, was at 
the height of his powers. He had designed more than 300 structures by his 
own estimate and had become prob ably the most highly paid architect in 
the country. He was aggressive, smart, and tough, and he needed all  these 
attributes almost immediately.
Walter’s prob lem was that Fillmore, his patron, was a lame duck, and 
Congress had Demo cratic majorities in both  houses. The Capitol Extension 
was a way to smear both the administration and the Whigs generally. The 
opportunity arose at the end of 1851, when the initial appropriation ran out 
and Walter,  because of  either inexperience or carelessness, forgot to apply 
for new money. Construction stopped, workers  were laid off, the Capitol 
grounds  were a mess, and Congress began to question both the wisdom of 
the proj ect generally and Walter’s competence and honesty.
Several of the arguments during  these early days reflected lawmakers’ 
dismissive attitude  toward government and  toward anything— even a 
building— that appeared to enhance federal power. This view could embrace 
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many prejudices. Po liti cal concerns back home prescribed public disdain 
for an elaborate building that could be said to reflect Eu ro pean “de cadence” 
or “pretentiousness.” Anything that did not extol the backwoods virtues 
of industry and Puritan simplicity was seen—at least publicly—as an ex-
travagance and an embarrassment.16
Other opponents had a diff er ent idea. Why lavish public moneys on a 
building that should be somewhere  else? The nation was growing, spread-
ing westward. It was time to move the capital city— and the Capitol—to 
Ohio, St. Louis, or Chicago. This argument had a veneer of nationalism, 
but  those who made it  were usually from the states that had a chance to host 
the proposed new venues.17 Building a new Capitol, and especially a new 
capital city, meant jobs. Why should Washington, D.C., get them?
The third argument was never forthrightly articulated, but it was clear 
that several Southerners wished to halt Capitol construction  because, even 
in 1852, they did not want to put money into a building in the capital of a 
country that they intended to abandon. This, perhaps, was the motivation 
for a prolonged and quite brilliant attack on additional Capitol Extension 
funding mounted by Arkansas Demo cratic Senator Solon Borland, a noted 
16Documentary History, p. 498.
17Ibid., p. 488.
Fig. 5. “North east view of the Capitol at Washington, with the new extension,” en-
graved by J. Steel, the original by T. U. Walter [Philadelphia, 1852]. (Library of Congress 
Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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proslavery hardliner. He was ultimately unsuccessful but managed to smear 
the proj ect and rally opposition to it without ever explaining his true 
objective.18
The motives for the personal attacks on Walter  were more transparently 
po liti cal and self- interested. He was a Whig appointee in a  dying Whig ad-
ministration who, at one point, in 1851 had more than 800 men working for 
him digging the foundations.  After the government itself, Walter was un-
doubtedly the biggest single employer in the district.  There  were a dozen 
rivals— many of them contest losers— who wanted his job for the prestige it 
brought, and just as many congressional hacks and lobbyists who wanted 
the job for the patronage it brought. Walter endured a constant stream of 
criticism and vilification for supposed incompetence and corruption through-
out 1852, but it was never  really pos si ble to tell  whether  these assaults arose 
from a desire to throw mud at the Whigs or from  simple greed. None of 
the charges ever amounted to anything, but serious damage was done to 
Walter’s reputation, and his days— and, perhaps, the days of the Capitol 
Extension— appeared numbered when the new Demo cratic administration 
of President Franklin Pierce arrived in March 1853.
The Capitol’s rise from a legislative sideshow to a point of congressional 
pride began with the advent of Pierce and was pushed forward by Jefferson 
Davis, who returned to Washington as secretary of war and shortly became 
one of the new president’s closest advisers. Within days of Davis’s arrival, 
the secretary of the interior, who was in charge of the Capitol, contacted 
him to see if he would send an army engineer to run the proj ect. Walter, 
already bruised, was about to take an even more severe beating from con-
gressional investigators, and regardless of his ultimate fate, the proj ect itself 
appeared to be in  great jeopardy.
Davis lost no time in taking action. It was a superb idea, and Davis liked 
it so much that within days he had induced Pierce to transfer authority over 
the proj ect to the War Department. A few days  after that, Davis named 
Captain Meigs as engineer in charge, reporting directly to him. Now he 
“owned” the proj ect, and his man was  running it. He left Walter in place 
but had him working  under Meigs.19
18Ibid., pp. 498–502.
19See Gugliotta, Freedom’s Cap, pp. 136–40, for a discussion of Meigs’s se lection.
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It was a bureaucratic masterstroke. The sharks in Congress had been 
focused on Walter, but suddenly Walter no longer mattered. He could stay 
or depart. He was no longer hiring the workforce or signing the checks. 
Opponents of the proj ect and patronage seekers lost interest in ousting 
him practically overnight.
Now  there was Meigs, but, as a lowly captain, he did not  matter  either. 
If lawmakers wanted to make trou ble, they  were  going to have to take on 
Davis, arguably the second- most power ful man in Washington. This was 
not a task to be undertaken lightly. Davis was smart, acerbic, intimidating, 
and capable of terrible rages, holding grudges, and ruthlessly taking ret-
ribution. He was very hard on anyone who crossed him. The chairman of 
the House Committee on Buildings and Grounds, a Capitol Extension ad-
vocate whom Davis had ignored during the 1850–51 planning for the ex-
tension, early in the Pierce administration mounted a campaign against 
“military rule” over civilian public works proj ects.20 Very shortly thereafter 
he lost his committee chairmanship.
The added benefit during this period of change was that Meigs turned 
out to be just as tough and smart as Davis and Walter. He was only thirty- 
six when he took over at the Capitol, and, like many of his Corps of Engi-
neers colleagues, he had spent most of his  career building forts and  doing 
surveys in the country’s nether reaches. He did not have much of a résumé 
at the time, but the corps regarded him as an up- and- comer and had also 
assigned him the job of building the Washington Aqueduct, bringing fresh 
 water to the district from  Great Falls on the Potomac River. Meigs embraced 
both assignments and quickly became a Davis favorite.
In the four years that they worked together, Davis, Meigs, and Walter 
defined the Capitol for posterity. Meigs, the army engineer, believed in build-
ing  things to last. He faced the new wings with thicker, heavier, and more 
durable marble than Walter and Fillmore had envisioned, mandated that 
new columns be made from one- piece marble monoliths, had win dows and 
doorframes made of iron instead of wood, and ordered the sash cords to be 
fashioned from wire rope instead of hemp. All of this cost much more money 
than had been originally predicted, but Meigs wanted the best and Davis 
agreed with him and was willing to pay for it. And Congress, cajoled by 
20See Montgomery C. Meigs, Capitol Builder: The Shorthand Journals of Montgomery C. 
Meigs, 1853–1859, 1861, ed. Wendy Wolff (Washington, D.C., 2001), p. 32.
206    Guy Gugliotta
Walter, earnestly proselytized by Meigs, and berated when necessary by 
Davis, appropriated the money.
Not every thing was easy. Meigs deci ded to change Walter’s original 
second- floor design by moving the Senate and House chambers to the inte-
rior of the new wings. Each would be enclosed, without win dows, and would 
have to be heated and ventilated artificially. No longer exposed to street 
noise and natu ral light, the new Congress would lose some of the raucous 
openness that had characterized it for sixty years. Instead, the new cham-
bers would be quieter, more intimate, clubby— and dignified. The design 
was controversial for de cades, but it was an effect that Davis liked. As a 
senator he argued against allowing lobbyists, cabinet members, and ambas-
sadors inside the chamber and wanted them confined in rooms set aside for 
their use.21 His views did not prevail at first, but they did  later. Davis wanted 
government that was more formal, and the new chambers moved it in that 
direction.
Meigs’s other key design decision was to abandon the austere neoclassic, 
whitewashed interiors favored by Walter and Fillmore in  favor of an opu-
lent Pompeiian style epitomized by the elaborate frescoes and wall decora-
tions of his chosen resident artist, Italian immigrant Constantino Brumidi 
(fig. 6), who had trained at the Vatican. The work of Brumidi and his as-
sistants gave the interior of the new Capitol wings (especially the Senate 
wing) spectacular dazzle, bordering on, and perhaps at times crossing the 
line into, excess. Protestant lawmakers clucked their disapproval, but throngs 
of tourists and congressional families visited the extension to see Brumidi’s 
paintings or watch him and his acolytes at work. One Brumidi– designed 
committee room was such a popu lar spot that the House Speaker had to 
keep a permanent guard on duty to manage the multitudes.22
Controversy mattered  little to Davis, who ran roughshod over all oppo-
sition, brazenly claiming at one point in his annual message to Congress 
that it was Congress that had chosen this “higher style” of decoration for its 
new wings.23 This was a patent lie. Davis and Meigs chose it, and consulted 
no one.
21Congressional Globe, Jan. 10, 1859, 35th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 288–90.
22Meigs, Capitol Builder, pp. 389, 429.
23Documentary History, p. 664.
Fig. 6. Photo graph of Constantino Brumidi, ca. 1855–65. (Brady­ Handy Photo graph Col­
lection, Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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By mid-1854 the triumvirate was building a colossus, and Congress could 
like it or not. Then Walter gave lawmakers an overriding reason to embrace 
the proj ect. When members of Congress returned  after the midyear recess 
in December 1854, they saw a seven- foot- long color drawing tacked to the 
wall outside the first- floor Capitol Extension office. It showed the new wings 
completed, with elegantly clad ladies and gentlemen in the foreground climb-
ing the eastern stairs, arriving in fancy coaches, or conversing in groups.
But in place of the old, leaky worn- out wooden dome, Walter had 
drawn a spectacular cast- iron replacement stretching to the sky with a col-
onnade, a row of high win dows, a tapered top, and a statue—as yet 
undefined— standing at the pinnacle (fig. 7). It was a power ful image, as 
Meigs found out when he walked a group of congressmen past it, hinting 
that the dome was a  future possibility— once the wings  were finished. Why 
not build it now? the congressmen asked.24 The dome and Walter’s draw-
ing, perhaps, had for the first time given members of Congress the op-
portunity to see exactly how im mense and how spectacular their new 
headquarters was  going to be. And Walter, who knew his audience, had 
put them in the picture. They  were the top- hatted dignitaries lingering 
with their beautiful wives on the staircase. With the dome on the drawing 
board, the Capitol became a congressional necessity and started to become 
a national monument.
All of this occurred at a time when the country’s tenuous unity was rap-
idly crumbling. Pierce was weak, and his administration was dominated by 
the disastrous piece of legislation known as the Kansas- Nebraska Act. Re-
fusing to take a stand on  whether states- to-be would have slavery, Congress 
deci ded to leave the decision up to the settlers— a notion known as “popu-
lar sovereignty.” No sooner had the act been signed into law than rival gangs 
of proslavery Missourians and armed free- state settlers streamed into Kan-
sas Territory to impose their  will.
The result was the national catastrophe known as “Bleeding Kansas.” 
The Whigs, already split over slavery,  were finished, but Kansas cost the 
Demo crats most of their Northern support and left the party in the hands 
of increasingly hardline Southerners. Antislavery Northerners formed the 
Republican Party, which had no Southern support. The sectional schism 
had opened wide. In one five- day stretch during late May 1856, abolitionist 
24Meigs, Capitol Builder, p. 164.
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firebrand Senator Charles Sumner gave a vicious speech against slavery’s 
defenders, attacking two senators by name. The next day proslavery gun-
men wrecked the town of Lawrence, Kansas, an antislavery stronghold. The 
day  after that, South Carolina Representative Preston S. Brooks, a cousin 
of one of the senators denounced by Sumner, nearly beat Sumner to death 
on the Senate floor with a cane. And two nights  later, abolitionist John Brown 
and his followers hacked five proslavery settlers to death with broadswords.
Although Davis had long opposed what he called “squatter sovereignty,” 
he was nevertheless instrumental in getting Pierce to support the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act. He also did nothing when old school chum and former 
Missouri Senator David R. Atchison wrote him a letter promising to “shoot, 
burn and hang” antislavery settlers.25 And he sent a message of solidarity 
to a group of South Carolinians who  were putting on a banquet to celebrate 
Brooks’s caning of Sumner.26 As secretary of war he did not comment di-
rectly on the chaos embracing the country, but the  middle ground evapo-
rated during the Pierce administration, and Davis bears some responsibility 
for helping it happen.
Davis’s views on slavery also played a role in the odd events surround-
ing the se lection of a design for the statue of Freedom. Meigs had given the 
25Quoted in William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, vol. 2, Secessionists Triumphant, 
1854–1861 (New York, 2007), pp. 72–73.
26Davis to South Carolina Citizens, Sept. 22, 1856, in Crist et al., Papers of Jefferson 
Davis, 6:44.
Fig. 7. “Original Design of New Dome on the U.S. Capitol,” by Thomas U. Walter, 
1854. This period photo graph of the lost seven- foot- long drawing of the architect’s pro-
posed new cast- iron dome attracted much attention when it hung in Walter’s office. 
(Architect of the Capitol)
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contract to Thomas Crawford, an American sculptor living in Rome, and 
Crawford had produced the figure of a  woman wearing a laurel wreath in 
her hair that both Davis and Meigs approved. Meigs, however, needed the 
statue to stand on a pedestal so she would not be bolted directly to the top 
of the dome and asked Crawford to modify the design. Instead, Crawford 
sent back an entirely new Freedom— a gorgeous, wraithlike figure wearing 
a “liberty cap,” the symbol from classic antiquity of a manumitted slave 
(fig. 8). Davis, as Meigs knew, did not like liberty caps, an opinion he said 
was an anachronism in Amer i ca, a country where  people “ were always 
 free, not freedmen.”27 This came from a man who owned one hundred slaves 
himself in a country that, in all, held four million  people in bondage. Meigs, 
who was against slavery but a dutiful subordinate, sent Crawford a non-
committal letter passing on Davis’s opinion, taking no position of his own 
and leaving Crawford to figure out by himself what to do. Meigs clearly did 
not want his own bureaucratic fingerprints on the decision. The final design, 
approved by Davis and Meigs (fig. 9), was a robust nineteen- foot Indian 
princess– Roman goddess with a buckskin skirt, classical drapery above the 
waist, Eu ro pean features, and a bird purporting to be an American ea gle 
sitting on her head with its mouth open. Freedom Triumphant in War and Peace, 
bolted in place atop the Capitol dome during the depths of the Civil War, 
was the design preferred by the president of the Confederacy.
The advent of new president James Buchanan in 1857 brought no relief 
from the po liti cal crisis. Buchanan, a  career politician, public servant, and 
Pennsylvanian, was prob ably the only Demo crat of stature still relatively 
unblemished by the slavery controversy, having spent the Pierce years as 
U.S. ambassador to  Great Britain. Still, it was clear that the party would 
have  great difficulty finding a consensus candidate in 1860. Failure to do so 
would give the Republicans a substantial opening, and if their candidate 
won, secession by at least some Southern states was all but certain.
Buchanan’s task was to find a way out of this mess, and he wagered his 
presidency on the Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in the case of Dred 
Scott, a Missouri slave suing for his freedom. In  later years, the Dred Scott 
ruling would earn notoriety for holding that slaves “had no rights which the 
white man is bound to re spect,” but the more trenchant finding at the time 
27Meigs, Capitol Builder, p. 66.
Fig. 8. “Statue of Freedom maquette, for the dome of the U.S. Capitol, T. Crawford, 
sculptor, Rome, Oct. 1855,” photo graph by Robert Macpherson. This design met with 
Jefferson Davis’s disapproval. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
Fig. 9. Crawford’s final design for the statue of Freedom replaced the liberty cap (see 
fig. 8) with an ea gle’s head and feathers. The plaster model from which the statue was 
cast in bronze was displayed for many years in the Old Hall of the House of Represen-
tatives in the Capitol, as seen in this photo graph created ca. 1859–78. (Library of Congress 
Prints and Photo graphs Division)
A National Icon Comes of Age    213
was that Congress had no right to exclude slavery from the territories.28 
Buchanan expected Dred Scott to defuse the Kansas crisis by providing a 
comprehensive  legal solution that would trump sectional politics.
Instead, Republicans  were outraged, regarding Dred Scott as a  legal sub-
terfuge cooked up by Buchanan and the court to give slavery the advan-
tage in any territorial dispute, and the decision triggered an economic panic 
 later in the year. The Buchanan administration, having painted itself into 
a corner in its opening days, spent most of the rest of its time in a futile at-
tempt to pass a proslavery constitution for Kansas.
Apart from this policy debacle, Buchanan performed as an old- style pol, 
big on deal- making, patronage, and cronyism. He was also an entertainer 
of note, whose fancy parties, as the country’s woes deepened, marked a Nero- 
like contrast to the austerity of the equally ineffectual Pierce, a recovering 
alcoholic who wandered his White House neighborhood at night looking for 
a cup of coffee and chitchat at the  houses of old friends like Davis.
Pierce’s departure prompted Davis to make a smooth, preplanned tran-
sition back to the Senate, where he acquired a reputation for moderation 
in the slavery dispute at a time when many of his Southern colleagues 
 were daily threatening secession. The congressional atmosphere was becom-
ing so rancorous that lawmakers from the diff er ent sections could scarcely 
speak civilly to one another. Davis’s ability to mute his tone as the crisis ad-
vanced in  these last prewar years prob ably gave him the stature that eventu-
ally won him the Confederate presidency. One of his best friends during the 
Buchanan administration was New York abolitionist William H. Seward, 
Abraham Lincoln’s leading rival for the 1860 Republican presidential 
nomi nation.
Despite the continued presence of all its members, the Capitol Extension 
triumvirate was not nearly as power ful in the Buchanan years. The princi-
pal reason was a sharp rift between Meigs and Walter, whose monstrous egos 
could no longer maintain the uneasy equilibrium that had guided them for 
years. Meigs enraged Walter by altering the inscriptions on early Walter 
drawings to give himself more credit for their execution. Walter enraged 
Meigs by plotting to have the Buchanan administration fire him. Meigs 
had Davis’s help, but Walter was allied with new Secretary of War John B. 
28“The Dred Scott Decision,” Digital History ID 293, http:// www . digitalhistory . uh 
. edu / disp _ textbook . cfm ? smtID​=​3&psid​=​293.
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Floyd of  Virginia, a notorious po liti cal hack but also a close Buchanan 
crony.29 Meigs eventually lost the  battle and left the Capitol in late 1859.
Despite this intrigue, the Capitol Extension in  these last, grim prewar 
years began to acquire a charisma it would never lose. The mystique prob-
ably claimed Walter first. When he began working in Washington, he had 
maintained his Philadelphia practice and had taken on several outside jobs. 
In an 1854 letter to one of his sons he said he had abandoned every thing 
 else to commit himself to the Capitol full time.30 Meigs was right  behind 
him. He earned only $1,800 per year as an army captain when he began 
working on the proj ect and needed a $300 yearly stipend from his  father, a 
well- to-do Philadelphia doctor, to make ends meet. But in 1854 he turned 
down job offers to dig a canal in Baltimore for $3,500 per year and to run 
a lead mine in North Carolina for $5,000 per year. He was in charge of the 
“greatest work of a civil engineer in the country,” he wrote in his diary, and 
would not give it up.31
For Davis, the enthusiasm never waned, and during the Buchanan years, 
his congressional colleagues joined him. The new House had gone into ser-
vice in late 1857. Its acoustics  were widely praised, and by themselves  were 
enough to term the new wing a success; but the lack of sunlight and the fancy 
Brumidi- inspired decorations  were a bit too avant- garde for many members. 
The new Senate, with a more muted decor, opened to high praise from the 
tenants in early 1859 and won generally favorable press reviews. By the end 
of the year, both “new” chambers  were well on their way to becoming, once 
again, simply “the Senate” and “the House.”
In 1860, with Davis directing legislative traffic, the Senate effortlessly and 
almost urgently passed appropriations ensuring that  there would be enough 
money to finish the dome, to move the Supreme Court into the old Senate 
chamber, and to comfortably fund Capitol construction through the arrival 
of the new administration the following year.
In 1859, the entire South Carolina congressional del e ga tion, which would 
abandon Congress within two months of Lincoln’s election, successfully 
lobbied the Buchanan administration to ensure that fellow South Carolin-
ian Clark Mills won the contract to cast Freedom at his new foundry on the 
29See Gugliotta, Freedom’s Cap, pp. 274–90, for a detailed discussion of the feud. See 
Allen, History of the Capitol, pp. 268–74, for another view.
30Walter to Thomas Walter, Aug. 19, 1854, Walter Collection, roll 4137.
31Meigs, Capitol Builder, p. 82.
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district’s eastern edge.32 And during House debate on the 1860 Capitol ap-
propriations for Capitol construction, Georgia Representative Joshua Hill 
told colleagues he would “never hesitate” when offered a chance to pro-
mote the “embellishment of the Capitol of my country, to vote for it with 
plea sure.” He resigned from Congress in 1861  after Georgia seceded.33
Meigs returned to the Capitol in the opening days of the Lincoln admin-
istration, reclaiming his post as engineer in charge and, with the help of for-
mer Senator Seward, now Lincoln’s secretary of state, becoming the Union 
army’s leading supply officer. He tried but failed to fire Walter, who had the 
ear of Secretary of War Simon Cameron, a fellow Philadelphian. Then, on 
May 19, 1861, Meigs shut down Capitol construction altogether, citing chang-
ing priorities prompted by the war.
For the first three months of the war, with Congress in recess, the 
Capitol— the new Senate and House chambers, the congressional offices, 
and even the rotunda— served as a transient barracks for newly mustered 
regiments of Union soldiers on their way to  battle. The Commissary Gen-
eral opened a bakery in the basement, and soot from the ovens wafted out 
the west front win dows and back into the Library of Congress stacks. Mess 
cooks left sides of meat and other perishables on the tiled floors of the com-
mittee rooms, and idle soldiers spent their days holding mock debates in the 
Senate and House chambers, swinging back and forth over the rotunda, and 
using  every dark corner in the building for a privy. The worst of this had 
been cleaned up by the time Congress convened for an emergency session 
in July, but it was not  until early 1862 when lawmakers took a close look at 
the building— still needing completion of the dome and a lot of exterior 
work. Walter had sat on his thumbs briefly in Philadelphia at the beginning 
of the war, but by the time the special session began, he and some of his 
contractors began lobbying the congressional leadership for a resumption 
of construction. This, Walter and his co- conspirators argued, could most 
easily be accomplished through the  simple expedient of transferring 
stewardship of the proj ect from the War Department back to the Interior 
32Walter to J. Ames, Jan. 1, 1860, Walter Collection, roll 4139.
33Documentary History, p. 768.
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Department, where it rightfully belonged and where it had been before 
the traitor Davis hijacked it in 1853.34
This was not a hard argument to make. Lawmakers had gotten the troops 
out of the building, but the bakery lingered for months, wearing out the 
army’s welcome. Meigs’s plan to put the Capitol Extension on ice  until  after 
the war generated  little enthusiasm. The building was not finished, had been 
sorely used in recent months, and, at a minimum, needed maintenance. 
Meigs had too much to do, crafting a supply system for a Union army that 
had 16,000 men in 1861 and would grow to more than two million over the 
next four years.
But most impor tant for Congress, finishing the Capitol made a statement 
about Union resources, Union resolve, and the  future of the United States. 
On March 25, 1862, Vermont Senator Solomon Foot, president pro tempore 
of the Senate and chair of the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, 
made the argument, telling his colleagues to vote for a resolution transfer-
ring the Capitol back to Interior Department jurisdiction and resuming 
construction:
This national Capitol of ours, in its pres ent condition, instead of being the 
boast and the pride of the country, instead of being an ornament and a credit 
to the country, stands to- day,  after 12 years, an unfinished and an unsightly 
pile. . . .  [W]e are strong enough yet, thank God, to put down this rebellion 
and to put up this our Capitol at the same time. And when the rebel lion 
 shall have been suppressed—as suppressed it soon  will be; when this war  shall 
have been terminated—as terminated it soon  will be; and when this Union 
of ours  shall have been restored—as restored it soon  will be; it  will furnish a 
fitting and appropriate occasion to celebrate that welcome event by crown-
ing the American Capitol with the statue of the Goddess of Freedom.
The joint resolution passed both  houses of Congress with fewer than ten 
votes in opposition.35
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